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This thesis seeks to encourage an anthropology of psychology through an ethnographic 
account of evidence-based psychological therapy in the United Kingdom. It examines the 
‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ (IAPT) service established in 2008 as part of the 
National Health Service (NHS) and is based on 18 months of fieldwork conducted between 
2016 and 2018 amongst mental health professionals and therapists-in-training. Through the 
invention of IAPT, ‘Cognitive Behavioural Therapy’ (CBT) and other cognate therapies such 
as ‘Mindfulness’ have become a hallmark of ‘evidence-based’ psychological healthcare. This 
research takes up the question of their acclaimed scientific status and asks how, and with what 
effects, psychological therapies have become conceivable and workable within the framework 
of evidence-based medicine (EBM).  
Divided into six chapters, the thesis offers a series of ethnographic reflections on some of 
the effects of the institutionalisation of evidence-based psychological therapy and the scientific 
persuasions that have made it possible. This research thus investigates the principles underlying 
psychological therapy, how they are conveyed through training and conferences, and how 
practitioners make sense of them in their everyday work. It examines some of the histories and 
logics that underscore the invention of IAPT, how psychological therapies align with dominant 
discourses in biomedicine concerning treatment and evidence, and some of the assumptions 
concerning ideas of selfhood that are implicit in them. We will see how professionals acquire 
particular skills and sensitivities in order to become therapists, how within specific professional 
contexts they debate and disagree with each other, yet also how they produce certain forms of 
critique and contextualisation familiar to social scientists. The ethnography shows that whilst 
psychological therapies – from ‘CBT’ to ‘Mindfulness’ – have become recognised as effective 
interventions for a range of mental health problems, they have also generated their own 
empirical tensions and uncertainties. We follow these ethnographic realities as we move from 
some of the ambitions and problems of the IAPT service to the contexts of research, education 
and training of therapists. 
The thesis argues that the epistemic success of CBT as the benchmark model of 
psychological healthcare in the UK rests on a persuasive, recursive move: CBT introduces 
 4 
accountability and measurement at the heart of its proposed vision of mental health – enacted 
through particular therapeutic practices of self-reporting and self-inspection – and this in turn 
enables it to demonstrate its value and validity in the terms set by the conventions of ‘evidence-
based’ practice. As a result, psychotherapeutic care has been reconstituted as a highly 
manualised, standardised and quantifiable intervention. It is the quest for objectivity and 
scientific validation that requires psychological therapy to be enacted as an object of scientific 
testing and accountability by way of rendering the human subjecthood at the core of its practice 
amenable to measurement and intervention. Such an ambition is not new in psychology, as we 
shall see, but it has been revivified in new and interesting ways through the promises and 
persuasions of evidence-based psychological therapy. 
The thesis thus contributes to anthropological studies of scientific epistemologies and 
therapeutic practices and suggests a way of treating ethnographically common psychological 
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notes on the text 
 
For the sake of anonymity, all the names of people encountered during my fieldwork have been 
replaced by pseudonyms with the exception of public figures, such as clinical psychologist 
David M. Clark and economist Richard Layard, and other published advocates and 
commentators cited in the text. Obvious identifying details of the university and community 
centre featuring in the text have been omitted in order to maintain the anonymity of staff, 
students, volunteers and others I worked with. It should also be noted that the ‘service users’ 
and ‘patients’ referred to in the text were encountered in social contexts outside of the National 
Health Service (NHS); I did not conduct research inside the NHS nor with NHS patients. 
Written or oral consent from participants was obtained wherever it was deemed appropriate 
and needed. This research project has followed the ethical guidelines of the Association of 
Social Anthropologists in the UK and Commonwealth (ASA) and received clearance from the 
PhD Committee of the Department of Social Anthropology in June 2016. 
Some of the quotations in this thesis are based on recorded conversations and some of them 
have been edited slightly in a way that preserves both coherence and clarity; readers read them 
not as spoken language but as texts, and the rules of those two modes of expression differ: it is 
not my intention to make people seem less fluent than they appear in person, and to quote 
verbatim without any editing would have done exactly that.  
The text in this thesis is set in 12-point Minion Pro font, with chapter titles and headings in 
28-point and 14-point Gill Sans Nova font, and subheadings in 12-point Gill Sans MT font. 













Psychology has increasingly come to occupy a central position in British mental healthcare. 
With the institutionalisation of evidence-based medicine (EBM) from the 1990s onwards, the 
scientific evidence base of psychological therapy has come under scrutiny. ‘Evidence-based 
psychological therapy’ is now deemed important in the provision of mental healthcare in the 
UK.  
This thesis draws on fieldwork with mental health professionals and therapists-in-training. 
It is an anthropological study of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), with reference also to 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) or ‘mindfulness’, in the institutionalised form 
it has taken as part of the National Health Service (NHS) programme called Improving Access 
to Psychological Therapies, commonly referred to by its acronym ‘IAPT’,1 launched in 2008. We 
are dealing here, therefore, with some recent developments in British mental healthcare. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter takes us straight into the professional 
world of IAPT therapists in the context of a South London community where the IAPT service 
has recently been introduced. The second chapter offers an historical interlude as we follow 
some key historiographical moments in the histories of psychology and psychotherapy before 
arriving at the invention of the IAPT programme. The third chapter takes us further into the 
circumstances of IAPT; it describes some common critiques of psychological therapy and 
examines the ethnographic and analytical significance of such critiques. In the fourth chapter, 
we move from the IAPT service to the training of IAPT therapists and explore what it means 
to learn to work therapeutically according to the model of CBT. The fifth chapter invites us to 
the conferences in which evidence-based therapy is discussed amongst professionals, and in 
which a ‘real science’ of psychotherapy is self-consciously pursued and defined. In the sixth and 
final chapter, we arrive in the therapeutic practice of psychological therapy: CBT meets 
mindfulness here, and we find our selves hovering between different models of the mind. We 
end with some reflections on ‘reflective thought’.  
We are thus examining evidence-based psychological therapy through some aspects of 
professionals’ daily work, as well as through the training, conferences and courses that make it 
possible; in following this, we will be watching the pursuit of scientific status in the context of 
 
1 Pronounced ‘ʌɪˈapt’.  
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some of the histories and theories of psychotherapeutics more generally. We are in the world 
of mental healthcare and the scientific persuasions of psychology. 
 
Fieldwork 
Situating the thesis: some contexts and concerns 
This thesis is the result of several years of fieldwork carried out in contexts where ‘mental 
healthcare’ is sought and practised. The research for this thesis is in part a continuation of 
previous projects. My first foray of fieldwork into the field of mental healthcare began in 2012 
when I carried out three months of ethnographic research for my undergraduate dissertation 
at the Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge. This fieldwork, although necessarily 
brief, presented an account of clinical psychologists in Denmark and explored some common 
aspects of their clinical practices. This work examined notions summarised as ‘the clinic’, ‘the 
client’ and ‘care’ which underpinned the therapeutic concerns and contradictions of this 
professional world (Bruun 2013). The summer of fieldwork in the clinic that I spent studying 
for this proved exciting but also tremendously difficult. ‘Access’ became an issue. No one, it 
seemed, and especially not the psychologists, wanted the intrusion of an outsider. Access was 
especially limited because psychotherapy is a practice highly self-aware of its therapeutic space: 
of the intimate, vulnerable and strictly confidential relation between the clinician and client. 
There can be no third-party observer in the consultation room. My very presence would 
collapse the practice I had set out to study. The methodological limitation here marks out the 
field of psychology and the difficulties of conducting ethnographic research in this area. It also 
points to a significant ethnographic boundary: in the study of scientific and therapeutic 
practices, questions of access can carve out ‘the field’ (Candea 2007). 
The recognition of the restrictions imposed on fieldwork ‘access’ in clinical contexts meant 
that any follow-up work had to be focussed not on the consultation practice per se but instead 
on the therapeutic training in some form. I tried this out through research in the UK looking 
at training in ‘play therapy’ – a type of psychodynamic child therapy (Bruun 2014). It seemed 
that the training offered another ethnographic starting point that my first fieldwork in the 
psychologists’ clinic had not so easily allowed.2  
 
2 Negotiating ‘access’ and ‘presence’ is not, of course, a unique circumstance of anthropological fieldwork, 
but more frequently so perhaps for medical anthropologists who often have to deal with critical issues 
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The fieldwork for this current thesis benefits therefore from the methodological sensibilities 
gained during earlier ethnographic work where fieldwork presence was often a matter of 
concern – for the people involved as well as myself, albeit for different reasons.  
All fieldwork is, we might say, ‘multi-sited’ in one sense or another (Falzon 2009). My own 
research has involved several ‘sites’ – but all connected by the governance of ‘mental healthcare’ 
implicated in the NHS programme of IAPT. My research has involved some moving between 
different field sites. Shifting between contexts meant shifting between different identities as an 
ethnographer and adapting various ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ positions that the fieldwork 
afforded. I shifted between working in a community centre based in London to following a 
postgraduate degree in CBT at a university in Northern England; in-between these 
commitments, I travelled from bustling conferences with hundreds of attendants to tranquil 
therapy sessions with only a small number of participants – each field ‘site’ demanding its own 
ethnographic sensitivities. During the university training course in CBT, I participated as a 
fellow ‘student’ as far as this was possible.3 In the South London Community Centre where I 
lived and volunteered, I was unanimously included as a member of staff, in a volunteering 
position as a coordinator of a ‘wellbeing group’; I was expected to participate alongside other 
staff members in weekly meetings, training events, and administrative tasks. In between all of 
this, when attending a range of conferences, I was more or less unproblematically participating 
as an ‘anthropologist’. Finally, I participated in a range of CBT therapy sessions, including two 
mindfulness courses, offered to ‘the public’ by local IAPT services.4 
There are perhaps a couple of important points to address here concerning what tend in the 
social sciences to be subsumed under two qualifying categories often referred to as ‘research 
ethics’ and ‘methodology’ (with some mode of ‘reflexivity’ featuring in one of the two).  
The first point concerns my own professional stance as an ethnographer. Whilst my 
fieldwork involved psychotherapeutic training and numerous hours of participation in therapy 
sessions and courses, I deliberately never sought to qualify as a therapist, nor did I think of 
 
relating to ‘patient confidentiality’ and other aspects of clinical ‘ethics’ as a prerequisite for any kind of 
ethnographic research (Simpson 2011). On ‘negotiated’ participant-observation in clinical settings, see Wind 
(2008). 
3 Although I was often identified – and given a status – as a ‘visiting researcher’, thus changing my position 
as a fellow therapist-in-training, see Chapter 4. 
4 Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy or ‘MBCT’ is the official label for what is often referred colloquially 
to as simply ‘mindfulness’ in UK mental healthcare services. 
 14 
myself as one. I did not, in other words, work as a psychotherapist as part of the fieldwork, nor 
did I pretend to have the necessary skills required to do so. As a result, I was never required to 
commit professionally to psychotherapy or any psychotherapeutic school, theoretical or 
otherwise.  
The second point is that I did not attempt to pass as a ‘patient’ either, as a way of gaining 
better access, as it were, to psychotherapy (i.e., clinical assessments, therapy sessions and 
consultations). I do not consider it a necessary condition for fieldwork to assume the role of a 
patient in order to study psychotherapy; I am making this point explicit here, as many 
anthropologists suggested me to do so. Such expectations were not unanticipated as medical 
anthropology has often appeared to assume a richer ethnographic reality surrounding 
‘patients’, with medical anthropologists often writing as if representing the ‘patient perspective’ 
or experience. This tendency is perhaps not so surprising either since we know that social 
anthropology also tended historically to find supposedly denser versions of ‘culture’ amongst 
people deemed at the peripheries, geographical or otherwise. For example, even when ‘Europe’ 
was finally established as a pertinent area of ethnographic study, anthropologists still travelled 
to Europe’s perceived peripheries to find the ‘real people’ (on this general point, see Ardener 
1987; McDonald 1987; Herzfeld 1989). Similar metaphorical peripheries have had a stronghold 
of a medical anthropology finding its ‘real people’ in the category of ‘patients’ (rather than, say, 
professionals, policymakers, and administrators). Although patients were necessarily 
implicated in my fieldwork, I decided to attend and participate in therapy sessions and 
workshops as a member of ‘the public’ or in my capacity as a ‘researcher’.5   
The difficulties of access and fieldwork presence in psychotherapeutic contexts – in clinics, 
institutes, training programmes, therapy sessions, etc. – have been duly noted by a few 
anthropologists who have previously undertaken research on psychoanalysis (cf. Gellner 1985; 
Kirsner 1998) and psychodynamic psychotherapy (cf. Luhrmann 2000; Davies 2009). In most 
cases, fieldwork in psychotherapeutic contexts has been achieved on the basis of the 
anthropologist’s additional professional position as a psychologist, psychotherapist or similar 
accreditation that allows for an undisputed ‘insider’ status in disciplinary terms. Ernest Gellner 
was famously unsuccessful on several occasions in gaining permission to study the British 
Psychoanalytic Society, turned down by the then President of the Society, Donald Winnicott. 
 
5 I always identified myself as an anthropologist and stated the purpose of my attendance whenever it was 
relevant or otherwise required. 
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The resistance to Gellner’s proposal appeared to be largely due to his principal status as an 
anthropologist and the fact that he had no affiliation to or credibility in the psychoanalytic 
profession (Gellner 1985). Gellner’s position was thus utterly unlike that of Douglas Kirsner’s 
(1998), and later James Davies’ (2009), both of whom undertook fieldwork in psychoanalytic 
institutions in their positions as professional therapists (Kirsner as a clinical psychologist and 
Davies as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist).  
Tanya Luhrmann (2000) also notes the constraints of her fieldwork in her ethnography of 
American psychiatry, reporting how her father’s status as a well-known psychiatrist and 
eventually her own training in psychoanalysis afforded her access to people and their 
professional worlds that would otherwise have been unavailable to her. Luhrmann states clearly 
that her intention was to study and write about psychoanalysts as an anthropologist, but it is 
also clear from her ethnography that her capacity to do so depended at times on taking up and 
performing the very professional position of the people she studied.  
In my own fieldwork, I have not followed the methodological route implicated in the 
ethnographies cited above. Neither was there any readily available context in which I could 
simply assume the role of ‘the anthropologist’ going about doing ‘participant observation’ in a 
more or less straightforward way amongst the people and practices I had set out to study. 
Instead, I found ways to negotiate fieldwork in each context which did not require me to attain 
or assume a professional commitment akin to the people I studied.  
It was through my earlier fieldwork that I had become aware of the notion of ‘evidence-
based psychological therapy’ – a notion that had turned out increasingly to be an issue for the 
child psychotherapists whose training I had followed; the type of therapy they practised had 
apparently been unable to achieve an ‘evidence-base’ within the framework of EBM, thus 
excluding it from the category of psychotherapies deemed ‘empirically supported’ by scientific 
research. I learned soon thereafter that a different practice of psychotherapy called Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy or ‘CBT’ had successfully claimed this label for itself. 
This work thus follows on from some of the conclusions of my earlier work by taking up the 
question of CBT’s acclaimed scientific status. It does so not by way of seeking to confirm or 
deny any claims to scientificity but asks instead how, and with what effects, psychotherapy in 




The field sites 
The ethnography presented in this thesis consists, in a sense, of two ethnographies. The first is 
an ethnography of the professional world of psychological healthcare (primarily in the context 
of IAPT) which takes us from communities to conferences; the second ethnography is about 
the education and training of CBT therapists. These seemingly separate worlds form part of the 
same ethnographic reality of ‘evidence-based psychological therapy’. CBT therapists graduate 
from IAPT-accredited university courses and psychological healthcare provided by the NHS 
consists primarily of different types of CBT provided by these therapists. ‘Evidence-based 
psychological therapy’ links university courses to psychological services and connects 
professional mental health conferences and policymaking with community centres and 
charities. 
By pointing out the connections between my fieldwork locations (and indeed the coherence 
of the fieldwork itself), I do not mean to suggest a new ethnographic holism. Neither do I 
pretend to offer a panoramic ethnography of ‘British mental healthcare’ or even ‘evidence-
based psychological therapy’. My approach is more unassuming and suggests instead that 
connections between a range of field sites (and fieldwork experiences) ‘do not add up to a whole 
but to a journey’ (Candea 2010: 2). This ethnography is an account of such a journey traced, in 
which connections are necessarily always partial and locations arbitrary (Strathern 2004; 
Candea 2007). 
This thesis then draws on fieldwork in and around more than one context in which 
evidence-based psychological therapy is sought. The following chapters set out these contexts 
in more detail. When I started fieldwork in the summer of 2016, I moved into a community 
centre where I volunteered as a coordinator of a ‘wellbeing group’. The South London 
Community Centre6 where I lived and worked for over a year was considered to be located in 
one of the poorer areas of London, a neighbour to the old Aylesbury Council Estate: this is a 
part of South London deemed notorious for its ‘socio-economic’ deprivation (see e.g. Exworthy 
et al. 2003). According to the NHS Foundation Trust of the region, it is also an area that has 
some of the highest rates of ‘mental illness’ and other health problems (NHS Digital 2018). 
When I moved into the Centre in August 2016, the administration had just received funding 
 
6 I refer to this community centre throughout the thesis by the pseudonym of the ‘South London Community 
Centre’ or simply ‘the Centre’.  
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from the local NHS Trust to employ in-house psychotherapists to help increase access to the 
IAPT service.  
In the meantime, I was also granted official permission to follow the training of mental 
health professionals at a postgraduate course in CBT. The director of the CBT course, a 
practising psychologist and lecturer, invited me to live with his family in the North of England 
where the University is based. I met the director, Philip, through a mutual friend in London as 
I was carrying out fieldwork on psychodynamic child therapy. When I later returned to 
Cambridge to begin my doctoral research, I was thoroughly intrigued by the idea of ‘evidence-
based’ psychotherapy; CBT was everywhere evoked as a form of psychotherapy based on 
scientific evidence, supposedly unlike other kinds of psychotherapy. I eventually moved to live 
with Philip and his family in Cumbria, from where he also ran a private clinic as a CBT 
therapist. Having previously worked as a therapist in the IAPT service, Philip’s main 
occupation was now as a university lecturer, teaching and supervising students in psychological 
therapies; he told me how he had trained ‘hundreds of IAPT therapists over the past ten years’ 
and many more CBT therapists over the past twenty years of teaching. I met his colleagues and 
students and I sat in on their classes, seminars, and clinical supervisions. 
In between my commitments in South London and my training in the North of England, I 
attended conferences. Most of the conferences took place in big cities: London, Birmingham, 
and Manchester; others were held in Lancaster, Cambridge, and York. The conferences were 
diverse but related through common concerns with ‘mental health’ and ‘evidence-based’ 
practice. I attended professional conferences in clinical psychology, as well as several specialist 
conferences on the research, training, and clinical provision related to a range of evidence-
based psychological therapies: most notably, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, Behavioural 
Activation, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy, and digitalised CBT-based online courses 
(‘computerised CBT’ or ‘cCBT’). There is also a growing market of ‘public conferences’ in the 
UK, many of which I attended. These were usually one-day NHS-related conferences 
promoting specific ‘themes’ such as the clinical application of research, new policies and their 
implementation, and strategies for outcome evaluation. 
We might refer in institutional terms to these particular contexts of fieldwork – in which 
psychological therapies are sought and put to work – as a university, a charity, and a national 
healthcare service. ‘The conference’, as another aggregate of field sites, brought some of these 
contexts together, and the people and problems in them. Conferences, universities, charities, 
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and public services, including the governing and regulatory practices implicated in this 
complex of institutions, have all played their part in defining and shaping ‘evidence-based 
psychological therapy’. 
 
Categories in action 
The terminology that features in this thesis requires some brief clarification. We will then be 
seeing certain terms or categories in action ethnographically – as part of people’s own 
definitional realities (cf. Ardener 1982; Chapman 1978; McDonald 1989). For now, I touch here 
on three terminological points.  
First, when dealing with ‘evidence-based psychotherapy’ as an ethnographic category, one 
immediate issue is that ‘psychotherapy’ in the singular can be misleading; much in the same 
way as we (‘the anthropologists’) might suggest that there is no one single practice or school of 
‘anthropology’ (Candea 2018a).The singular ‘it’ is the result of reconciling multiplicity in spaces 
of coordination such as journals, courses, seminars, lecture rooms and conferences. 
In British mental healthcare, a range of theories, techniques, and interventions that mental 
health professionals recognise as ‘psychotherapeutic’ or ‘psychological’ have generally been 
brought together under a single banner of ‘psychotherapy’. Psychotherapy is often deployed in 
this way as an ‘umbrella term’ for multiple practices, subsuming them in a single classification.  
‘Psychotherapy’ is often used to refer to both the practice of a specific intervention as well 
as the school of thought or theory that is seen to inform this intervention. ‘Psychotherapy’ is 
also a term used to refer to a set of distinct professional disciplines (Davies 2009) self-
consciously differentiated from ‘the discipline of psychology’ (Bruun 2013). In turn, ‘the 
discipline of psychology’ comprises a range of disciplinary divisions such as ‘forensic’, ‘health’, 
‘occupational’, ‘clinical’, and so on (including their many subdivisions).  
The professional distinction between ‘psychology’ and ‘psychotherapy’ is now a common 
one in the UK, and I have seen it in action on several occasions. Clinical psychologists have 
often pointed out to me that they practise psychotherapy as part of their professional, clinical 
work, yet they are not psychotherapists in the disciplinary sense of the term. Distinctions are 
drawn up between psychotherapy as a profession (or a range of professions) versus a clinical 
practice (a type of treatment; e.g. ‘psychotherapy’ as opposed to ‘medication’). Clinical 
psychologists have also in their own accounts of their discipline been eager to draw out a 
division of labour by which they occupy the top of an educational hierarchy, followed by 
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‘psychotherapists’ and then ‘counsellors’ (and, more recently, ‘Psychological Wellbeing 
Practitioners’) at the bottom – a hierarchy actively maintained in print and in person. 7 
According to this professional hierarchy, psychotherapists usually cannot claim the title of 
‘psychologist’. (Although some psychotherapists are trained as psychologists too.)  
The second terminological point I wish to make concerns schools of thought within 
psychotherapy. Histories of psychotherapy have typically distinguished between three main 
psychotherapeutic schools of thought; these are 1) psychoanalytic and psychodynamic; 2) 
humanistic, and 3) cognitive and behavioural (see e.g. Ehrenwald 1976; Rieber 1980). Each one 
of these schools consists of a range of approaches and theoretical orientations; for example, 
‘psychodynamic psychotherapy’ refers to any psychoanalytic school seen to derive from Freud 
or any of the psychoanalytic schools after him (e.g. ‘Jungian analytical psychology’, ‘Kleinian 
object relations therapy’, ‘Lacanian psychoanalysis’); the term might also refer to the 
‘expressive’ or ‘creative arts’ psychotherapies (i.e., music therapy, movement therapy, 
psychodrama, art therapy, and play therapy). Likewise, the third school of thought referred to 
as ‘cognitive and behavioural’ itself covers a wide variety of therapeutic schools, derived in part 
from CBT, which include Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), Compassion-
Focused Therapy (CFT), Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), and many others 
(Dryden 2012).8  
Both psychotherapists and psychologists could thus be described collectively as 
‘practitioners of psychotherapy’ at the same time as we might recognise that ‘psychotherapy’ is 
a creature with myriad faces; as I have indicated, there are as many different schools and 
professions of psychotherapy as there are different ‘subdisciplines’ of psychology. (And, of 
course, not all psychologists practise psychotherapy.) It is perhaps because of this convoluted 
kinship network of ‘disciplines’, ‘practices’, ‘professions’, ‘approaches’ and ‘schools’ subsumed 
under the two broad categories of psychology and psychotherapy that a lot of confusion 
persists. 
 
7 For recent historiographical examples, see the chapters written by clinical psychologists in Hall et al. (2015) 
– an edited volume that claims to offer ‘the first history of British clinical psychology’. 
8  These latter subdisciplines are also known collectively as ‘third-wave’ therapies. The CBT literature 
distinguishes between three historical ‘waves’ of therapeutic orientations: the recent ‘third’ wave of cognitive 
and behavioural therapies is characterised by practices grounded in ‘mindfulness’, ‘compassion’ and 
‘metacognition’. 
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My third point concerns different terminological variants of evidence-based psychotherapy 
currently in circulation; the most common of these are ‘evidence-based psychological therapy’ 
(or ‘therapies’, in the plural) and ‘evidence-based therapy’ (also known as ‘EBT’). These terms 
are used to distinguish ‘evidence-based psychotherapy’ from the broader movement of 
‘evidence-based medicine’ (or ‘EBM’) from which it is said to derive (cf. Rowland & Goss 2000). 
In the following chapters, I use the terms ‘evidence-based (psycho)therapy’ and ‘evidence-
based psychological therapy’ interchangeably, as do the practitioners and professionals I did 
my fieldwork with. 
Whilst I think this brief clarification of terminology is necessary from the very outset – 
especially useful to readers who might well be unfamiliar with these common distinctions in 
British mental healthcare – this is a language of psychology which is of anthropological interest 
and it will receive further attention  in the chapters that follow. 
 
Anthropology and psychology 
To many outsiders, the discipline of psychology is still intrinsically associated with the 
psychoanalytic movement. The latter is often said to have had its heyday in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Earlier histories of British psychology and psychoanalysis – often written by 
practitioners rather than historians – tended to emphasise an historical interchange between 
psychoanalysis and psychology, dominated at times by institutional competition and 
intellectual rivalry (e.g. Ehrenwald 1976). More recently, historians of psychology have pointed 
out the inadequacies of an historiographical delineation of ‘psychology’ as constituting a 
uniform discipline vis-à-vis psychoanalysis; indeed, other ‘psy’ disciplines and technologies 
have been constitutive of both and a history of psychology has proven to be rather more 
complicated (cf. Rieber 1980; Danziger 1997; Rose 1984; Marks 2017). 
This historiography and the issues involved will not be repeated here. I have instead aimed 
to situate ‘psychology’ and ‘psychotherapy’ historically in Chapter 2 for the specific purposes 
of the thesis. Moreover, in situating this study in relation to relevant fields in anthropology 
(especially psychological anthropology, cognitive anthropology, and psychiatric 
anthropology), this thesis reflects on earlier anthropological studies whilst it seeks instead to 
contribute to a more rigorously ethnographic approach to, and understanding of, ‘psychology’ 
as it is lived and worked. 
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In the meantime, before discussing my approach in more detail, the following paragraphs 
offer some preliminary reflections on anthropology and psychology, including my own 
analytical language, after which we turn to the chapters of this thesis. 
 
From psychoanalysis to cognitive science 
Despite a great effort in the first half of the twentieth century by British psychologists to 
distance themselves from psychoanalysts,9 anthropologists have tended to treat psychology and 
psychoanalysis somewhat synonymously. This treatment was perhaps due to the fact that both 
psychoanalysts and psychologists in the early twentieth century drew heavily on the 
ethnographic work of anthropologists in their own studies of ‘human psychology’ – and vice 
versa: anthropologists had long engaged with psychoanalytic theories in dealing with their 
ethnographic material despite their critiques of those same theories (see e.g. Malinowski 
1927).10 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, psychology acquired new importance and a 
professional standing in Britain (Derksen 2000; Jones 2004). It was also in the post-war decades 
that psychoanalytic thought made another appearance in British social anthropology but this 
time in the disguise of what became known as ‘structuralism’, which Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1908–2009) had developed in France during the late 1940s and 50s (Lévi-Strauss 1963a).  
It was only much later, with the establishment of ‘cognitive science’ – the so-called ‘cognitive 
revolution’ – from the 1970s onwards, and its influence on British social anthropology, that 
‘psychology’ gradually came to occupy another conceptual space amongst anthropologists: it 
seemed as if anthropologists had moved from the mythic and symbolic universe of 
psychoanalysts (and Levi-Straussian structuralists) to the experimental laboratory of the 
cognitive scientists. In that move, some anthropologists began to challenge what to them 
appeared to be anthropology’s ignorance of the discipline of psychology and the study of ‘the 
 
9 Such efforts were primarily instigated by psychiatrists and later clinical psychologists based at the Maudsley 
Hospital and the Institute of Psychiatry in London before and after the Second World War, see Kohon 
(1986); Derksen (2000, 2001); Jones (2004); Marks (2015). 
10 Malinowski examined the Freudian Oedipus complex in the context of Trobriand kin relations and child 
development in his book Sex and Repression in Savage Society (1927), but famously dismissed any notion of 
Oedipal universality claimed by psychoanalysts of the day. Although Malinowski remained a critic of 
psychoanalysis and its ‘exorbitant claims’ throughout his career, he simultaneously acknowledged its 
contribution to important aspects of human psychology, especially its ‘open treatment of sex’ was in his 
opinion ‘of the greatest value to science’ (Malinowski 1927: vii–viii). 
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human mind’ (Blount 2011). Cognitive science equipped anthropologists with an altogether 
different attention to ‘the mind’ from that which had been pursued by anthropologists inspired 
by Malinowski and Lévi-Strauss. Importantly, it included new evolutionary theories and 
experimental approaches to an anthropology of the human mind: ‘cognitive anthropology’ was 
born (Irvine 2018). Cognitive anthropology also sought to put an end to the Durkheimian 
separation of ‘the social’ from the ‘psychological’ and ‘biological’ that had informed so much 
of anthropology.11  
It was also around this time that academic textbooks on psychology started to define 
psychology as ‘the science of mind and behaviour’ (e.g. Gross 2012 [1987]). This particular self-
definition was partly pursued in opposition to former psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic 
schools considered now ‘pseudo-scientific’.12 Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and many of the 
prominent psychoanalysts who came after him (such as Carl Gustav Jung, Melanie Klein, 
Alfred Adler, Jacques Lacan, and Wilhelm Reich – to name just a few) were confined to the 
footnotes of these textbooks and mostly discredited. Key psychoanalytic ideas were now 
increasingly seen to threaten a self-consciously ‘scientific’ psychology that sought company 
with medical science and psychiatry rather than with psychoanalytic psychotherapy.  
One striking consequence of this reputed ‘new science’ of psychology was that 
psychoanalysis was accused of having inflicted, for decades, parental blame and personal guilt 
in the therapeutic world; not only was psychoanalysis deemed profoundly unscientific by 
methodological standards, it was also rejected as morally dubious for holding patients (or their 
parents or relationships) responsible for their experience of psychological distress. An 
assertively biological psychiatry arose in its place, especially in the US (Luhrmann 2000), but 
also in the UK where a ‘neuro’-science came to the rescue. 13  Contrary to psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy, a biomedically-orientated psychiatry asserted that the disturbed or distressed 
 
11 Maurice Bloch (2012) has more recently proposed a reinvigoration of a cognitive anthropology, although 
many of his sentiments (such as his suggestions of incorporating and accounting for ‘psychology’ in 
anthropology) are not particularly new (see e.g. chapters by Boyer and Sperber in Whitehouse 2001). 
12 This is a point we return to ethnographically in Chapter 5. 
13 The constellation of psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and psychiatry and clinical psychology, on the other, 
differed significantly between the US and the UK; psychoanalytic training and practice had been central to 
American psychiatry and clinical psychology (as opposed to their British equivalents) up until the 1980s and 
it was against this institutional status of psychoanalysis that a self-consciously ‘biological’ psychiatric science 
took shape (Luhrmann 2000). In the UK, psychoanalysis never gained such institutional prominence in 
psychiatry and clinical psychology (even if it remained popular amongst well-educated people) where 
behavioural psychotherapeutics had taken the lead since the Second World War, pioneered by psychological 
research at the Maudsley Hospital in London (Marks 2015). 
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mind was a result of a biologically dysfunctional brain; it thus appeared to locate responsibility 
elsewhere, namely in the genetic make-up and biochemical mechanisms of ‘the brain’. 14 
‘Mental illnesses’ were no longer anyone’s fault: they were instead discrete ‘disorders’ that could 
be detected in ‘the brain’ of afflicted patients. Moral responsibility seemed to have been 
dispensed with; psychiatric diagnosis and intervention are necessarily ‘objective’ affairs. The 
fact that psychiatry sought to redefine itself as a discipline based firmly on scientific medicine 
means that many practitioners still feel that they are dealing with clinical matters beyond ‘moral 
definition’ (McDonald 2011). British psychology followed, for the most part, in the scientific 
footsteps of psychiatry.  
However, despite the general rejection of psychoanalysis within British psychology, it had 
nevertheless offered an important language against which psychology built its psychological 
laboratories in the UK. Psychoanalysis seemed to have come and gone but it had left behind a 
language of ‘human psychology’ that remained pervasive in British society as well as in clinical 
psychology (Danziger 1997; Rose 1989, 1996). Owed to psychoanalysis were now common 
concepts with which to talk about a perceived internal selfhood: ‘the psyche’, ‘ego’, ‘personality’, 
‘fantasy’, ‘unconscious’, ‘dissociation’, ‘motivation’, ‘repression’, ‘trauma’, and so forth.  
In the meantime, earlier generations of social anthropologists have generally tended to 
dismiss or ignore the discipline of psychology, often portraying it as an embarrassing 
descendant of Freudian psychoanalysis or the discipline of an equally problematic evolutionism 
and reductionism, as in the case of evolutionary psychology (see e.g. debates in Whitehouse 
2001; see also Bloch 2012; Irvine 2018; Introduction in Navaro-Yashin 2012). However, most 
present-day clinical psychologists feel that they have long ago moved beyond Freudian 
psychoanalysis (Bruun 2013, 2014), and many also take issue with the crude evolutionism and 
reductionism of the kind that anthropologists have often alluded to in discussions of 
psychology as a discipline.  
This critical tendency amongst anthropologists can in part be traced back to the early 
anthropological critics of psychology and psychoanalysis, in particular Edmund Leach and later 
 
14  Littlewood (2002) describes these epistemological models of mental illness as ‘personalistic’ versus 
‘naturalistic’ explanations pertaining respectively to a psychotherapeutic versus a biological psychiatry. 
‘Personalistic’ because the ‘illness’ is perceived to be intrinsically implicated in the constitution of ‘the person’ 
contra ‘naturalistic’ aetiologies in medical pathology. 
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Ernest Gellner, two formerly prominent figures in British social anthropology, both of whom 
were based at Cambridge University.  
In Leach’s well-known article ‘Magical Hair’ published in 1958, psychologists and 
psychoanalysts are conjointly treated as practitioners of a discipline against which are ranged 
anthropologists and sociologists (Leach 1958). In his article, Leach challenges the psychologist 
‘Dr Berg’ who, he claims, uses ethnographic accounts – in the style of Freud – to act as empirical 
evidence for the universality of psychoanalytic theories such as the symbolic acts of ‘castration’ 
in ritual or the unconscious link between hair and sexuality (‘phallic symbolism’) in different 
cultures. Leach critiques the symbolic interpretations that psychoanalysts attend to in their 
analyses of ‘the inner psychic states of the individual’. He argues that psychological analysis and 
anthropological analysis are intrinsically unalike. According to Leach, they are even ‘irrelevant’ 
to each other: the psychoanalyst is ‘concerned with the inner feelings of the individual’ as 
opposed to the anthropologist, who studies ‘symbolism as expressing states of the social system 
rather than the states of the individual psyche’ (Leach 1958: 168). Leach proposes a division of 
‘public’ and ‘private’ symbols, the ‘collective’ and ‘individual’, ‘external’ and ‘internal’ (evoking 
again familiar distinctions associated with Durkheim and others): 
 
This distinction between public and private, social and individual, is one which constantly concerns the 
social anthropologist. In most situations he will be well advised to leave psychological matters to 
psychologists and stick firmly to the public sociological facets of the case. (Leach 1958: 148) 
 
We could summarise Leach’s argument as suggesting that psychology and anthropology 
constitute two different practices of knowledge production, two distinct epistemologies. 
Nonetheless, Leach’s engagements with structuralism and the work of Lévi-Strauss (see Hugh-
Jones & Laidlaw 2000), and the introduction of both into British anthropology, speak of his 
longstanding interest in aspects of psychoanalytic thinking. It is clear from Levi-Strauss’ own 
ethnographic work that ‘structural anthropology’ owed a great deal to psychoanalytic theories 
(e.g. Lévi-Strauss 1963; see also Ingham 1996; Moore 2007).  
One of the first documented attempts to study a ‘psy’ discipline ethnographically was made 
by Ernest Gellner, who had approached the British Psychoanalytic Society in order to 
undertake fieldwork on psychoanalysis. As noted earlier however, Gellner was never granted 
access by the Society who had repeatedly turned down researchers. Lacking proper fieldwork 
research, Gellner nevertheless produced a book (1985) on psychoanalysis – drawing very much 
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on his former training in analytical philosophy – in which he examined psychoanalytic theories 
as a ‘self-protected system of belief’, and the prevalent influence of psychoanalysis on the 
understanding of ‘emotion’ in the British middle-classes. Gellner’s work offered a stark critique 
of psychoanalysis.  
Taken together, Leach and Gellner’s work implied that anthropologists cannot, and should 
not attempt to, get into people’s heads as it were (anthropological knowledge was instead to be 
based on observations of ‘social’ or ‘external’ representations such as behaviours and symbols). 
Such convictions in British social anthropology were rather conventional at that time, and they 
were also in keeping with Malinowski’s empiricist sentiments, some of which still tend to hold 
epistemological reference in social anthropology today. 
This kind of (functionalist and structuralist) empiricism has since been called into question 
(Ardener 1971; Candea 2018b), as has the aforementioned dichotomies. (Although various 
versions of these dichotomies – internal/external, cognitive/cultural, individual/social, 
private/public, and so on – still feature in much contemporary anthropology.) This thesis 
follows on from an anthropology (see Cohn & Lynch 2017; Latour 2004a; McDonald 2012a; 
Toren 2012a) that has decisively moved beyond these problematic bifurcations associated with 
an older social science. In other words, this study presupposes no analytical ‘division of our 
universe’ (Candea 2011) into ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ worlds, and it grants no a priori status to 
psychology and anthropology as having a privileged or intrinsic access to either world. Such 
notions are not to be taken for granted in the following pages; they are instead very much a part 
of the ethnographic subject-matter under study – as part of the assumptions and theories that 
the people studied might have of themselves and others and the world in which they live. 
 
Foucault and the study of ‘psy’ 
Michel Foucault (1926–1984) has arguably been one of the most influential theoretical pioneers 
in the study of psychoanalysis, psychology and psychiatry in the humanities and social sciences. 
Anthropologists’ engagement or disengagement with Foucauldian frameworks has been 
analytically formative in the study of the psy disciplines.  
At one end of the spectrum of this literature, we find social scientists dedicated to a critical 
scrutiny of everything ‘psy’, building on Foucault’s work on the emergence of psychopathology 
and its institutions, as well as his work on ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1973, 1988a, 1991). This 
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body of Foucault’s work 15  was taken up and analytically elaborated in a series of critical 
histories of the psy disciplines by Nikolas Rose in the 1980s and 90s (Rose 1984, 1989, 1996). 
Rose and others have demonstrated how psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological 
institutions and practices have constituted new forms of political subjection and self-
governance, new configurations in ‘governmentality’ and ‘biopolitics’ (see e.g. Rose 2006; 
Burchell et al. 1991; Rose & Abi-Rached 2013; Jenkins 2010). The crux of the arguments that 
run through much of this literature is the contention that, in the name of expertise and care, 
psychiatry and psychology conceal and work through specific moral and political ideologies 
that shape the ways we come to know, relate to, and act upon ourselves and others.  
Some anthropologists have gone further. Deploying a similar Foucauldian critique, they 
have argued that as psychiatry has become installed as the authority concerning what it means 
to be ‘normal’ or ‘mentally ill’, partly through the making and remaking of the international 
classifications of the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), it has 
succeeded in establishing itself as the paramount authority on the provision of therapeutic 
treatment for these classified disorders, generating a profit-making market of psycho-
pharmaceuticals – drugs that have, it is argued, ‘done more harm than good’ (Davies 2013). 
This literature targets modern psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industries in particular (e.g. 
Borch-Jacobsen 2012; Kirk 1999) and it has echoes of earlier critiques that came out of the anti-
psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 70s (Szasz 1974). This was a movement influenced by 
Foucault’s early suspicion of everything ‘psy’ and his history of the invention of madness which 
appeared to expose psychiatry in many ways as a structural oppressor (Foucault 1988b [1961], 
1988a [1962]). Foucault’s scholarship thus had a significant impact on intellectual anti-
psychiatry critics (many of whom held academic positions in psychiatry, see e.g. Szasz 1974), 
although he often distanced himself from the direction in which they took his work. 
The ethnographic work of Tanya Luhrmann (2000) can be read as an objection to the kind 
of critical studies of the psy disciplines I have just mentioned. Luhrmann refrains from situating 
her study of American psychiatry in terms of Foucauldian governmentality, deeming such 
social science perspectives a naive romanticism that does little justice to the suffering subjects: 
 
15 It should be noted that Foucault’s history of ‘the medical gaze’ and ‘the clinic’, as well as his general critique 
of psychiatry, form part of his earlier work; his much later work on ethics, truth and freedom (e.g. Foucault 
1990, 1997) can be read as a significant rethinking of his earlier theories of power and subjectification 
(Laidlaw 2014, 2018). 
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‘Foucault did presume that madness had always existed, but he romanticised it in a way that, 
despite all his insights, did a terrible disservice to its pain. […] Madness is real, and it is an act 
of moral cowardice to treat is as a romantic freedom.’ (Luhrmann 2000: 10-12). Instead, 
Luhrmann identified two competing paradigms in psychiatry: the psychotherapeutic model 
(informed by psychoanalysis and psychotherapy) and the biomedical model (informed by 
molecular biology, psychopharmacology and neuroscience) and provided an ethnographic 
account of the epistemological and empirical conflicts between talk therapy and drug therapy, 
and the medico-moral consequences of losing the former to the latter. 
James Davies’ (2009) work on the training of psychoanalytic psychotherapists in England 
seeks to build on Luhrmann’s study of psychoanalysis. Davies also seems echo Luhrmann’s 
general dismissal of Foucault’s genealogies of the psy disciplines. Instead, Davies sets out to 
explore how ‘individual subjectivity’ is shaped by ‘institutional mechanisms of socialisation’ by 
studying people within their educational and professional environments – that is, the 
psychoanalytic institutes and training centres. Drawing on Durkheim and Bourdieu, Davies 
makes the case that psychoanalytic trainees engage in a formative process of ‘professional 
socialisation’ within a ‘moral and cultural community’. He argues that, by means of ‘hidden 
institutional devices’, the process of socialisation transforms trainees (who typically start out as 
patients) into loyal practitioners who come to sustain and reproduce the values and practices 
of the psychoanalytic tradition (Davies 2009: 2-3). My research thus also seeks to follow up on 
both the work of Luhrmann and Davies with an anthropological study of CBT therapists.  
In summary, the Foucauldian literature discussed above could be read now as an important 
intervention in the historiography of the psy disciplines, as seeking to destabilise the discursive 
power of their institutions, pathologies and therapeutics. However, Foucault’s work concerned 
with mental illness can also be seen to reflect his own vehement criticism of the status and 
attraction of psychoanalytic theory more generally amongst French intellectuals. In British 
social anthropology, a profound disquiet with the psy disciplines was partly encouraged and 
shaped by this particular body of Foucault’s work. Before him, figures such as Durkheim (2008 
[1912]) and Malinowski (1927) had long moved the ‘social’ away from the ‘psy’, albeit for 
different reasons. Some anthropologists, self-consciously practising a social science, strived 
hard to distance themselves from the work of psychoanalysts and psychologists as part of a 
division of labour, as exemplified by Leach’s account above (1958). Others quite simply rejected 
psychoanalytic ideas that had gained traction in the ‘culture and personality’ school that arose 
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in the US during the 1930s, and which is considered to be the forerunner of the American 
subdiscipline of psychological anthropology that took shape in the 1970s and 80s (cf. LeVine 
2010; Schwartz et al. 1992). An unease with psychoanalytic theories can be seen to extend 
through British social anthropology quite broadly now, although some anthropologists have 
called for serious re-engagement or collaboration with psy disciplines and related fields, from 
psychoanalysis (e.g. Moore 2007) and psychiatry (e.g. Luhrmann & Marrow 2016) to 
neuroscience (e.g. Northoff 2010) and cognitive science (e.g. Bloch 2012). 
Whilst ethnographic examinations of Euro-American renditions of the individual, 
autonomous ‘self’ remain relevant (see e.g. Battaglia 1995; Macfarlane 1994; Morris 1994), and 
Foucauldian critiques of the ‘psy’- and ‘neuro’-sciences of the kind mentioned above still have 
a stronghold in anthropology, it is Foucault’s later work on ethics, subjectivity and truth (e.g. 
Foucault 1997) and his volumes on the history of sexuality (Foucault 1988c, 1990, 1992) which 
have inspired anthropological work more recently. This body of work has injected analyses 
with new enthusiasm, leaving some of the ‘darker’ conclusions of Foucault’s earlier work 
behind (cf. Ortner 2016; Laidlaw 2016, see also 2018). 
It is also Foucault’s work on ‘ethical self-formation’ which has been particularly instructive 
over the past twenty years in shaping a range of anthropologies of ethics, morality and 
subjectivity (see e.g. Faubion 2001, 2011; Boellstorff 2005; Laidlaw 2002, 2014; Moore 2011; 
Robbins 2013; Brodwin 2013; Mattingly & Throop 2018). Recent anthropological studies of 
psychological therapies have followed this sweeping current: Joanna Cook (2015) and Else 
Vogel (2017) have both explored mindfulness-based therapies as practices of self-care with 
reference to Foucault’s theory of ‘reflective thought’ and ‘self-cultivation’. 
 
What kind of ethnography is this? 
Ethnographic writing can sometimes imply a certain taken-for-granted distinction between an 
academic world and an ethnographic one. Such a conceptual division is not always readily 
maintained in this thesis. Rather, the contexts and people under study in this thesis often shift 
between and traverse common boundaries: occasionally, aspects of my own academic world 
became ethnographically interesting as some of the people I studied (i.e., mental health 
professionals) were themselves occupying an academic context much like my own – many 
collect data, investigate, analyse, comment, and critique; they attend academic seminars, 
workshops and conferences. In other words, the people I studied were fully capable and willing 
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to ‘talk back’ (Brettell 1993), as they often did during my fieldwork.16 Ethnographic distance is 
therefore not always given beforehand.17 
Anthropologists have long been aware of, and have had to deal with, ethnographic realities 
within which their own analyses risked being eaten alive, as Edwin Ardener was keen to point 
out (Ardener 1971; see also McDonald 2007 [1989]). The people or realities we set out to study 
might not always be unlike ourselves or our academic homeland. These circumstances 
necessarily challenge any a priori distinctions we might have tacitly drawn up for ourselves 
between the anthropologist and those under study. It is also a point of methodological 
reflexivity concerning anthropology’s own epistemological assumptions, such as the 
differentiation between theory and ethnography or data. Although this is far from a new 
concern in anthropology, some recent ‘turns’ to ontology – the most vocal of which have been 
brought together and recognised under the single banner of ‘the ontological turn’ (Holbraad & 
Pedersen 2017) – have complicated that cherished distinction further, but in a way that is in 
itself inherently ‘theoretical’, as Paolo Heywood (2018) astutely demonstrates. The ways in 
which we thus draw up, and draw on, ethnographic ‘framings’, as Matei Candea (2005) has put 
it, have significant implications for how we proceed with an anthropology seemingly ‘at home’. 
Bringing anthropology closer to ‘home’ – closer to the contexts in which anthropology itself 
emerges, lives and thrives – has its merits as well as its limits (Strathern 1987). It is not always 
an easy homecoming.18  
 
16 This is not, of course, a novel condition by any means. As Americo Paredes noted in the 1970s: ‘It was one 
thing to publish ethnographies about the Trobrianders or Kwakiutls half a century ago; it is another to study 
people who read what you write and are more than willing to talk back’ (1978: 2). More than a decade later, 
Renato Rosaldo amongst others reflected that ‘social analysis must now grapple with the realization that its 
objects of analysis are also analyzing subjects who critically interrogate ethnographers’ (1989: 21). 
17 For example, practitioners of evidence-based healthcare frequently read and comment on social science 
studies of their professional practices, programmes, services and so on. It would be a misleading account of 
evidence-based psychological therapy if I simply proceeded by keeping to a ready-made and unambiguous 
distinction between a world of ethnographic subjects (mental health professionals) contra a world of 
academic commentators (anthropologists and other social scientists). 
18 Whilst the debates about anthropology’s homecoming are not new (see e.g. Jackson 1987), many of the 
issues discussed four decades ago still seem embarrassingly relevant today. For example, in a Current 
Anthropology article from 1986 on the study of minority language enthusiasts in France – many of whom 
were themselves social scientists – Maryon McDonald aptly observed, in reply to some condemning 
comments from anthropological colleagues, that: ‘some of the commentators’ responses themselves illustrate 
how very difficult it is to hold our own ways of thinking up for inspection, to allow that some of our most 
cherished ideas and assumptions might be not unproblematic handles on history and anchors on reality, but 
as fit a subject matter for ethnography as any of the other worlds, socially and geographically more distant, 
that we have more comfortably subjected to our anthropological gaze’ (1986: 344). 
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Pointing out these concerns here, hopefully goes some way to direct the reader through the 
intersection of those people directly involved professionally in evidence-based therapy and 
those professionals who comment on evidence-based practice (i.e., historians, philosophers, 
public health scholars, and other social scientists). Indeed, many mental health professionals 
themselves are critical commentators on the problems and limitations pertaining to their own 
‘evidence-based’ practice, as we will see throughout the thesis. I hope the following chapters go 
some way to pay heed to the critical multiplicity found within the same professional spaces that 
I have tried to do an ethnographic account of. 
Similarly, it became clear to me during my fieldwork that there was no privileged position 
from which I could comment, as an anthropologist, on the issues I encountered in 
psychological healthcare without being cast as just another commentator – another voice 
amongst many others. My account then (and any of its descriptions, insights, critiques) can 
undoubtedly expect to be absorbed into the same ethnographic reality that it portrays as yet 
another ‘perspective’ on issues that have, for some time now, attracted considerable debate in 
the UK. Within such a context (and contestation) of perspectives, this thesis might likewise 
expect to be subsumed under either one of two broad categorisations that have taken hold of 
these debates about psychological therapy: 1) those who seek to promote, or are otherwise 
supportive of, evidence-based psychological therapy and 2) those who are opposed to its 
convention, claims, and institutionalisation. 
This point has been exemplified to me not only during fieldwork but also in the presentation 
of aspects of this research amongst peers and other social scientists. Over the past years, I have 
been asked to respond to questions along the lines of whether the IAPT service deserves support 
or not; ‘are you for or against CBT?’, ‘what is the solution?’, and so on, were common responses 
to my research topic. However, the aim of this research is not to arrive at a set of ‘solutions’ 
(this has also become increasingly expected of doctoral research in the social sciences). Nor do 
I consider it the job of the anthropologist to arrive necessarily at such conclusions. In saying 
this, I do not mean to suggest that we – the ethnographers, the analysts – are somehow free of 
normative assertions. But normativity might not always be what the anthropologist wants to 
add to the conversation. Although this research does not seek definite answers to these 
questions (‘is the IAPT service good or bad?’, ‘should we invest in CBT or not?’, etc.) – answers 
which involve, I think, a more complicated grasp and interrogation of both ‘for’ and ‘against’, 
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‘yes’ and ‘no’, and for whom or what exactly something is ‘good’ and ‘works’ – I feel that some 
answers are nevertheless contained in the ethnography itself. 
These issues have required some rethinking of my own analytical language and framing. 
One immediate issue has to do with anthropological theorising and conceptualisation familiar 
to psychology. As I have indicated above, few anthropologists could be said to have taken 
psychology and cognitive science securely out of their conceptual toolkits to find it deserving 
of ethnographic scrutiny. Anthropology and the psy disciplines have long tended to come 
together in intellectual engagement (for a critical summary, see Toren 2012a; Hickman 2010)19 
– producing, for instance, ‘cross-cultural’ studies of mental health issues such as schizophrenia 
(for a recent example, see Luhrmann & Marrow 2016). Such collaboration or interdisciplinarity 
has been, and remains, the intellectual backbone of some work done in anthropology, especially 
in those subdisciplines known as cognitive anthropology and psychological anthropology, and 
including some strands of medical anthropology, too (see e.g. Kleinman 1988; Frake & Tyler 
1987; Ingham 1996; Littlewood 2002; Whitehouse 2001; Luhrmann 2006; Quinn 2006; Bloch 
2012; Mair 2018). This kind of anthropological work has its own merits, but it is the empirical 
problems and limitations of such work that are of interest here.  
One such limitation is this: when anthropologists assume or uncritically reproduce in their 
own work the same definitional realities that are shaping, and have been shaped by, psychology 
– be it even general concepts such as ‘cognition’ or ‘introspection’, for example, or any of their 
other ontological and epistemological presuppositions – they are inevitably engaging in 
precisely the same processes that I want to hold up for inspection in my ethnography.20 So 
although we might be tempted, in the following chapters, to talk about people and care practices 
in terms of ‘subjectivity’, ‘cognition’, ‘reflective thought’ and cognate terms – or even take on 
board notional distinctions such as ‘physical health’ versus ‘mental health’ or any other 
mind/body dualism – this thesis encourages a shift in which such notions are dispensed with 
analytically. In the meantime, there have been several attempts to stabilise these concepts as 
theoretical and analytical constructs for better or worse in anthropologies of religion, ethics 
 
19 In British social anthropology, an intellectual alliance between anthropology and psychology might be 
traced back to the fabled Cambridge Torres Straits Expedition in 1898 (Haddon 1901), especially the work 
of the experimental psychologist-cum-anthropologist W.H.S. Rivers (see e.g. Rouse 1999; Pickles 2009), who 
is also credited for having established psychological laboratories at the University of Cambridge and 
University College London (Sullivan 2012).   
20 ‘Holding up for inspection’ is owed to McDonald (1986). 
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and morality, including cognitive, psychological and medical anthropologies.21 It is, however, 
the capacity of these ideas to persuade and the realities they inform which are of interest to this 
thesis.  
There are many such notions then which, for an anthropologist working in the world of the 
psy-disciplines and their practices, have ethnographic interest rather than becoming part of the 
anthropologist’s own analytical language. Treating this world ‘ethnographically’ is meant here 
in the basic but nonetheless important sense of ‘rendering strange’ a set of assumptions or 
entities – including those that may be presupposed by the theories and categories that 
anthropologists often use and share with psychologists. Rendering strange however should not 
be taken as an exercise in exoticism as other anthropologists have pointed out (see e.g. Hastrup 
1995); rather, my point is equally about rendering more familiar the familiar in anthropology. 
Indeed, this thesis could be read as an exercise in improving a more general awareness in 
anthropology of how our own ways of theorising and categorising have much more in common 
with the conceptual world of psychologists than anthropologists have cared to acknowledge 
and investigate.22 This sharing of pre-theoretical commitments, we might say (Moore 2004), is 
not always of concern to anthropologists for various reasons, but this thesis attempts to 
encourage us to make a constructive necessity out of examining those knowledge practices 
closest to us, and which may at times include our own. To put this point in a different way, this 
study investigates how certain assumptions about care and selfhood (‘mental health’) have 
become widespread and culturally meaningful in the UK; that is, how people understand 
themselves and others through the psychological realities of CBT and IAPT; how people might 
 
21 The concepts of ‘mind’, ‘self’, ‘cognition’, ‘psyche’, ‘subjectivity’, etc., have been variously deployed in these 
fields and the literatures are extensive; recent examples, which have been particularly influential, include 
amongst others: Biehl et al. (2007); Bloch (2012); Laidlaw (2002); Luhrmann (2006); Mageo (2002); Moore 
(2007); Quinn (2006). For critical commentary on some of these concepts in anthropology, see e.g. Battaglia 
(Battaglia 1995); Navaro-Yashin (2012); Strathern (1995); Toren (2012). For critical histories, see e.g. 
Danziger (1997, 2008) and Rose (1984, 1989, 1996). 
22 Toren & Piña-Cabral (2011) have expounded in more general terms on a similar sentiment in their 
discussion of epistemology in anthropology. I fully agree with them when they say: ‘We want to see a more 
general awareness that analyzing ethnographically the lived world of those closest to us (including ourselves) 
is just as tall (but no taller) an order as analyzing and understanding those distant others who seem most 
exotic to us. […] In no case is the relationship between researcher and researched to be taken for granted 
[…] because what is at stake here is the very possibility (or not) for an engagement with other human beings, 
whoever they may be […] This taken for granted has everything to do with the fact that, apart from studies 
of scientific practice, there is little ethnography concerning our own processes of knowing (often held to be 
the province of psychology) … and too rarely do anthropologists question the set of entities presupposed by 
the theories they use’ (2011: 2).  
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live, use, confirm, resist or reinvent such ideas about mental health, and some of the 
consequences, as psychological therapies continue to proliferate and persuade. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
The thesis consists of six chapters plus a conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces a community centre 
in South London with particular reference to its ‘wellbeing programme’. This chapter explores 
how psychological healthcare has been envisaged by the IAPT service and how ‘access’ to such 
care has been problematised. I argue that the inventors of IAPT have framed a reported crisis 
of mental health and wellbeing in the UK as a question of ‘improving access’; meanwhile, access 
has been further problematised by IAPT therapists themselves working in communities where 
such ‘access’ to psychological therapies has been deemed lacking. We will see some of the caring 
capacities of the work of IAPT therapists beyond IAPT’s own clinical context and a perceived 
‘medical model’. I suggest that the effects of their efforts to improve access to psychological 
healthcare are not reducible to, nor necessarily always in the service of, IAPT or ‘evidence-
based’ therapy. The central ambition of improving access to psychological therapy has proven 
rather more complicated and inventive: IAPT therapists could be said in practice to have 
enlarged and consolidated the ‘psychotherapeutic’ to include other modes of care. I suggest that 
the ethnographic material in this chapter points to the limitations of theories of 
(bio)medicalisation/de-medicalisation. 
In Chapter 2, we pause for a moment to consider some of the historical trajectories that have 
shaped what we might recognise today as ‘mental healthcare’ in Britain. The chapter follows 
the significance of psychotherapeutics through a brief history of institutional formations from 
the asylum and mental hospital, through to the Tavistock Clinic and Maudsley Hospital, to the 
invention of ‘evidence-based psychological therapy’, with CBT at its core. The chapter thus 
offers a brief but important excursion into historiography and a more recent history of IAPT’s 
invention as the product of clinical psychology and ‘happiness’ economics. 
Chapter 3 examines in more detail the structure of the IAPT service and the problems 
therapists experience as they are called upon to ‘monitor’ psychotherapy. We will see why some 
people regard IAPT’s model of public psychological healthcare as worrisome, whilst others 
endorse the avowed effectiveness and need of such a model. All of this takes shape around some 
common critiques of the service in particular, and the role and significance of psychological 
therapy more broadly. This chapter points to some tensions in the ways in which social 
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scientists have tended to situate and theorise psychological worlds and how practitioners in 
such worlds have done their own situating and self-commentary. We will see that an 
anthropological analysis may not always differ significantly from what is already contained 
ethnographically in the critical discourses mobilised here by the mental health professionals 
themselves. 
In Chapter 4, we follow the training of therapists in evidence-based psychological therapy 
through an IAPT-accredited university course in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. I argue that 
CBT is constituted through, relies on, and instils a particular diagrammatic vision of ‘human 
psychology’. We will see that learning to work therapeutically involves an affective engagement 
on the part of the student through articulations with working objects and all the circumstances 
of the therapeutic learning environment. The students acquire therapeutic skills by becoming 
more sensitive to ever keener distinctions. In the practice of psychotherapy, these distinctions 
are thereby themselves rendered articulate in the theories, models, consultations, records, 
patients, clinical guidelines, and everything else that make up ‘CBT’.  
Chapter 5 explores professional conferences as important occasions in which the self-
definition of evidence-based psychological therapy is sought. By engaging some historical 
specificities on the question of ‘objectivity’, and by relating these to the discipline of psychology, 
this chapter attempts to describe how IAPT professionals understand ‘evidence’ and, in turn, 
how psychological therapy construed as an object of scientific observation has been pursued. 
Psychological therapy, I suggest, has longed strived to be recognised as the product of science, 
but with ‘subjectivity’ as its scientific object. It could be said to have finally achieved such 
recognition, at least in the UK, but it is also because of this achievement that empirical problems 
have continued to loom large. 
In Chapter 6, we end with the therapeutic practice of CBT itself and with another prominent 
‘evidence-based’ therapy introduced into the IAPT service: Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy (MBCT) or ‘mindfulness’. This chapter examines some therapeutic specificities of 
psychological therapy as we move from CBT to mindfulness. Whilst mindfulness therapy is 
said to have been derived in part from CBT, it is in the juxtaposition of these two therapeutic 
models that serious tensions are experientially confirmed. I argue that whilst CBT and 
mindfulness have both been recognised as effective interventions for a range of mental health 
problems, they have also generated their own therapeutic uncertainties. Psychological therapies 
 35 
have come to shape conflicting models of ‘the mind’, with different notions of selfhood effected 
through these practices. 
 
Contribution and Argument 
The thesis contributes to anthropological studies of mental healthcare through presenting new 
empirical material on psychological therapy through ethnographic reflections on a group of 
mental health professionals who tend to be absent from such studies: clinical psychologists and 
psychotherapists. More particularly, the thesis presents the first anthropological study of CBT 
and the IAPT service (as far as I am aware at the time of writing). As I have indicated, only a 
few anthropologists have carried out fieldwork on the topic of psychotherapeutics – and these 
studies have focussed on psychoanalysis or psychopharmacology (Luhrmann 2000; Davies 
2009; Jenkins 2010). Others have addressed the profession of clinical psychology in their work 
but this has often been in passing rather than as a main ethnographic focus (see e.g. Calabrese 
2008; Meyers 2013; Young 1997). Clinical psychology and psychological therapies, therefore, 
have remained surprisingly peripheral in anthropologies of mental health, which have 
historically been occupied with psychiatry rather than psychology (see e.g. Kleinman 1980; 
Littlewood 2002; Brodwin 2013). Recent attention to mindfulness-based therapies in the UK 
(see e.g. Cook 2015, Drage 2018, Wheater 2017) seems to move us closer to approaching 
psychology and psychologists as objects of enquiry. However, many ethnographers remain 
committed to some strand of psychological anthropology or ‘cross-cultural’ research (see e.g. 
Long 2018; Luhrmann & Marrow 2016; Mair & Cook 2018; Martin 2019) rather than 
conducting an anthropology of psychology as this thesis encourages. 
The overall focus of this thesis lies in the intersection of three topics that I would summarise 
as professional training and practice, accountability and scientificity, and models of care and 
selfhood. It is through these intersecting concerns, and through a diverse set of contexts in 
which evidence-based psychological therapy is sought, that the thesis contributes with 
anthropological material to an emerging debate on IAPT just as it is becoming a key component 
of contemporary mental healthcare in the UK (Pickersgill 2019a, 2019b; Marks 2018a).23  
 
23 This debate has so far been characterised by scholars within the history of science (Sarah Marks) and within 
sociology and STS (Martyn Pickersgill) whose studies are based on interviews and archival/textual research.  
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Rather than focusing primarily on clinical encounters or the ‘patient experience’, this thesis 
investigates the principles underlying psychological therapy, how they are conveyed through 
training and conferences, and how practitioners make sense of them in their everyday work. It 
examines some of the histories and logics that underscore the invention of a national 
psychological healthcare service, how psychological therapies align with dominant discourses 
in biomedicine concerning treatment and evidence, and more fundamentally, some of the 
assumptions concerning ideas of selfhood that are implicit in them. We will see how 
professionals acquire particular skills and sensitivities in order to be practitioners, how within 
specific professional contexts they debate and disagree with each other, yet also how they try to 
resist certain hegemonic values and expectations externally, beyond such contexts. 
The thesis interrogates a set of common bifurcations and framings in the anthropological 
literature that are often mobilised to critique, contextualise or represent various aspects of 
mental healthcare. I argue that the salience of the IAPT service and the tensions and debates it 
has generated reside in its advocates’ efforts to redefine putatively political, social and economic 
issues as matters of psychological concern and competence through the notion of national 
mental health or wellbeing, with a problematisation of access and of mental ill-health 
(especially the category of ‘depression’) and a consequent call for psychological intervention in 
the form of CBT. It is these recent changes in the rationale behind, and in the delivery of, a 
public psychological health service that have, in turn, been cast by many critics and mental 
health professionals alike as inherently ‘political’ and ‘economic’ moves, but moves that have 
nonetheless been hailed as necessary in solving a reported national mental health crisis. It is, 
however, the general deflection of critique by the founders of IAPT that has served to both 
obscure and prevent certain forms of critical scrutiny through which other models or 
approaches to psychological healthcare could be appropriately envisaged and enacted. 
The thesis suggests that the epistemic success of CBT as the benchmark model of 
psychological healthcare in the UK rests on a persuasive, recursive constitution of 
psychological therapy: CBT introduces accountability and measurement at the heart of its 
proposed vision of mental health – enacted through particular therapeutic practices of self-
reporting and self-inspection – and this in turn enables it to demonstrate its value and validity 
in the terms set by the conventions of ‘evidence-based’ practice.24 This thesis will suggest that 
 
24 I am grateful to Matei Candea for encouraging me to state this argument explicitly here.  
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the institutionalisation and widespread acclaim of the IAPT initiative, as well as the daily 
problems and concerns that practitioners now experience, are grounded in the persuasions of 
a self-consciously ‘scientific’ model of psychological therapy that has to reflect a commitment 
to evidence-based medicine.  
As a result, psychotherapeutic care has been reconstituted as a highly manualised, 
standardised and quantifiable intervention. It is the quest for scientific validation that requires 
psychological therapy to be enacted as an object of scientific testing through clinical trials by 
way of rendering the human subjecthood at the core of its practice amenable to measurement 
and diagnostic classification. This pursuit of objectivity hinges on the transformation of its 
antithesis, ‘subjectivity’ – the foundational object of psychotherapeutic practice – into a 
particular epistemic object that can be scientifically tested and intervened upon. Such an 
ambition is not new in psychology, as we shall see, but it has been revivified in new and 
interesting ways through the promises and ideals of evidence-based psychological therapy.  
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A caring reality 
‘There is no doubt that CBT works. It really works. But it doesn’t leave a lot of space for people 
to be human: to be contradictory and complex beings’, Paola tells me as we sit down in her 
office to discuss her work as a psychotherapist in the ‘Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies’ (IAPT) service. ‘However,’ she continues, ‘evidence-based psychotherapy is the only 
way to run an NHS service like IAPT. The medical model is the only way to do it.’  
According to Paola, and other mental health professionals like her, psychotherapy has 
become conceivable and workable within a ‘medical model’ of public healthcare.25 The launch 
of the IAPT service in 2008 as part of NHS England was widely promoted by its founders – the 
economist Richard Layard and the clinical psychologist David Clark – as an initiative to 
improve access to evidence-based psychological therapy. A majority of mental health 
professionals appear to have been supportive of the initiative at the time; the launch of IAPT 
was felt not only to be an official recognition of the scientific validity of clinical psychology 
(and related professions) but also a necessary improvement of public mental health services 
(see Pickersgill 2019a, 2019b; Marks 2018a). When I began my fieldwork, I met many mental 
health professionals like Paola who felt that this improvement had been achieved within a 
medical model of care, and it was deemed ‘the only way’ to run a public psychological health 
service.  
This chapter opens up one of the guiding questions of this thesis: how has evidence-based 
psychological therapy become conceivable and workable? And with what effects? We will see 
in more detail some of these empirical effects in later chapters. In the following, I explore this 
question in relation to an ethnographic concern with ‘care’. This chapter puts forward a 
number of interlinked observations that connect to this central concern.  
First, I observed that the ‘psychotherapeutic’ – namely, psychological care – extends beyond 
the clinic or consultation room; that some form of evidence-based psychological therapy is now 
implicated in everyday caring realities beyond clinical contexts. I saw IAPT professionals 
attending to and enacting caring practices every single day in ways that seemed to surpass 
 
25 The ethnographic term ‘mental health professional’ is used here as an umbrella term for the different but 
related professions featuring in the provision and management of psychological healthcare in the IAPT 
service: these include first and foremost CBT therapists and other psychotherapists, clinical psychologists, 
counsellors, and – a new profession specific to the service – Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners or ‘PWPs’. 
The distinction between CBT therapists and PWPs will discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
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IAPT’s conception of ‘good’ and ‘effective’ care understood as a set of standardised evidence-
based interventions. As a result, we will see here that whilst psychological therapy in the UK 
might indeed be situated within a so-called medical model of public health, the significance 
and shape that this form of care has taken is not reducible to nor necessarily always in the 
service of IAPT and its ‘evidence-based’ principles. The South London Community Centre in 
which I did my first period of fieldwork presents us with one such caring reality simultaneously 
in and beyond the convention of IAPT.  
Charities and community centres across the UK are increasingly invested in and entrusted 
to facilitate services like IAPT. We might think of such places as communities of care. They 
have become places of ‘access’ in which perceived hard-to-reach members of the public and 
other marginal groups deemed most at risk are seen to be more easily reached and provided 
for. One important point here is that the inventors of IAPT have framed psychological care as 
a question of ‘improving access’; meanwhile, access has been further problematised by IAPT 
professionals themselves working in communities where such ‘access’ to psychological care has 
been deemed lacking. The implication of such communities for the reported success of the 
IAPT service should not be underestimated. That is, the ‘success’ of psychological therapies, in 
IAPT’s own terms, is not simply a result of the scientific validation and authority granted to 
them through the evidence-based framework and strategies (cf. Layard & Clark 2014), but is 
equally owed to communities of care: the people, spaces, things, and concerns embroiled in 
caring practices.  
We could feasibly argue that IAPT has construed notions of ‘psychotherapy’ and ‘mental 
illness’ in ways that are more familiar within contexts of biomedicine and its appeal to 
evidence-based medicine. However, instead of being solely a case of biomedicalisation, 
‘improving access to psychological therapies’ has also proven rather more complicated and 
inventive: IAPT professionals could be said to have enlarged and consolidated the 
psychotherapeutic in practice to include other modes of psychological care – and caring beyond 
a medical model. The material in this chapter points therefore to the limitations of theories of 
(bio)medicalisation/de-medicalisation (see Clarke 2010; Pickersgill 2019a; Yates-Doerr & 
Carney 2016); we are invited instead to attend to the specificities of what ‘mental health’ and 
‘wellbeing’ might mean to those engaged in it every working day.26 
 
26 On ‘specificities’, see Mol (2008); Mol et al. (2010); Vogel (2016). 
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A medical model 
In present-day England, if you are experiencing particular kinds of prolonged distress – for 
example, being unable to eat and sleep or enjoy activities that one would normally take pleasure 
in; feeling unbearably stressed or anxious or in despair – there is a reasonable chance that you 
might be diagnosed with ‘depression’ or ‘anxiety’, that is, if you have made an appointment 
with a General Practitioner (GP). Depending on your GP’s assessment of your reported 
distress, you might be given a prescription for a psychopharmaceutical (such as anti-
depressants) – in other words, medication in the form of pills to be swallowed – but you are 
also likely to be offered some form of evidence-based psychological therapy, commonly known 
as ‘talking therapy’. Even if you have not attended a GP appointment, you might come across 
psychological services through your workplace, university, school or a charity in your 
neighbourhood. Today, it is also increasingly likely that you might call a local NHS service and 
refer yourself on the telephone – or online via one of their websites. The psychological services 
that you will come in contact with are part of the ‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ 
programme.  
This is a relatively new mental health service in England which has received worldwide 
acclaim for its reported evidence-base and effectiveness; whilst it was launched only a decade 
ago, it has already had millions of pounds invested in it, with the objective of making 
psychotherapeutic treatment for ‘mental health problems’ more accessible (cf. Department of 
Health 2010, 2015; NHS Digital 2018). 
According to the medical model at work here, psychological healthcare concerns evidence-
based interventions: therapies that have been clinically tested in randomised control trials 
(RCTs). The now common label of ‘evidence-based psychological therapy’ is applied to 
interventions that are understood to have successfully passed through clinical trials through 
which the ‘effectiveness’ of the intervention has been verified. Applied to psychology, this 
model also claims that ‘mental’ healthcare should adhere to the same therapeutic logic and 
procedures as ‘physical’ healthcare (or ‘biomedicine’). Features of biomedical care provision 
often highlighted as central to this medical model include the practices of ‘diagnosis’, ‘disease 
classification’ and ‘targeted intervention’. Importantly, the model construes patients as 
constituting specific diagnostic categories which are matched with specific therapeutic 
procedures. In other words, the degree and type of ‘disease’ or ‘disorder’ are seen to correspond 
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to a particular degree and type of intervention. This means that when patients are referred to 
the mental health service of IAPT, they are ‘stepped up’ or ‘stepped down’ on a treatment scale 
according to the diagnosed ‘severity’ of their reported symptoms. This is usually referred to as 
the ‘stepped-care model’ of IAPT. 
Medical models or approaches are not new in the discipline of psychology, but they could 
be said to have undergone a novel reformulation with the introduction of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) in the 1990s. EBM has been described as a methodological framework for 
assessing the effectiveness of clinical practices or interventions (Goldenberg 2006; Lambert et 
al. 2006). EBM quickly became a scientific convention beyond medicine; it has become 
constitutive of many aspects of psychological education and practice, for example, but has also 
prevailed beyond therapeutic arenas, redefining itself in more general terms as ‘evidence-based 
practice’ (cf. Trinder & Reynolds 2000). 
What counts as evidence-based practice in the UK is now a matter of national assessment 
and regulation conducted by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the 
UK’s evidence-based practice advisory board for the NHS. Established in the late 1990s, NICE 
has become the official executive body under the Department of Health responsible for 
evaluating and authorising ‘health and care’ interventions (Dobson 1999), the results of which 
are published as protocols known as clinical guidelines – or simply as ‘the NICE guidelines’. 
NICE could be said to partake also in an aspect of regulatory objectivity (Cambrosio et al. 2006, 
2009) – the collective management of evidence and clinical convention – a topic we return to 
in Chapter 5. The NICE guidelines prescribe specific interventions endorsed as ‘scientifically 
proven’ or ‘empirically supported’ for a range of specific clinical conditions. Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy or ‘CBT’ is one such intervention prescribed in the NHS through the 
IAPT service in the treatment of conditions diagnosed as depression and anxiety disorders 
(Department of Health 2015; NHS 2018). CBT has become a form of psychotherapy so 
prevalent within the NHS and beyond it that it has largely become synonymous with the notion 
of evidence-based psychological therapy. 
The mental health service of IAPT and the regulatory practices of NICE can both be seen as 
contributing to a biomedical understanding of psychological care. This medical understanding 
construes mental ill-health as discrete ‘disorders’ and classifies patients according to specific 
criteria that define each disorder. In CBT, a patient’s condition is typically described with 
reference to symptoms classified as ‘cognitive’, ‘behavioural’ and ‘emotional’. In the IAPT 
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service, therapists are therefore treating patients who have been diagnosed with specific 
symptoms of psychopathology. ‘Psychopathology’ is a word rarely used in IAPT outside clinical 
or educational contexts and is more often talked about colloquially as ‘mental health problems’. 
What is important here however, is that the IAPT therapist is required to assess the patient’s 
‘problem’ as if it were a discrete and observable pathology located in the cognitive interiority 
of the person. It is assumed therefore that patients are referred to psychological therapy because 
they exhibit predictable symptoms that correspond to different types and degrees of predefined 
disorders. 
All this means that when a patient undergoes psychological assessment, that patient is asked 
to report on their experiences and some of these will be classified as ‘symptoms’ (e.g. ‘cognitive 
distortions) which then determine the degree and type of the disorder already defined in 
diagnostic manuals (e.g. ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ or ‘severe’ depression). IAPT deploys a diagnostic 
procedure that relies on self-reporting in the form of patient questionnaires, such as PHQ-9 [9-
item Patient Health Questionnaire] for diagnosing depression (see Figure 1). It is thus assumed 
that patients are referred to a therapist because of distinct mental health problems that can be 
identified and targeted with treatment, in the same way as a patient diagnosed with a heart 
dysfunction might be referred to a cardiologist. It follows from this assumption that therapists 
should assess patients as if they suffered from discrete disorders, just like a cardiologist might 











The anthropological point here is that this medical model of psychotherapeutic care  
exemplified by IAPT has relied on a physiological reconstitution of ‘psychopathology’ in which 
therapists are imagined to detect ‘problems’ or ‘disorders’ that are distinct and observable 
through predictable symptoms which in turn can be treated through targeted intervention. This 
assumption has become instructive of other areas of care beyond mental healthcare, but it has 
had profound metaphorical and philosophical import in clinical psychology – approaching 
‘psychotherapy’ as if it were a type of medication to be taken once a week. 
Paola was used to this rationale in her own work as a psychotherapist in the assessment and 
treatment of patients. It was also the implicit presumptions of this rationale that she had alluded 
to when she had told me how she felt that the medical model ‘does not leave a lot of space for 
people to be contradictory and complex beings’. Paola felt that she worked with a medical 
model not out of choice but out of necessity: it was apparently ‘the only way’ to run a largescale 
public health service. A medical model of care has been widely celebrated (and criticised) for 
alleviating ambiguity by deploying an exclusively diagnostic approach, promising ‘certainty’ 
and ‘effectiveness’. But although Paola appreciated the reported effectiveness of this model, she 
also felt that it compromised other ways of caring – including an acknowledgement of the 
complexity of psychological distress – that allowed people to ‘be human’. 
 
The Community Centre: ‘a glimpse of a new community’ 
The Community Centre where I volunteered was founded in the late nineteenth century as part 
of the ‘Settlement House Movement’ and was one amongst other houses in East and South 
London reportedly founded by graduates from the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford. 
When I moved into the Centre, I was told that its early founders had been driven by 
convictions that ‘inequality and deprivation in inner cities demanded a radical response’. The 
vicar of the local church, ‘Father John’, as he was known, took me on an hour-long walk around 
the neighbourhood informing me about ‘the mission’ of the Centre. He told me how the early 
founders’ conviction of ‘a radical response’ in the form of ‘hands-on community work’ owed 
much to the Christian faith of the time but also how pertinent this vision remains. ‘This part of 
South London still struggles with all the consequences of inequality’, he said as we walked 
through one of the putatively poorest council estates in England. Father John was keen to 
emphasise the centrality of ‘the Church’ in the community work of the Centre and its ‘shared 
sense of purpose’. Yet he wanted to assure me that ‘community work’ went beyond religious 
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convictions – the work was also ‘political’, he stressed, in the sense that it worked to improve 
human welfare for all regardless of ‘faith, colour, and culture’.  
During the twentieth century, the original ‘Settlement House’ in the form of the church 
building had expanded and other spaces had been built to accommodate a growing number of 
‘residents’ in the neighbourhood. Together with the church, other spaces such as meeting 
rooms, kitchens, a hall, offices and a garden were now seen to make up the ‘community centre’. 
The Centre was led independently from the church by a team of six staff members working 
together with volunteers. Attached to the original church building was also a Victorian terrace 
house referred to as the ‘Residency’. I was given a room in this house where I lived together 
with four other volunteers who worked as ‘coordinators’ of different projects. I had been asked 
to work as the coordinator of the ‘community garden’ and its ‘wellbeing group’. The job 
primarily entailed running weekly ‘gardening sessions’. We will return to the wellbeing group 
later. 
The Settlement House Movement has been credited historically for inspiring early ‘welfare 
state’ advocates in the early twentieth century, most notably William Beveridge (1879-1963) 
and Clement Attlee (1883-1967) and their plans for a ‘cradle to grave’ welfare state (Koven 
1987). From this came the significant legislation of the National Insurance Act in 1946. 
Historians have also linked Settlement Houses to late Victorian liberalism and described this 
‘liberalism’ as the source of the early welfare state in Britain. The British welfare state that arose 
is said to have been shaped most significantly by a ‘statism’ emerging before and during the 
First and Second World Wars, followed by the ‘universalist’ ambitions of the 1940s and 50s 
(Fraser 1984: 233). 
These points are worth noting since the invention of ‘community centres’ has tended to be 
analysed solely in light of a ‘privatisation’ of the national welfare system instigated by Margaret 
Thatcher’s state reforms of the mid-1970s and 80s. Indeed, the Centre sees itself as an example 
of this history of the welfare state and its decline, and a resulting fight against ‘social inequality’. 
It also shares many of the protestations and aspirations of the ‘grassroots’ activism of the late 
1960s and 70s. The ‘welcome’ pamphlet I was given when I first arrived in the Centre stated 
clearly such aspiration: 
 
We need settlements for the 21st Century: places that offer a glimpse of a new community—where 
residents, local groups and organisations co-operate to build a better neighbourhood. 
 47 
In addition, staff members also told me how the more recent restructuring of the NHS, together 
with the introduction of further ‘private sector’ involvement prompted by the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012,27 had steered the provision of public health services further into a reliance on 
charities and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). I was provided with several 
figures from statistics and other research that ostensibly confirmed the distressing 
consequences of these changes (e.g. Garnett et al. 2017). For example, the council estates 
surrounding the Centre had recently been estimated to fall ‘within the bottom 10% most 
deprived nationally’. Research had also estimated that a third of the children in the 
neighbourhood ‘live in poverty’ (e.g. Fonagy & Clark 2015). I was likewise informed that the 
area had seen some of the highest levels of ‘social isolation’ amongst the elderly. ‘This part of 
London remains an area of stark inequality’, asserted the Director of the Centre in my first 
meeting with him. ‘Most residents in our community live well below the poverty line next to 
expansive new developments crowned by multi-million-pound penthouses.’  
Circumstances of inequality were frequently explained to me and were seen as the result of 
the local government’s ‘gentrification’ or ‘urban restructuring’ policies, involving most 
significantly ‘real estate development’ with the effects of ‘community displacement’. These 
experiences often resolved into a logic and language of exclusion/inclusion (Candea 2010) 
mobilising common categories of critique.  The issues identified – for example, ‘homelessness’ 
or ‘lack of access to healthcare’ – were variously defined, contextualised and criticised with 
reference to ‘politics’ and ‘economics’, ‘society’ and ‘culture’. A ‘crisis’ in public healthcare was 
thus broadly felt and experienced by those living in this part of South London, and similar 
accounts are not uncommon in the UK (see e.g. Exworthy et al. 2003). A perceived ‘mental 
health crisis’ has entailed and elicited criticisms of the ostensible causes and effects of such a 
crisis. These are points we return to later. 
The mental health professionals working in and around the Centre described their job as 
concerned with ‘the local community’, with people who have little means to get by, with single 
parents or new mothers or lonely neighbours, including the elderly, the sick and the marginal. 
The Centre housed different activities and organisations: it had a popular church choir 
originally started by people who had been homeless or addicted to drugs or alcohol,28 a dance 
 
27 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/7/contents/enacted [accessed January 2019]. 
28 On the question of alcoholism, drugs and addiction, see McDonald (1994) and Weinberg (2011); for 
commentary on homelessness in Britain, see Anderson (1993) and Bretherton et al. (2013). 
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and music academy for children and young people, a tutorial service for families unable to 
afford tutoring or unable to help their kids with homework, as well as an in-house educational 
organisation encouraging and assisting sixth-form students to apply to university, lunch clubs 
for the elderly, and much more. 
The Centre actively seeks, in its own terms, to celebrate diversity, community and face-to-
face interaction in a context of increasing social alienation and impoverishment. The people 
working in this Centre see themselves as trying to make a difference in a part of London which 
was described to me as ‘an extremely deprived area socio-economically’, but also ‘very multi-
cultural’ – the latter a positive feature to those who worked in the Centre. The older generations 
of the community were described to me as ‘White British’ South Londoners. Many of them had 
grown up and lived in the same neighbourhood all their lives, witnessing the Second World 
War as children, the introduction of social housing in the 1960s and 70s as young adults, and 
then a ‘slow decline’ of neighbourhoods, as some residents described it, into ‘ghettos’ and then 
suddenly, it seemed to them, a rapidly transforming ‘gentrification’ over the past ten years. 
When I moved to the neighbourhood, many of the old housing estates had already been sold 
by the Council to private developers. The large concrete blocks had been demolished over the 
past decade and replaced with ‘sleek brick-and-glass buildings with balconies and gardens that 
only people with money can afford’, as one of the residents put it. ‘The locals are losing their 
homes’, a volunteer of the Centre observed. ‘Families are being pushed out of South London’, 
another resident told me. ‘I am losing my home and my family has lived here for generations. 
The community is falling apart.’ 
In the UK and elsewhere, common understandings of ‘community’ align with other 
conceptual titans, not least the concept of ‘culture’. The idea of ‘community’ was born of 
romanticism (Chapman 1978; Anderson 2006 [1983]) and has, much like ‘culture’, largely 
become part of people’s apperceptions in Europe and beyond (Bauman 2000; McDonald 
2012b). It tends to evoke geographical or typographical properties and boundaries, together 
with perceived commonalities: a community might have its own ‘identity’, ‘language’, 






‘Gardening for Wellbeing’  
When I moved into the Centre in the summer of 2016, it had recently set up a ‘wellbeing 
programme’. This was an initiative supported by the local Council and NHS Trust29 as it was 
seen to align with IAPT’s sustained efforts to raise awareness of ‘talking therapies’. Whilst the 
Centre itself did not offer psychological therapies – it was not part of the NHS – nor did it 
identify as a mental health charity, ‘wellbeing’ was nevertheless something to be improved 
according to the managing staff, the volunteers and community workers. It was not obvious to 
many people however, what exactly ‘wellbeing’ might entail or how it might be achieved or 
attended to. It was open to multiple (sometimes conflicting) interpretations and imprecisions, 
but this ambiguity seemed also to underscore the importance of the term. Wellbeing is a 
concept that has become reified increasingly over the past twenty years as an object of expertise 
and investigation from economists and psychologists to philosophers, sociologists and 
anthropologists. The recent invention of a self-defined ‘Science of Wellbeing’ attests to the 
contemporary popularity of the notion (see Alexandrova 2017). 
Key to the Centre’s efforts to run a wellbeing programme was the ‘community garden’, a so-
called ‘urban garden’ set up in the old parking space and courtyard. I became a volunteer 
coordinator of the community garden, hosting weekly gardening sessions for residents, 
especially for people diagnosed with mental health problems or for those considered ‘isolated’ 
and ‘lonely’. Usually, five to ten people would attend these sessions which lasted three or more 
hours in the afternoon. A typical session involved drinking tea and coffee, catching up and 
talking about someone’s life or whatever came up; sometimes we discussed the Centre’s many 
activities and events or any appointments that the participants had attended. All of this took 
place around and through the practice of gardening. 
Gardening, like cooking (Yates-Doerr & Carney 2016) or farming (Mol et al. 2010), could 
be said to be a practice of caring. Gardeners attend to the weather, the soil, seasonal changes, 
and much more; they plant, water, weed and cut; compare, smell, touch, taste, watch and wait; 
they experiment with growing different herbs, vegetables or flowers, and attend to their 
environment. Gardeners, in other words, take care of a garden.  
This was the logic of the community garden when it was set up about ten years ago. People 
were growing vegetables and flowers out of discarded plastic boxes. ‘Urban gardening’ was the 
 
29 The South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLaM).  
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term coined for these green oases and pocket gardens surrounded by concrete, steel and stone. 
The summer I began volunteering, the community garden had just received funding from a 
local charity to renovate the outdoor space and make it more ‘user-friendly’. We spent several 
weeks removing the old plastic boxes as we started building stationary wooden vegetable and 
flower beds instead. We dug up the former car space, planted grass where there had been 
concrete, and installed a small shed (for rainy days) and a kitchenette for cooking and coffee-
making. The staff in the Centre deemed it a green haven for the elderly, the sick, the lonely, the 
poor, and the mentally ill: ‘for people in need of a caring environment’, I was told. We were all 
‘gardening for wellbeing’.  
It was during my first summer of living in the Centre that I met Paola, a psychotherapist in 
her 40s, whom I introduced earlier in this chapter. Paola was passionate about ‘making a 
difference’ in this area of London and had been funded a position by SLaM (The South London 
and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust) as a ‘community worker’. It had initially been difficult 
to convince SLaM of the importance of such a position, she told me. However, since 
community centres were also considered important sites as the public face of ‘access’ to public 
healthcare, Paola had successfully argued that ‘working in the community’ was crucial to 
reaching people deemed to have little or no access to psychological therapy. 
With Paola’s assistance, I ran the gardening group. The Centre’s idea behind ‘gardening for 
wellbeing’ was that it provided a more intimate setting and opportunity ‘for getting to know 
people in need of care’. Paola and I listened to people’s life stories, their ideas and worries; many 
were seeking some form of help with self-reported ‘mental health problems’, and some had 
difficulties finding or making sense of ‘the services’. Some concerns revolved around types of 
financial difficulty expressed as debt, cuts to social benefits or struggles with tenancy and rent 
increase. Most participants in the wellbeing group presented themselves with a diagnosis of 
mental illness; a few had previously been hospitalised and others had been in and out of 
psychiatric services for years. Others told me about their process of ‘recovery’. Recovery often 
meant that people had been declared ‘fit to work’ and to ‘take care of themselves’ (some indeed 
felt they had ‘recovered’, but others did not). This was a language of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental 
illness’ that the participants themselves conveyed, and many were familiar with psychiatric or 
psychological terminologies relating to the diagnosis and symptomatology of their own 
reported conditions. 
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When Paola started working in the Centre in her position as an IAPT therapist, it had 
become clear to her that ‘many people aren’t getting the right kind of care, or have difficulties 
accessing it’. Derek, for instance, a man in his 50s, had been diagnosed with schizophrenia in 
his early 20s. He had lived in the borough all his life, been in and out of psychiatric in-patient 
units and, when I met him, had recently ‘made a home out of a room in an old factory building’, 
as he put it, because he was unable to afford his flat after his benefits had been cut. Derek had 
attended the wellbeing group’s gardening sessions for over a year and had taken up creative 
painting classes offered by another charity. He told me how painting had had a positive effect 
on his ‘mood and mind’; he was now more likely to sleep for an entire night instead of a few 
sporadic hours that he was otherwise used to. Through the Centre’s Wellbeing Programme, 
Derek had also been offered weekly psychological therapy in IAPT which he felt had helped 
him greatly in dealing with his emotions, especially the manic, uncontrollable outbursts that he 
said would paralyse him for days. He felt that talking therapy allowed him to come to terms 
with aspects of his life that still haunted him. 
Many locals like Derek had come in contact with the IAPT service through the community 
garden or by being involved in other activities organised by the Centre. People like Derek were 
therefore one of the main reasons why Paola saw the gardening sessions as a means to help 
locals get ‘the right kind of care’. The Centre sometimes provided this care in the form of other 
engagements: lunch clubs for the elderly, for example, or the Alcoholics Anonymous choir. At 
other times, the right kind of care meant accessing public health services, such as IAPT’s 
programme of psychological therapy. The weekly gardening sessions were thus part of a 
collective effort to improve not only access to IAPT (that is, evidence-based psychological 
therapy) but also an ever sought-after ‘wellbeing’.  
Although our sessions were referred to as the ‘wellbeing group’, I had been instructed that 
they were explicitly not part of an official mental healthcare service or pretending to provide 
therapy in any shape or form; instead, they offered a way in which participants could access 
such professional services if they wanted. However, for the mental health professionals 
involved, ‘gardening for wellbeing’ was still part of a process of psychological care. ‘Yes, talking 
or gardening is not psychological therapy, but these meetings are still therapeutic for many of 
those who attend’, Paola asserted after one of many long days spent gardening. Improving 
access to IAPT turned out to be less straightforward than its founders had envisaged (Layard 
and Clark 2014), but also far more ‘caring’ than the anthropologist had anticipated. We were 
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undoubtedly no longer in the clinic. We were in ‘the garden’. We were gardening for wellbeing 
and cooking up ‘health’ (see Yates-Doerr & Carney 2016). 
 
Improving access to IAPT 
When economist Richard Layard and psychologist David Clark introduced their plans for a 
new mental health programme in the early 2000s, it was widely promoted as a commitment to 
‘improving access to psychological therapies’. This idea was deemed so fundamental to the 
programme that it became the official name of the service when it was launched as part of the 
NHS in 2008. In Chapter 3, we return in more detail to the features of the programme itself. 
Before we arrive there, we will be looking at how IAPT took shape around two important 
inventions: the category of ‘depression’ and the practice of ‘self-referral’. Depression and self-
referral have been construed, respectively, as obstacle and solution; we turn first to the question 
of access which has been problematised with reference to both.  
 
Problematising access: ‘depression’ and ‘self-referral’ 
In the promotion of IAPT, Clark and Layard argued that a lack of access to evidence-based 
psychological therapy had resulted in a mental health crisis in the UK (see e.g. Layard 2005a; 
Clark et al. 2009). In other words, people categorised as suffering from ‘mental illness’ were 
construed as being ‘cut off’ from services or otherwise lacking mental healthcare because of 
public health infrastructures that limited access to psychological interventions.  
‘Depression’ has been, and remains, the central category of ‘mental illness’ evoked here. We 
could say that ‘depression’ has been reified, through the invention of IAPT, as a discrete 
psychological pathology that should be treated primarily through evidence-based psychological 
therapy. Importantly, documents such as ‘The Depression Report’ (The Centre for Economic 
Performance 2006) asserted that ‘depression’ could be accounted for in terms of its economic 
costs, a claim that further reified the category as a significant object of economic concern and 
expertise. Sociologist Martyn Pickersgill has suggested that the design of the IAPT programme 
relied on an economic problematisation of ‘depression’ which structured not only the way in 
which Layard lobbied the Government but also the programme’s subsequent implementation 
(Pickersgill 2019a: 633). Elaborating on this point, we might also note that it has been through 
the language of economics – in particular, ‘happiness economics’ (Layard 2005b) – that Layard 
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and Clark have continued to justify IAPT to its critics (e.g. Layard & Clark 2014). They thereby 
rendered its ‘success’ quantifiable within a cost-effective framework. Within this framework, 
calculations of the reported economic burden of public mental healthcare also justified 
psychological therapies rather than psychopharmaceuticals such as antidepressants (Layard et 
al. 2007; see also Layard & Clark 2014).  
The economic problematisation of not just ‘mental illness’ but of an allegedly nationwide 
mental health crisis, epitomised by the category of ‘depression’, has elided into an economic 
justification for psychological therapy spearheaded by CBT. As such, the proposed ‘solution’ to 
the reported crisis of mental illness was therefore not simply deemed to be a matter of 
establishing the most effective intervention (e.g. CBT or antidepressants, or combined 
treatment) but rather a matter of access to such interventions. ‘Access’ was thus systematically 
problematised by Layard and Clark to persuade the Government to introduce a new model of 
provision of public mental healthcare within which psychological therapy could assume a 
central position. If ‘psychological therapy’ was the solution to the problem (‘depression’), then 
‘improving access’ was the conceptual means by which it could be achieved.  
However, what exactly ‘improving access’ entails or requires, in practice, has been left 
relatively unquestioned. Clark and Layard argued early on that improving access to 
psychological therapies could be accomplished through a new procedure of ‘self-referral’, 
complemented by conventional patient referrals issued by GPs. Today, self-referral is 
considered to be the primary way in which people access IAPT. 
Self-referral has generated its own problems, however. One problem has been that the 
practice of self-referral assumes and relies on the idea of the self-determining individual 
capable of self-inspection and self-report. These might seem like rather innocent human 
features, but their implicit assumptions have proven tremendously problematic in public care: 
from the very notion of ‘the individual’, to this individual’s capacity to choose and make 
informed decisions (see e.g. Strathern 1995; McDonald 2010; Reubi 2012). Self-referral can thus 
be seen as an explicit instantiation of a ‘logic of choice’ (Mol 2008) owed to a relatively new 
formulation of ‘patient choice’ which has informed health policymaking in the UK and 
elsewhere (Greener 2009; Mol 2008). In mental health conferences, I watched presenters 
(mostly policy-makers and service commissioners but also practitioners) discussing topics 
related to the concept of patient choice, with many asserting that patients should be allowed to 
be in control of their own care: ‘they have a choice after all’. Such discussions and their wide 
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dissemination across public services have helped construe people as choosing agents in charge 
of their own ‘mental health’ – to ‘take care of yourself’ – but also rendered patients further into 
(ac)countable subjects. Referring your ‘self’ to a service might require one to take up a particular 
subject position, in which ‘mental health’ is not only something one ‘has’ but is something that 
constitutes the very notion of ‘our selves’ (Rose 1989, 1996). This position assumes a self in 
charge of itself, so to speak. 
Of course, we might likewise say that choosing and self-determining selves are precisely 
what ‘good’ care is supposed to be about: patients should be allowed to have a will and a choice 
in letting other people care for them and in caring for themselves. Self-referral is thus one 
important practice confirming the ideal of care as choice and agency over oneself; ‘it’s good 
practice’, some practitioners told me, ‘it’s ethical’. These are concerns familiar also to the 
anthropology of ethics (e.g. Faubian 2011; Laidlaw 2014) and, more recently, an anthropology 
of ‘the good’ (Fischer 2014; Robbins 2013). Anthropologists working in these fields in relation 
to mental health have often tended to locate ‘the ethical’ in practices described as ‘self-care’ (see 
e.g. Yates-Doerr 2012; Nissen 2015; Cook 2015; Vogel 2017; McKearney 2018) drawing on the 
Foucauldian legacy concerned with ethics as ‘the care of the self’ (Foucault 1988; see also Moore 
2011 and Laidlaw 2002). However, anthropological framings of ‘care’ and ‘the self’ have to be 
wary of not simply re-instantiating ethnographic assumptions that are also built into Foucault’s 
ethical selfhood. We come back to this point in Chapter 6. What I want to suggest for now is 
that IAPT’s promotion of self-referral forms part of the proliferation of a range of emerging 
practices in the UK framed as in the service of ‘self-care’.  
 
‘Working in the community’ 
When I started working with IAPT professionals at the community centre in London I quickly 
learned however that questions of access were problematised further internally amongst 
professionals within local IAPT services and by local authorities commissioning the services. 
Despite the reported acclaim of the implementation of ‘self-referral’, for many IAPT 
professionals, relying on ‘self-referral’ seemed nevertheless an inadequate notion for 
‘improving access’. I found out later in my fieldwork that calls for ‘working in (and with) 
communities’ were often raised and discussed on panels at IAPT conferences and in meetings 
with NHS Trusts and Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). Raising awareness of self-
referral amongst people deemed to be ‘cut off’ from mental health services, as many argued, 
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was indeed seen as part of what ‘working in the community’ might entail. However, other 
therapists working in IAPT do not assume that access is simply achieved by adding ‘self-
referral’ to the infrastructure of public mental health, as Layard and Clark claim. 
Important aspects of Clark and Layard’s ambition seem yet to be realised. One day when I 
was with Paola in the office, I commented on the slight irony of her role: she had been employed 
to improve access to the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies service. She admitted it 
seemed slightly absurd but explained that the IAPT service, in spite of ‘its extensive integration 
in the NHS across the entire country’ was still struggling to provide ‘psychological healthcare 
to communities considered most in need of such care’. The ‘communities’ deemed to have little 
or no access to public health services had been identified as ‘low-income’, often ‘ethnic’, with 
‘high levels of unemployment’ and ‘social deprivation’. The neighbourhoods of South London 
in which the Centre was based were generally regarded as one such example of lack of access to 
mental health services.  
 Once I got to know the area better, I realised that the ‘communities’ in this area of London, 
to which Paola was referring, are only a ten-minute bus ride from the South London and 
Maudsley Hospital (SLaM) located in Denmark Hill. SLaM is one of the largest and most 
distinguished NHS Trusts in the country (headed by the Maudsley Hospital with several 
departments under the University of Kings College London, most notably the Institute of 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience). It is also important to note that the Maudsley 
Hospital and the Institute of Psychiatry formed the birthplace of a specific ‘laboratory-’ and 
‘research-based’ psychotherapeutics in the form of behavioural therapies in the 1950s. This 
historiography seems to have been largely eclipsed by IAPT’s own historical self-celebration as 
‘new’ and ‘novel’ in all aspects of its own invention, in which it has drawn up for its own 
purposes a recent historical past in which the 1990’s movement of evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) and Richard Layard’s ‘happiness economics’ of the early 2000s feature as historical 
forefathers. However, the much earlier clinical work and research of the Maudsley Hospital 
and the Institute of Psychiatry could be seen as a precursor to the institutional practice of, and 
indeed the very notion of, ‘evidence-based’ psychological therapy.30  
The issue appears to be that, despite its extensive and much-lauded institutionalisation, 
IAPT has still not, in its own terms, been successful in ‘accessing’ many communities deemed 
 
30 For a fuller account of this historiographical point, see Marks (2015). 
 56 
most in need of its mental health services. This was a point raised repeatedly during my 
fieldwork. The ‘mental health services’ and ‘the communities’ in question were often discussed 
as being far apart despite their geographical proximity: many services were practically located 
right in ‘the community’ they sought access to. I was surprised to learn in meetings with IAPT 
professionals that one of the central objectives of IAPT to secure public psychological 
healthcare for those deemed most in need was a commitment that these professionals still had 
to negotiate and defend within the context of IAPT itself. For Paola, it was only after a period 
of difficult negotiation with the regional NHS Trust, her employer, that she had finally been 
granted a position ‘to work in the community’. Paola told me about this triumphantly: ‘You 
see, access to mental healthcare requires more than just policy-making and the commissioning 
of services. It is the actual work done on the ground which improves access to IAPT.’ Paola 
shared this conviction with many other IAPT therapists I met. For them, ‘improving access’ 
meant working in the communities themselves; engaging people face-to-face; educating those 
who have never heard of the concept of ‘talking therapy’, let alone ‘IAPT’; collaborating with 
and across other public health services beyond the stipulated interests of one’s own specialist 
provision of care; and very much more.  
Paola and her colleagues had explained to me that the ‘work done on the ground’ meant 
understanding ‘user experience’. This involved trying to take account of the ‘real needs’ as well 
as the ‘social context’ and ‘cultural environment’ of those people reportedly lacking access to 
psychological therapy. Such a shift in concern was not only important to the IAPT therapists I 
worked with in London but was also noted increasingly in professional conferences on mental 
healthcare that I attended. These practitioners were thus working to contextualise and locate 
their own practices. What had initially been promoted as a near-universal and uniform public 
service (cf. Layard and Clark 2014), now had to take account of its own contextual operation. 
As a result, the IAPT programme is now more commonly discussed amongst practitioners as 
consisting of local services, each having to respond to its own ‘local community’, its ‘people’ or 
‘users’, and their needs, problems, and experiences. 
Working in, or with, ‘the local community’ turned out to revolve around the concept of ‘co-
production’, a notion which has become increasingly widespread in discussions of public 
service provision in the UK (Barnes et al. 1999; Glynos & Speed 2012). Co-production is often 
described as a way of working together to produce ‘user-led’ and ‘people-centred’ services 
pertinent to a range of disciplines and institutions from hospitals, museums and schools, to 
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architecture, psychiatry and development studies. Co-production was a hot topic in almost all 
professional conferences I attended in which questions of ‘access’ and ‘improvement’ were on 
the agenda. The term is said to have been coined by American economist Elinor Ostrom in the 
late 1970s to describe a process of collaboration between ‘users’ and ‘providers’ in the 
assessment, management and delivery of public services (Filipe et al. 2017). Ostrom argued that 
the viability of any ‘public service’ depends on direct interaction with, and understanding of, 
‘the community’ in which it seeks to operate (Ostrom 1996). Although ‘co-production’ seems 
to have become mainstream in the UK in government, research and public policy discourses 
especially (Jasanoff 2004), it has nevertheless been described as one of the most radical 
approaches to NHS reform (Malby 2012).  
In relation to IAPT, co-production can be summarised as challenging the idea of patients 
on the passive receiving end of mental health services. The concept frames instead patients as 
‘users’: people use services and are seen to be embroiled in an active evaluation of them. In 
conferences on NHS mental health services, the language of co-production was thus used to 
radically reframe the role of ‘patients’ as ‘service users’, often presented as a way to rethink the 
process of providing care. ‘Service users’ and also ‘communities’ were understood and 
discussed here as important agents with the capacity to collaborate with practitioners in the 
design and improvement of mental health services. Co-production thus provided a meaningful 
language through which mental health practitioners felt more engaged with their patients; 
rather than viewing patients as passive recipients, they were understood as taking active part in 
the production of their own care. This language also captured what many IAPT therapists felt 
was the inherently ‘collaborative’ quality of psychotherapy: some felt it put the ‘relationship’ 
back into the practice of psychological care. 
Paola had thus been hired in part to improve access to the IAPT service in communities that 
local authorities had identified as ‘difficult to reach’. With funding from the borough’s Clinical 
Commissioning Group (CCG), she and other mental health professionals had managed to set 
up a ‘Wellbeing Hub’ to improve access to relevant healthcare services by putting residents in 
contact with providers, assisting them with referrals or appointment, informing them about 
available services, and so on. ‘Finding the right support and care can seem complicated and 
overwhelming for many people’, Paola had told me in our first meeting. As part of the 
Wellbeing Hub’s ‘outreach’, she had started a ‘drop-in’ service at the Centre; ‘This service is for 
anyone living in the area who is worried about their wellbeing or that of someone close to them.’ 
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The Hub also included an online directory of organisations intended to help ‘signpost’ services, 
thus assisting health professionals to navigate between them in providing the best support to 
people in need of care. When I asked Paola why the Wellbeing Hub had been deemed so 
necessary, she told me that access to care is a process that needs to be simpler. Bringing services 
together and the people who run them was crucial to this aim. 
Linked to the aim of signposting was another initiative called the ‘Wellbeing Network’. It 
was set up to provide a forum for the service providers and service users of the Wellbeing Hub. 
The Network met once a month to discuss different issues, share experiences, give 
presentations, and so on. Paola’s intention was to bring organisations such as charities and 
NHS services into direct contact and conversation with each other, engaging both professionals 
and carers as well as service users. The Centre hosted the monthly meetings and they were 
quickly considered quite an achievement with over thirty representatives from healthcare 
services and charities attending every month. I attended these meetings for over a year, gaining 
access by representing the Centre’s wellbeing group in my role as a coordinator, as well as in 
my open role as an anthropologist engaged in research on mental healthcare. The Wellbeing 
Hub and the Wellbeing Network were widely felt to link the original efforts of the ‘settlement 
house’ to the contemporary ambitions of a ‘community centre’. 
 
Care beyond IAPT    
As we have seen, the South London community centre has become a context for ‘improving 
access’ to evidence-based psychological therapy. But while it has certainly participated in 
IAPT’s vision of improving access to psychological therapies, it has done so by attending to 
‘mental health’ and ‘wellbeing’ in ways that no longer hinge on questions about the scientific 
status of the interventions deployed. In fact, the language of ‘intervention’ or ‘effectiveness’ – 
and other cognate notions owed to the putative ‘medical’ model of care – is largely absent from 
the psychological care pursued in and around the Centre by the mental health professionals I 
worked with. Rather, it is the potential ‘caring’ capacity of any activity and concern relating to 
‘mental health’ that they foreground. This is partly why the Centre was able to align a range of 
seemingly different activities and concerns with a common aim to care for the ‘wellbeing’ and 
‘mental health’ of its residents. Gardening, singing, cooking, and dancing, or doing CBT 
sessions on a computer, talking to a therapist, running for charity, selling marmalade at the 
annual community festival, volunteering, and so on, were part and parcel of the same world of 
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caring practices. Indeed, it is perhaps the persisting ambiguity of the notion of ‘wellbeing’ which 
has assisted such alignment. 
The Centre’s community garden and its wider wellbeing programme were therefore not 
intended to provide psychological therapy per se, although it was talked about as a ‘therapeutic’ 
space. The garden was intended instead to offer an informal ‘pathway’ for people who were said 
to be ‘out of reach’ from healthcare services to better ‘access’ the care they need. Accessing 
psychological care was not, however, a straightforward case of being referred by a GP or by 
one’s ‘self’. Rather than attending to people as individual clinical subjects (as would be the case 
in the psychotherapeutic consultation room), daily care practices in the Centre sought to 
address all the shifting and diverse circumstances that were seen to constitute ‘mental health’ 
and ‘wellbeing’. Psychological care emerged therefore not simply as a matter of passive clinical 
subjects being on the ‘receiving’ end of a ‘delivery’ line of care provided by active professionals. 
Even ‘patients’ act and enact in the process of caring for themselves: they swallow pills, for 
example, or talk about their past, book appointments, attend appointments, fill out 
questionnaires, practise exercises, techniques and inspections, and so on. Patients are not just 
intervened upon but are actively engaged in the ‘enactment’ of care (cf. Mol 2002). These issues 
have been explored elsewhere in anthropology (see Mol 2008; Lynch & Cohn 2016; Pols 2012; 
Yates-Doerr 2012), but what seems important to highlight here is that psychological care called 
for concerns, relations and engagements with the context at hand in which there was no 
prescribed ‘evidence-based’ procedure to improve ‘access’ or ‘mental health’, with neither ‘the 
patient’ nor ‘wellbeing’ pinned down as stable objects of scientific enquiry. 
Other forms of care beyond psychological therapy (as envisaged by the IAPT programme 
an undergirded by the regulatory practices of NICE) were thus constitutive of IAPT 
professionals’ efforts to improve ‘mental health’ and ‘wellbeing’. For example, the concept of 
‘diagnosis’ or the category ‘cognition’ are fundamental to psychological therapies such as CBT, 
and yet neither did ‘diagnosis’ nor ‘cognition’ necessarily figure as relevant in the caring 
practices of IAPT therapists when ‘working in the community’. If it seemed difficult for the 
professionals to make the language of CBT (or evidence-based therapy more generally) 
workable outside the clinic, it was not because of a lack of ‘access’ but rather because problems 
identified in clinical contexts quickly became entangled with circumstances beyond those 
which evidence-based practice presupposes. 
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We might be tempted to conclude that ‘access’ has been envisaged and provided by IAPT 
according to a medical model in which ‘self-referral’ assumes the ideal of the autonomous 
human subject; an individuated ‘user’ capable of reflecting and reporting on their own self; 
informed to make decisions with a will and a choice. And further, equipped with such a model 
of the patient, IAPT could be said to have contributed further to a medicalisation of mental ill-
health. However, as we have seen, access to IAPT and the provision of psychological care have 
also relied on modes of caring which go beyond medicalisation or a medical model of care.  
 
Beyond common divisions 
The IAPT service might appear then to have been designed according to a medical model of 
care, and it is within this model that IAPT still seems to operate and provide CBT specifically 
and psychological healthcare more broadly. Yet the ethnographic reality of the Community 
Centre shows how caring practices often traverse the clinical contexts that gave rise to them. 
IAPT’s vision of psychological therapy in the form of CBT (and other CBT-based 
interventions) is not always what is deemed to be workable or conceivable when we move 
beyond the psychological consultation room. In and around the Centre, the language of 
‘evidence-based psychological therapy’ or ‘CBT’ was at once confirmed and negated. IAPT’s 
notion and practice of psychological healthcare as consisting of a specific set of evidence-based 
interventions (that correlate with discrete types and degrees of ‘mental disorder’ or ‘mental 
health problems’) have been difficult to enact outside IAPT’s clinical contexts – wherein 
psychological therapy is highly standardised and manualised – because this model of care fails 
to allow people, as Paola put it, ‘to be contradictory and complex beings’. 
On the contrary, it was communities such as the South London Community Centre which 
have allowed people ‘to be human’, according to the mental health professionals, because they 
put conceptions of ‘care’ and ‘wellbeing’ into practice beyond a perceived medical model. We 
could then be tempted to theorise community centres of this kind as constituting a process of 
‘de-medicalisation’, in common with recent anthropological studies of care practices beyond 
clinical contexts (Yates-Doerr & Carney 2016), or, some form of opposition to medicalising 
structures and rationalities (see e.g. Vale 2012; Wright et al. 2018). However, there was no 
straightforward de-medicalisation of ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ involved in all of this. 
For example, it was not unusual for the community garden’s participants to talk about their 
‘mental illness’ as if it corresponded to discrete disorders located in ‘the brain’ or ‘the mind’ 
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and which would eventually yield to the right kind of drug or talk therapy. There was no easy 
way out of the assumptions built into the medical model that IAPT in many ways seems to have 
revivified. One such assumption has been the metaphorical ‘pill’: the notion of medication was 
instructive of how ‘psychotherapy’ or ‘talking therapy’ was framed and made sense of: 
something to be ‘prescribed’, ‘applied’, ‘taken’. In other words, it appeared that the IAPT service 
had contributed to a medical model of the ‘psychotherapeutic’ (as it figures in the form of CBT) 
whereby psychological therapy has been stabilised as a set of consistent and fixed techniques – 
as if it was prescribed medication. The problem was, however, that getting well through 
psychological care was nothing like swallowing a pill. We return to this pervasive metaphoric 
in Chapter 5. 
The IAPT service and its formulation of psychological therapy might thus be described as 
having reified notions of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ within a largely medical model of 
ill-health (see also Pickersgill 2019a), often adhering to the language of neuroscience and a 
biological psychiatry rather than its own psychotherapeutic (especially ‘psychodynamic’) 
heritage (Bruun 2014; Marks 2015). However, the caring practices of mental health 
professionals that take shape around these notions are not always in the service of IAPT’s 
scientific persuasions. IAPT therapists might work, in their own words, to ‘improve access’ to 
psychological therapy but the daily work required to do so involves concerns and caring beyond 
that envisaged and accounted for by the IAPT service. The clinical objects of concern in IAPT 
– the patient, the disorder, the mental health problem – are rarely what IAPT professionals end 
up dealing with when ‘working in the community’. The category of ‘depression’, for instance, 
did not always offer a pertinent language in this context, nor did the notion of ‘self-referral’, 
although both have been fundamental to IAPT’s construal and problematisation of ‘access’. 
Anthropologists studying the professional work of psychotherapists have often delineated 
the ‘psychotherapeutic’ in opposition to the ‘biomedical’ (cf. Luhrmann 2000; Davies 2009; 
Calabrese 2013). Yet, the ethnographic reality of IAPT might serve as an analytical break 
against a common bifurcation of the psychotherapeutic and the biomedical as opposing 
scientific epistemologies and modalities of care. Another common division in medical 
anthropology has been between processes of ‘(bio)medicalisation’ (Foucault 1973; Lock & 
Gordon 1988; Canguilhem 1989; Clarke 2010) and, by contrast, those resisting medicalising 
practices and logics (see e.g. Harvey 2008; Luhrmann 2000; Davis 2012; Yates-Doerr 2012; 
Cook 2016) including its governmental implications as outlined in the works of Foucault 
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(1991), Rose (2006), Hacking (1991) and others. But situating care practices – and 
psychological therapy in particular – along the lines of this conceptual division might not 
always be helpful. 
So, whilst it could be argued that the Community Centre represents a case of ‘de-
medicalisation’, this sort of theorising runs the risk of construing the IAPT service – and 
specifically the work of IAPT professionals – as a direct resistance to the prevalence of 
biomedicine; such a conclusion would be misleading. On the contrary, suggesting that IAPT is 
in the service of biomedical rationalities does not adequately capture or acknowledge the 
shifting and diverse concerns and caring practices of so many IAPT professionals working to 
improve mental health and wellbeing in communities where psychological therapy has been 
introduced. If we fail to attend to care outside the conceptual framework of either 
medicalisation or de-medicalisation, we have failed to appreciate a great deal about what 
psychological care means to many mental health professionals.  
The case of IAPT is one such ethnographic reality which could be said to simultaneously 
engage a medical model of ill-health and care and reinvent it by encouraging other forms of 
care beyond a clinical context and rationality. It remains that the founders and advocates of 
IAPT, as well as the practitioners working in the service, frequently asserted that a medical 
model was ‘the only way’ to provide psychological healthcare on a ‘national scale’ and ‘as part 
of the NHS’. And yet, providing access to psychological therapy emerged as different modes of 
caring practices that were not exclusive to such a model and indeed traversed it. ‘Mental health’ 
and ‘wellbeing’ took on different meanings and mores in and around the Centre; indeed, the 
aim of improving access involved active engagements with potential patients beyond 
‘(self-)referral’. Through glimpses of the modes of caring practices that unfold in the South 
London Community Centre, we saw that IAPT therapists’ aim to improve access is not 
contained in any one particular practice, and further, that accessing psychological healthcare 
does not always necessitate the use of evidence-based psychological therapy nor align with 
IAPT’s conception of psychological care as standardised and measurable in compliance with 
the principles of EBM and the NICE guidelines. 
The community garden was thus enacted as a mode of (psychological) care. ‘Gardening for 
wellbeing’ did not hinge on any ideals of the ‘individual’ sought through self-referral nor did it 
instantiate mental health problems as discrete disorders but, rather, we might say that it put 
relationalities into practice, involving more than human carers (cf. Cohn & Lynch 2018): 
 63 
plants, seeds, sunny days, coffee and soil were all part of a caring relationality. Likewise, 
participants were brought into new relationalities through the community centre at large and 
beyond: at times this resulted in CBT sessions at the local IAPT service; at other times not. The 
mental health professionals felt that the community garden acknowledged – and perhaps 
served as a reminder of – the therapeutic ‘relationship’ in psychotherapy, even if gardening was 
not psychotherapy; it allowed people to be ‘human’, in Paola’s words. It also reminded the 



























































A brief history of psychotherapeutics 
This chapter takes us into some historical contexts that have been important in shaping ‘mental 
healthcare’ and the more recent invention of evidence-based psychological therapy. This 
historiography cannot be dealt with in full in this thesis; I have sought instead to draw attention 
to particular aspects of what professionals might recognise today as ‘mental healthcare’ in 
Britain, that in one way or another have laid the grounds for the much later invention of the 
IAPT service. Some of these points have been well-rehearsed elsewhere by historians (as 
references in the text suggest).  
It also seems important to note here that the historiography of psychology and 
psychotherapy is a contentious one with more histories written by practitioners themselves 
than by professional historians (such as Ehrenwald’s famous book from 1976, titled The History 
of Psychotherapy). More recent attempts to write ‘the history’ of clinical psychology seem to 
have been similarly inclined. For example, at one of the conferences I attended, I met Sarah 
Marks, an historian of psychology, who told me how she had been gradually excluded from the 
editorial position first granted to her in what was proclaimed to be the first historical volume 
on clinical psychology in Britain published by the British Psychological Society [BPS] (cf. Hall 
et al. 2015). Marks nevertheless published two chapters in this volume, but her efforts to bring 
a critical editorship to the book as the only professional historian were largely dismissed (Marks 
was subsequently removed as one of the editors of the book when it was published in December 
2015; ibid.). Other historians of psychology I met reported similar difficulties in their research 
and publication projects. Historian Rachael Rosner, for instance, had long tried to write a 
historical biography of the founder of Cognitive Therapy, Aaron Beck, but had repeatedly been 
denied access to important archival material in the possession of psychological institutes 
claiming to support historical research (see Rosner 2012). 
A brief but important excursion into history and historiography, I feel, will aid 
comprehension of my ethnographic work. I concentrate here on the period of the nineteenth 
century up until the mid-twentieth century in situating a history of psychotherapeutics within 
the development of medico-legal structures such as ‘the public asylum’ and ‘the mental 
hospital’. Each of these provided a definitional context against which a ‘national mental health 
service’ was consequently conceived and constructed – and through which the IAPT service 
later emerged with its own notion of public psychological healthcare.  
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Following other scholars of the ‘psy’ disciplines (see e.g. Marks 2018), I use the term 
‘psychotherapeutics’ here in an attempt to encapsulate historically contingent forms of 
psychological therapeutics that might not always be thought of as ‘psychotherapy’ as present-
day mental health professionals use the term. 
 
From the asylum to the mental hospital 
The public asylum in Britain developed within the legal framework of the Poor Law of 1834, a 
revision of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, with its carceral structure in the form of 
‘workhouses’ (Unsworth 1993). Workhouses were set up to provide ‘indoor relief’ for ‘paupers’ 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this period, the public asylum 
became the primary institution of mental health intervention across Europe founded on a 
legalistic and custodial approach to madness which had defined its institutions since the 
seventeenth century (Foucault 1961). The institutionalisation of asylums as centre points for 
the treatment of the ‘mentally ill’ had initially been founded on ‘reformist’ and ‘therapeutic’ 
values. However, during the nineteenth century, and up until the early 1930s, British asylums 
appear to have been characterised by a highly custodial management of patients which seems 
to have involved little or no ‘medical’ or ‘psychological’ treatment (Unsworth 1993). Rather, 
the custodial nature of the asylum could be seen as protecting the ‘liberty of citizens’ (including 
doctors and psychiatrists) from ‘dangerous’ patients through practices of confinement. 
According to some historians, this was a rationale epitomised in the Lunacy Act of 1890 
(Busfield 1998).  
It was partly through the political work of Liberal Governments of 1906-1914, which 
introduced reforms into public welfare, that the principles underlying the treatment of ‘mental 
disorder’ and ‘the insane’ began to shift away from custodial models of treatment. It was in 
many ways the outbreak of the First World War that challenged the asylum system and its 
Victorian orthodoxy. The emergence of ‘war trauma’ amongst citizens, especially soldiers, 
challenged legal assumptions about the appropriateness of compulsory detention in particular 
and the role of asylums in general (Jones 2004). During and after the First World War, 
numerous soldiers returning from the war suffered from the effects of what became known as 
‘shell-shock’, a condition considered to have been identified by the psychologist Charles 
Samuel Myers (1915). The diagnostic category of ‘shell-shock’ brought new aetiologies to the 
fore which undermined hereditarian theories of psychopathology. The putative increase in 
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patients deemed to suffer from the trauma of war together with the observation that these 
patients seemed to cut across established social classes, was a phenomenon held as evidence 
against the conventional theory of ‘inherited mental disease’ (such as the Victorian notion of 
‘tainted families’, see Myers 2015). In the aftermath of the war, the theories and practices which 
developed in dealing with patients suffering from shell-shock had a profound impact on 
changing perceptions of ‘mental disorder’ as a matter of ‘national’ and ‘public health’. As 
Busfield notes (1998: 13), the devastating stigma of pauperisation and treatment in terms of 
detention did not seem an apt reward for the nation’s ‘public’ facing up to the dangers of war, 
and especially ill-fitting for officers and gentlemen apparently suffering from the trauma of 
battle.  
Changes in the public provision of mental healthcare gradually came under way with 
investments in new clinics and research departments in Britain. One of the earliest initiatives 
was the establishment of the Maudsley Hospital in 1915 by the London County Council. The 
Maudsley was set up to provide early psychiatric treatment with both inpatient and outpatient 
services. However, the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 meant that it largely functioned 
as a military hospital until it reopened in 1923 (Allderidge 1991).  
The radical restructuring of the nineteenth-century institutions is said to have been 
instigated in 1930 with the Mental Treatment Act, drawing on the resolutions and 
recommendations of the work that had been done in the 1924-6 Royal Commission on Lunacy 
and Mental Disorder (2016). Histories of psychiatry often refer to the Act as the advent of a 
new medical era (e.g. see articles in Marks 2017); the language of the Poor Law was formally 
abandoned and replaced with a new language that sought to define patients not in terms of 
pauperisation and dangerous lunacy, but in terms of ‘rate-aided persons’ and ‘clinical need’, 
and, most significantly, it discarded the term ‘asylum’ and renamed it the ‘mental hospital’. 
Moreover, the 1926 report by the Commission asserted ‘that there is no clear line of 
demarcation between mental illness and physical illness’, with the implication that both should 
be given the same medical attention and by the medical profession.31  
These shifts have often been described as a victory and turning point in the discipline of 
psychiatry: psychiatrists (i.e., medical doctors) were finally given full credence as scientists of 
 
31 Royal Commission on Lunacy and mental Disorder (London HMSO, 1926), p. 20. 
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psychopathology and thus granted professional authority over the mental hospital – and over 
people deemed ‘mentally ill’. 
 
Psychoanalysis and the Tavistock Clinic 
Another important initiative during the First World War, and one directly affected by the 
problem of ‘shell-shocked soldiers’ and the growing spectrum of ‘war neuroses’, was the 
introduction of new clinical methods promoted by the neurologist Hugh Crichton-Miller 
(1877–1959), who had looked to the ‘new psychology’ that had developed in Vienna and Zurich 
during the two previous decades, namely psychoanalysis (Rose 1986; Marks 2018).32 This led 
to the establishment of the Tavistock Clinic in 1920 under the organisation name of the 
Tavistock Institute of Medical Psychology, a private institute specialising in both 
psychotherapeutic training and treatment. 33  The early vision of the Tavistock Clinic, as 
pioneered by Crichton-Miller, was to de-medicalise the conventional treatment of patients 
which meant that there were no doctors in white coats, no detention units, and no medical 
restraint equipment – three defining features of the asylum. The Tavistock was also one of the 
first ‘outpatient’ clinics in Britain, providing services on the basis of voluntary admission. 
Although it was originally a private clinic (like most other psychotherapy clinics that followed 
after), the Tavistock Clinic became part of public mental health services with the 
implementation of the National Health Service in 1948. 
During the 1920s, the Tavistock was the first clinic in Britain to apply psychoanalytic and 
psychodynamic approaches to mental disorders in an institutional setting (Turner et al. 2015). 
However, whilst the first three decades of the twentieth century can be seen as the early heydays 
of psychoanalytic thought amongst intellectual elites in Britain (Rose 1986), psychoanalysis still 
remained ‘strongly opposed by the general public, the Church, the medical and psychiatric 
establishment, and the press’ (Kohon 1986: 28). Such opposition was also evident from 
psychoanalysis’ limited institutional endorsement: the Tavistock Clinic sought to obtain official 
recognition as a postgraduate training institution by the University of London on several 
 
32 Several influential articles and books on psychoanalysis were published in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century and many were translated into English. Sigmund Freud’s first book, The Interpretation of 
Dreams, was published in English in 1915 [originally published as Die Traumdeutung in 1899]. 
33 It was originally to be termed simply the ‘Tavistock Clinic’ but due to its location on Tavistock Square and 
complaints from the General Post Office it was formally named ‘The Tavistock Square Clinic for Functional 
Nervous Disorders.’ It was known as simply ‘the Tavi’. 
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occasions, but its proposals were constantly rejected (Dicks 1970). And whilst the seeming 
pervasiveness of shell-shock, and the psychoanalytic theories which accompanied it, had a 
significant impact on the work and research of some doctors and academics, 34 
psychotherapeutics in general remained a marginal activity in Britain up until after the Second 
World War (Jones 2004). 
In addition to this, it seems important to note that despite the Tavistock Clinic’s 
philosophical anchoring in psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment however, psychoanalysis was 
only provided to patients by a few trained specialists at the Clinic. The Tavistock is said to have 
been unusually diverse in terms of both treatment and training beyond psychoanalysis, 
bringing together social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, neurologists and 
psychotherapists in the courses and services it offered (Tavistock and Portman 2009). It became 
known for new ‘psychological’ and ‘social’ understandings of psychopathology and 
intervention, and for taking issue with a singularly physiological and hereditarian notion of 
mental disorder and its ‘carceral’ intervention model (Rose 1986). The Tavistock also became 
part of the ‘mental hygiene’ movement, which introduced methods for prevention and early 
intervention that attended to ‘bio-psycho-social’ processes and emphasised ‘the individual case’ 
by situating people in their ‘social environment’ in which symptoms were seen to occur (Dicks 
1970).  
Such ideas and practices, radical as they were felt at the time, continued to challenge 
institutional arrangements that underpinned ‘public sector’ provision with its custodial 
asylums. Nonetheless, change in the legal and institutional constitution regarding ‘mental 
treatment’ only came about after the 1930 Mental Treatment Act, when British psychiatry 
eventually vindicated many of Crichton-Miller’s contentions. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, one contention that became increasingly salient was the proposal of attending to 
the economic benefits of ‘good mental health’ – such an aspiration was linked to other ‘science 
and society’ issues following the war – which went beyond the idea of the ‘individual patient’ 
or ‘subject’ (the conventional objective of psychoanalysis) and rather conceived of health in 
terms of the nation’s population as a whole construed as ‘the public’. The present-day 
conception of ‘public mental health’ is in many ways owed to this ambition. 
 
 
34 For example, the anthropologist W. H. Rivers and his colleagues (see Sullivan 2012).  
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The lab and the clinic: The Institute of Psychiatry and the Maudsley 
Hospital 
The use of some form of psychotherapeutics in what became known as the ‘public sector’ of 
mental healthcare can therefore be seen to have been practised in some form since the opening 
of the NHS in 1948 when the Tavistock Clinic became part of the new public health service 
together with the Portman Clinic, another psychoanalytic institute.  
However, the introduction of psychotherapeutics into the NHS which in many ways could 
be said to have laid the foundation of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) was not a result of 
the Tavistock or Portman implementation. Rather, at the end of the Second World War and in 
the post-war years that followed, the newly founded Institute of Psychiatry at the Maudsley 
Hospital combined laboratory and clinical research in the development and application of 
behavioural approaches to mental illness. As Marks has noted (2012: 1-2), histories of CBT 
frequently cite American psychiatrist Aaron Beck and the psychologist Albert Ellis as the 
original inventors of ‘cognitive therapy’ in the 1950s and 60s (cf. Beck and Rose 1979), and tend 
to pay little attention to the development of behavioural approaches in Britain which predates 
the work of both Beck and Ellis. We turn now to some of the historical specificities that gave 
rise to a form of psychotherapeutics that became known as ‘behavioural therapy’. 
When the Second World War broke out, most of the staff from the Maudsley Hospital were 
moved to the Mill Hill emergency premises outside London to treat soldiers and military 
personnel suffering war neuroses. In 1942, the clinical director of the Maudsley, Aubrey Lewis, 
appointed the German psychologist Hans Eysenck to do psychological research at the Mill Hill 
(Derksen 2000, 2001). Eysenck shared Lewis’ vision of establishing psychology as an 
experimental laboratory science on which psychiatry could rest as the ‘intervention science’. At 
the Maudsley, psychology was thus practised as ‘a basic science of psychiatry’ in the study and 
treatment of psychopathology – this pursuit was an explicit attempt to align psychology and 
psychiatry with medicine where physiology had long been established as the ‘basic science of 
physical disease’ (Lewis 1967: 7). Aubrey Lewis’ vision for the Maudsley was partly inspired by 
the influential work of Emil Kraepelin, whose definition of ‘clinical psychology’ referred to the 
‘psychological laboratory’ in his psychiatric clinic in Munich, in which psychologists-as-
scientists applied the theories and methods of experimental psychology to construct psychiatric 
treatments (Kraepelin 1896). In post-war Britain, clinical psychology as a discipline and 
profession was thus originally established as a science in the clinic at the service of psychiatry. 
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At the end of the Second World War, Lewis and Eysenck returned to the Maudsley Hospital 
and the Institute of Psychiatry was founded when the Maudsley was amalgamated with the 
Bethlem Royal Hospital, which provided the financial means of the Institute. In 1947, Lewis 
appointed Eysenck to head the new Department of Psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry, 
setting up the first postgraduate training programme to establish the professional position of 
the ‘clinical psychologist’ (Derksen 2000: 4). 
After the war, the integration of the Institute of Psychiatry and the Maudsley Hospital as 
part of the NHS introduced the provision of psychotherapeutics in the form of behavioural 
therapy, distinct from the psychodynamic tradition of the Tavistock, which had also become 
part of the new public health service. However, the original implementation plans of the NHS 
did not include mental health services (Busfield 1998: 16). It was only with the inclusion of 
state-funded mental hospitals in the NHS plans of 1944, under the insistence of the Minister of 
Health Aneurin Bevan (Foot 1975), that psychotherapeutics consequently came to occupy a 
position in the provision of psychiatric treatment. Whilst psychotherapeutics in the public 
sector remained considerably limited in post-war Britain, it had nonetheless become an object 
of renewed scientific interest pioneered by the Institute of Psychiatry and the Maudsley 
Hospital as a unified teaching, research and healthcare institution. 
 
The invention of IAPT 
In 2007, on World Mental Health Day, a new healthcare programme by the name of ‘Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapies’ (IAPT) was officially announced in the UK by clinical 
psychologist David Clark and economist Richard Layard.  
This initiative, which had won the support of the Labour Government in 2005, called for the 
implementation of specifically ‘evidence-based psychological therapies’ in the NHS (Pickersgill 
2019). The subsequent implementation of the IAPT initiative in the NHS as the first 
psychological healthcare service of its kind was widely acclaimed as a ‘scientific’ achievement 
for psychological therapies and clinical psychology (Department of Health 2010; Hall et al. 
2015; Layard & Clark 2014). Yet since IAPT’s inception, the service and its proclaimed 
achievements following its nationwide implementation have been met with intense criticism 
from practitioners of psychotherapy (see e.g. Leader 2008; Lees 2016; Rizq 2012; Samuels & 
Veale 2009).  
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This opposition, and the diverse range of critical voices contained by it, has been asserted 
primarily by practitioners of psychotherapeutic schools and disciplines generally excluded 
from the ‘evidence-based’ classification as authorised by the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE).35 But points of contention have also been voiced from within the 
‘evidence-based’-labelled community, by CBT practitioners and clinical psychologists alike. 
IAPT therapists drawing on their own work experience have increasingly taken issue with 
various aspects of the service (see e.g. Binnie 2015; Steel et al. 2015). Despite IAPT’s continued 
self-celebration (Clark 2018; Layard & Clark 2014) and reported success in the UK (e.g. 
Department of Health 2010; NHS Digital 2018), concerns and criticism from both within and 
outside the service seem to pervade (see e.g. Pilgrim 2009; Rizq 2012; Williams 2015; Binnie 
2015; Lees 2016). We explore these critiques in Chapter 3.  
IAPT’s acclaimed success has also been reported on internationally, featuring for instance 
in renowned academic journals such as The Lancet and Nature; the latter journal described the 
IAPT service as representing ‘a world-beating standard thanks to the scale of its 
implementation and the validation of its treatments’ (Nature 2012: 473). In a New York Times 
article titled ‘England’s mental health experiment: no-cost talk therapy’ (Carey 2017; as cited 
in Pickersgill 2019: 628), IAPT was acknowledged for its ‘ambitious effort to treat depression, 
anxiety and other common mental illnesses’. In a conference in 2018 that celebrated the 10th 
anniversary of IAPT, I watched the founder David Clark give a presentation (in his capacity as 
the ‘National Clinical and Informatics Advisor for IAPT’) in which he told the audience that 
several other countries are ‘developing plans for IAPT-like CBT services’. ‘Building on the UK 
model, Norway now has 40 IAPT services’, he said exultantly, ‘and Australia’s NewAccess for 
depression and anxiety programme is also strongly influenced by IAPT’.36  All such public 
commentary has elided IAPT with CBT and vice versa, and in turn hailed both as the gold 
standard of psychological healthcare.  
It was partly through the movement of EBM that psychological therapies secured a scientific 
status on an equal footing with biomedical therapies, the latter consisting mainly of 
 
35 These include various subsets of psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy, including ‘creative’ 
or ‘expressive’ psychotherapies (e.g. art therapy, play therapy, music therapy). 
36  This reported success of IAPT has also prompted calls recently for the adoption of similar national 
psychological health services in Holland, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark. However, such calls have not been 
without contention; for instance, psychologists and psychotherapists in Sweden have issued official 
statements objecting to the Swedish Government’s implementation plans (see, for example, debates in 
Ankarberg 2017). 
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psychopharmaceuticals. The ‘evidence’ to which the academic and popular CBT literatures 
refer has been produced according to methodologies drawn from EBM (see Parry 2000; 
Salkovskis 2002; David et al. 2018). Within this framework, evidence is ranked according to the 
reliability and verifiability of the epidemiological research design used (Lambert 2006). The 
randomised control trial has become the gold standard, followed by meta-analyses and 
systematic reviews (Timmermans & Berg 2003; Pearce et al. 2015). In Chapter 5, we return in 
more detail to the epistemic underpinnings and implications of this scientific epistemology.  
As noted in Chapter 1, evidence-based practice can be said to have become formally 
institutionalised in England and Wales with the foundation of the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE). This Institute was originally termed the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (hence the abbreviation: ‘NICE’) when Tony Blair’s Labour Government 
was formed in 1997. It was then officially launched in 1999 in an attempt to end the so-called 
‘postcode lottery’ of public healthcare in NHS England and Wales (Dobson 1999). In 2005, it 
joined with the UK Health Development Agency and was renamed as the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence; following the Health and Social Care Act 2012, it changed again 
to its current name (adding ‘care’ to reflect new regulatory responsibilities for social care) whilst 
also attaining the status as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body (ENDPB). ENDPBs 
are organisations that deliver and regulate particular public services; although they are not 
officially part of a governmental department, they are still ‘sponsored’ by departments – NICE 
is under the Department of Health – and ministers are ultimately responsible to Parliament for 
their department’s sponsorships. NICE is overseen by its own self-appointed board (Cabinet 
Office 2007). 
NICE was designed to evaluate the cost-benefits of particular treatments within the 
framework of a state-funded healthcare system and to provide guidelines for NHS practitioners 
for best clinical practice (NICE 2019). Published in 2004, the NICE guidelines on anxiety and 
depression stated that, ‘When considering individual psychological treatments for moderate, 
severe and treatment-resistant [i.e., resistance to antidepressants] depression, the treatment 
choice is CBT’.37 The 2004 NICE guidelines were a significant achievement for CBT as it laid a 
 
37 Published in December 2004, see article CG23: https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/CG23. This version has 
since been updated and replaced by CG90: ‘Depression in adults: recognition and management’ (published 
October 2009, updated April 2018): https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg90. 
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political foundation on which IAPT could be designed and lobbied successfully by Clark and 
Layard.  
 
Disciplines join forces: clinical psychology meets ‘happiness economics’ 
The IAPT programme was thus said to have been designed by clinical psychologist David Clark 
and economist Richard Layard in the early 2000s before it was formally launched in 2008. As I 
suggested in the previous chapter, Clark and Layard were instrumental in framing a putative 
crisis in British mental health as a problem of ‘access’ to care, and to then delineate the solution 
to this problem in simultaneously clinical and economic terms. In lobbying the Government, 
it was argued that public mental healthcare should be optimised by improving access to 
evidence-based psychological therapy whilst such improved access would also have immense 
economic benefit for the UK (for example by reducing unemployment benefits, cf. The Centre 
for Economic Performance 2006; Layard et al. 2007). Underscoring this argument was a claim 
derived from ‘happiness economics’ (cf. Layard 2005b) that the improvement of psychological 
wellbeing, on the one hand, and economic welfare, on the other, are not separate aims or 
domains of inquiry but rather form part of the same goal, with the former enabling the latter. 
It was at a British Academy event held in 2003 that David Clark is said to have first met with 
Richard Layard, after which they started working together to incorporate psychological therapy 
in UK policymaking (Evans 2013; Layard and Clark 2014). In the context of British mental 
health, Richard Layard was already known for his research on the economics of happiness and 
wellbeing and his formulation of ‘happiness economics’ epitomised by the book Happiness: 
Lessons from a New Science (Layard 2005a). Happiness economics can be summarised briefly 
as concerned with the study of how improvement in what is termed ‘happiness-related 
measures’, such as ‘mental health’, can increase ‘economic life’ (ibid.). Layard’s interest in 
mental health as the prime indicator of ‘national happiness’ subsequently resulted in his focus 
on psychological therapy as a clinical-cum-economic solution to a reported mental health crisis 
in the UK (Layard 2005b; Helliwell et al. 2012). According to Layard, the ‘subjective happiness 
of a population’ was linked to the economic growth of a nation. ‘Mental health’ was thus reified 
as both obstacle and solution to Britain’s economy (Layard 2005a). 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the category of ‘depression’ proved tremendously important in 
situating clinical psychology in the rationale of happiness economics; in different ways, Clark 
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and Layard’s professional work had revolved around the problem of ‘depression’.38 Clark for 
instance had long been engaged in research into cognitive behavioural interventions for people 
diagnosed with depression. After meeting Clark, Layard appears to have begun a more 
systematic dissemination of documents and presentations on ‘depression’ embedded in a 
discourse of the constitutive effects of ‘mental health’ on ‘the economy’ (e.g. Layard 2005a, 
2005b; see also Pickersgill 2019a). Layard’s publications seem to have caught the attention of 
senior Labour figures and other important political figures and institutions (ibid.). For 
example, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit invited Layard in 2005 to a seminar at which Clark 
was also present (Evans 2013b) to present a report titled ‘Mental health: Britain’s biggest social 
problem? (Layard 2005a). This report asserted that ‘There are now more mentally ill people 
drawing incapacity benefits than there are unemployed people on Jobseeker’s Allowance’ 
(Layard 2005a 1). Mental illness, Layard claimed, ‘imposes heavy costs on the economy’ (ibid.). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Layard proposed that the solution to these economic issues was to be 
found in an extensive investment and expansion of psychological therapy and trained mental 
health professionals. These publications laid the foundation of another influential report 
published a year later by the Centre for Economic Performance (2006): The Depression Report, 
also discussed internally as ‘The Layard Report’. 39 
Following a period of intensive lobbying by Layard and Clark, the proposal of an evidence-
based psychological therapy service as part of the NHS was successfully incorporated into the 
New Labour’s manifesto for the 2005 election. The Manifesto designated ‘behavioural’ therapy 
as the preferred means of psychological treatment alongside biomedical ‘drug therapies’ (The 
Labour Party 2005: 65). Following Labour’s election victory, Clark was largely responsible for 
designing the service resulting in the first implementation framework of 2006 (Clark et al. 
2009). Clark and his colleagues initially designed IAPT to provide CBT exclusively to treat ‘mild 
 
38 David Clark is currently Professor of Psychology at the University of Oxford, where he also first studied 
experimental psychology before training as a clinical psychologist at the Institute of Psychiatry and Maudsley 
Hospital. In 2000, he became the Head of Psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry where he set up ‘The 
Centre for Anxiety Disorders and Trauma’ together with fellow Oxford psychologist Paul Salkovskis and 
Clark’s wife, Anke Ehlers, a professor in experimental psychopathology at Oxford. Since the launch of the 
IAPT service, Clark has continued to act as National Clinical Adviser to the Department of Health when new 
policies and regulations concerning the service are introduced. 
Richard Layard is a well-known labour economist and was formerly a professor at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE). Layard had been appointed to the UK House of Lords in 2000 after 
having become a prominent figure in New Labour party politics. Layard also remains a member of the 
Labour Party and the House of Lords. 
39 The Depression Report was released on 19 June 2006. 
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to moderate depression’ and ‘anxiety disorders’ in accordance with the NICE guidelines of 
2004. However, cognitive behavioural therapies have since proliferated (Marks 2012, 2017), 
incorporating also mindfulness in the form of MBCT (Cook 2016, Drage 2018) under the 
banner of evidence-based psychological therapy.  
We could summarise Clark and Layard’s promotion of the IAPT programme as proposing 
two overarching and interlinked objectives: 1) to implement and improve access to evidence-
based psychological therapies, in order to; 2) meet the rapidly growing demand for mental 
healthcare in the UK. These objectives did not, of course, emerge unrelated to circumstances 
that were already taking shape in and around the NHS. Issues relating to questions of access, 
evidence, and accountability had been a concern across several public sectors since at least the 
1990s (Shore & Wright 1999; Strathern 2000) and were also of central concern in the movement 
of EBM of the same period (Lambert et al. 2006; Timmermans & Berg 2003). EBM’s influence 
on psychology is said to have been partly a reaction to an increasing conception amongst 
clinicians and public health policymakers that ‘the public’ was not provided with the ‘best 
practice’ in mental healthcare due to empirically unsupported treatments (Department of 
Health 2010; Turner et al. 2015; Clark 2018). From the first implementations of IAPT, CBT was 
singled out as the foremost psychological intervention with an established evidence base (Clark 
et al. 2009; The Centre for Economic Performance 2006). The past twenty years have seen a 
rapid increase in scientific research investment in a range of CBT-based interventions, many 
of which have now received broad scientific recognition.40 The reported efficacy of CBT has 
been widely documented with reference to mild and moderate depression, anxiety, PTSD, 
OCD, and various eating disorders.41 
It also seems important to note that the notion of, and attention to, ‘the mental health of a 
population’ was linked to an older conviction constitutive of the NHS itself, namely the idea 
that ‘the physical and mental health of a nation’ is generative of a ‘healthy’ national economy 
 
40  For systematic reviews, see e.g. Butler et al. (2006); Hofmann et al. (2012); Öst (2008). The terms 
‘empirically supported therapy’ (EST) and ‘evidence-based therapy’ (EBT) have become largely synonymous 
with CBT within the NHS (including CBT-derived therapies such as ‘mindfulness’ [i.e. Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy]; see ‘NHS CBT’: http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Cognitive-behavioural-
therapy/Pages/Introduction.aspx [accessed April 2018]; and ‘The Evidence Base for Psychological Therapies: 
Implications for Policy and Practice’: http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Cognitive-behavioural-
therapy/Pages/Introduction.aspx [accessed April 2018].  
41 See, e.g., Clark et al. (2003); Freeston et al. (1997); Salkovskis et al. (2003); Tang et al. (2005); Teasdale et 
al. (2002). 
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(Busfield 1998). In a slight inversion of this rationale, however, Layard argued that there was a 
significant disparity between increased national economic growth and a decline in the ‘mental 
wellbeing’ of the UK population (Layard 2005b, 2006; see also Layard and Clark 2014). As noted 
above, Layard proposed that the explanation of this disparity was to be found in ‘happiness 
economics’ which seeks to measure ‘happiness-related’ issues such as ‘mental health’ – 
proposing, for example, a ‘Gross National Happiness’ index – rather than ‘economic 
productivity’ (e.g. Gross National Product [GNP]) as an indicator of the progress of ‘the 
economy’ (ibid.). The IAPT service with evidence-based psychological therapy at its heart was 
thus presented, as we saw in Chapter 1, as the key solution to problems framed as ‘social’ and 
‘economic’ that were identified as a consequence of mental ill-health, especially ‘depression’ 
(Clark & Layard 2005, 2014).  
We could say that IAPT emerged as a joint ‘psychological-economic’ enterprise. Not only 
was evidence-based psychotherapy deemed effective in scientific and clinical terms, it seemed 
also to be a tremendously ‘cost-effective’ approach in economic terms: IAPT, it was argued 
(Layard et al. 2007), would eventually pay for itself by increasing productivity (employment) 
and thus reduce state benefits. 
 
In summary, ‘talk therapy’ and ‘drug therapy’ in the UK can now be seen to have become equals 
– sometimes rivals, sometimes companions – as therapeutic solutions to ‘common mental 
health problems’ like depression and anxiety. With the reported demand for new effective 
treatments and a continued increase in the use of anti-depressants in the UK, the introduction 
of the IAPT programme as a ‘free’ psychological health service was therefore deemed by its 
founders and by other advocates in clinical psychology and economics (e.g. Hall et al. 2015; 
Helliwell et al. 2012) to be greatly ‘needed’. In the meantime, other mental health professionals 
have mourned the end of what they see as a more ‘relational’ practice of psychotherapy (Lees 
2016).  
‘IAPT’, as one critic put it, offers ‘second class therapy for citizens deemed to be second class’ 
(Samuels 2016: xii). We now turn to some of these tensions following the institutionalisation 




































‘The more I do evidence-based psychotherapy, the less I believe in it’, Rosie remarked gloomily 
as we were heading out for lunch after a staff meeting at the university department where she 
taught psychology. It was important to therapists like Rosie that psychotherapy still means that 
someone is taking care of you: ‘there is a relationship in psychotherapy and that’s what matters.’ 
This chapter points to some tensions between how social anthropologists have tended to 
situate and theorise psychological worlds and how professional practitioners in such worlds 
have done their own situating and self-commentary. Such a juxtaposition is not intended to 
align or conflate the two (the anthropologist and the people studied) but to draw attention to 
how mental health professionals themselves produce critiques familiar to social anthropology 
and, importantly, how such critical assessments often imply similar contentions that have 
tended to preoccupy anthropological theorisation of the ‘psy’ disciplines and its practitioners 
(cf. Rose 1989, 1996).  
It is, therefore, the critical significance of psychological therapy that is the topic of this 
chapter. By ‘critical significance’ I mean to indicate how critiques of IAPT have been framed 
by mental health professionals themselves and the significance of such critiques. In the 
following paragraphs, we will see how certain critiques of IAPT that I encountered during 
fieldwork with IAPT professionals wielded techniques of contextualisation and critique that 
have also tended to inform the analytical languages of social scientists in their discussions of 
psychological therapy. We might reflect that an outsider’s analysis may not always differ 
significantly, therefore, from what is already contained ethnographically in the critical 
discourses mobilised here by the psy practitioners themselves. This is not a failure of analysis 
but an ethnographic note on the widespread persuasiveness of a particular kind of critique.  
We will see first some common critiques of IAPT from within the service itself (that is, by 
the therapists working in the service), after which we turn to social anthropology. First, I 
describe some key features of the IAPT service in more detail. ‘Screening’ and ‘recovery’ are 
deemed to be measures fundamental to the monitoring of psychological therapy but they are 
also burdensome for many therapists, as we will see, who now feel that the service they work in 
has become a ‘factory of therapy’. In the meantime, I suggest that the metaphor of the ‘factory’ 
has contributed to certain visions of accountability that have made IAPT conceivable; some 
practitioners feel, however, that it is precisely this pursuit of accountability which makes IAPT 
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fail in practice: the complexity of care – ‘the relationship in psychotherapy’ – is deemed to be 
at stake.  
We explore these concerns as we turn to some contextualisations of IAPT and the question 
of ‘responsibility’. Anthropologists’ increasing attention to the notion of responsibility owes 
much to scholarly debates in the social sciences about the significance of (neo)liberal processes 
of subjectification and (self-)governance in the proliferation of psychological therapies. Social 
scientists, including anthropologists, might classify themselves as being radically different from 
the psy practitioners studied here, but they nevertheless share with them many of the same 
compelling critical stances. 
 
The stepped-care model 
The IAPT service is provided as part of primary care in NHS England and operate on a 
‘stepped-care’ model. This stepped-care provision of psychological healthcare was built in part 
on principles derived from the economic model of ‘managed care’ that began to inform the 
NHS in the 1980s.42 The NHS was to rest on three m’s: managers, markets and measurement 
(Ferlie et al. 1996). 
As we saw  in Chapter 1, the stepped-care model of IAPT is based on a ‘triage’ approach to 
healthcare in which the classification of degrees of clinical urgency decide the assignment and 
course of treatment. 43  The IAPT service’s three ‘steps’ is also  a division of labour and a 
hierarchy of intervention. Intervention is understood in terms of ‘intensity’, from ‘low-
intensity therapy’ (‘step 1’ and ‘step 2’) to ‘high-intensity therapy’ (‘step 3’). These ‘steps’ 
correspond to a specific therapeutic profession in the provision of treatment: low-intensity 
therapy is administered by Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners (PWPs) and step 3 is 
provided by CBT therapists.  
 
Screening 
People usually enter the IAPT service by referral through their General Practitioner (GP), as 
well as through self-referral via NHS websites or over the telephone. We saw in Chapter 1 that 
 
42 Managed care developed primarily in the US and came to the fore with the enactment of the U.S. Health 
Maintenance Organisation Act of 1973. A form of managed care was introduced in the UK ten years later in 
1983 when Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government commissioned the businessman Roy Griffiths to 
write a report on the ‘general management’ of the NHS (Griffiths 1983). 
43 For an illustration of the stepped-care system, see Figure 1 in the Appendix. 
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self-referral is a defining novelty and key component of the ‘improving access’ scheme. During 
my fieldwork, it was frequently explained to me how self-referral was aimed at people 
considered to be disinclined to consult their GP because of ‘social stigma’ or ‘embarrassment’ 
still associated with ‘seeing a psychotherapist’. However, some of these same professionals 
likewise saw the practice of self-referral as having overburdened the already unmanageable 
waiting lists.44  
Following referral, a person is placed on one of three ‘steps’, based on a diagnostic 
assessment usually conducted over the telephone. These are called ‘screening calls’. PWPs 
conduct the initial screening call using diagnostic patient questionnaires or ‘measures’. This 
usually takes between 10 to 15 minutes. The severity of symptoms assessed through the initial 
screening call determines the degree of ‘intensity’ of treatment.45 The ‘low-intensity’ treatment 
offered to those placed in the category of step 1 or step 2 consists primarily of ‘guided self-help’, 
‘psycho-education’ and/or ‘computerised CBT (cCBT)’, all provided by Psychological 
Wellbeing Practitioners. Those placed in step 3 qualify for a ‘high-intensity’ treatment 
involving a specified number of CBT therapy sessions (usually between 6 – 12 sessions, 
depending on the diagnosis). ‘High intensity’ is thus the only category through which there is 
a guaranteed course of psychotherapeutic consultations with a CBT therapist (or other 
accredited IAPT psychotherapist). 
Screening is often said to be provisional; a diagnosis may change following the 
commencement of treatment, for example, after a first consultation with a CBT therapist, 
although I was told that ‘provisional’ assessments rarely change in practice. Both the practice 
of screening and subsequent ‘assessments’ entail a checklist of ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ 
criteria informed by the publications of international diagnostic manuals of psychopathology.46  
 
 
44 The criticism has been firmly countered by the founders of IAPT in their book Thrive: The Power of 
Evidence-based Psychological Therapies (Layard and Clark 2014). Clark and Layard argue that people who 
receive treatment through IAPT’s self-referral tend to have a markedly quicker recovery than people who get 
referred by a GP or social worker. One of the reasons, they argue, has to do with the fact that people who 
self-refer often are more ‘independent’ about their mental health compared to ‘the average person’ who gets 
referred through ‘the system’. 
45 This involves classifying a ‘patient’ and classifying a condition in accordance with three definitions of the 
degree of psychological acuteness: ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ or ‘severe’. 
46 These are DSM-5 (The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th ed.) published by the 
American Psychiatric Association (2013) and the ICD-10 (The International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th ed.) published by the World Health Organization (2017), the 
latter of which is the official manual in the UK (although the ICD manual is strongly influenced by the DSM). 
 82 
Recovery 
The daily actions that IAPT professionals are required to take ‘to manage the waiting list’ are 
often accompanied by a worrisome awareness of the shortage of ‘proper treatment’ available to 
those who are taken off the list. An important aspect of this concern has to do with the statistical 
measure of ‘recovery rates’. ‘Recovery’ means that someone who has been a ‘patient’ emerges – 
as a ‘recovered patient’ – with insignificant or no symptoms at the end of their treatment. 
‘Symptoms’ are determined by scores recorded on scaled questionnaires (or ‘measures’) which 
have been designed to assess a specific, predefined condition. Questionnaires are usually 
handed to patients at the end of the therapy session to fill out. 
The national target goal for the total population of ‘recovered patients’ is set by the 
Government. The Government target is that 50% of eligible referrals to IAPT services should 
move to recovery (Department of Health 2015). ‘Eligible referrals’ are patients who have 
completed a course of treatment in the year of having started treatment following assessment; 
these patients thus make up a separate statistical group of the overall referrals to IAPT since 
not all referred patients start or finish their assigned treatment plan. Annual targets for 
recovery rates for local IAPT service providers are stipulated and regulated by the Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs). The NHS in England is split into CCGs. These are clinically-
led organisations that are responsible for the planning and commissioning of healthcare 
services in their regional areas. CCGs are accountable to the Secretary of State for Health 
through NHS England and are measured according to how much they improve treatment 
outcomes for the entire regional population which they administer. All IAPT service providers 
— in clinics, hospitals, community centres, and so on. — are accountable to their CCG. IAPT 
services are thus required to meet the annual targets for recovery rates instituted by their CCG 
who commission the specific services. This means that if an IAPT service provider fails to meet 
the specified percentages of patient recovery, they risk getting their funding cut. In some cases, 
the CCG might decide to close the service altogether and prioritise funding of other NHS 
services. 
Recovery is measured in terms of ‘caseness’, which means that a patient has been assessed 
to have enough symptoms of a mental health problem and thus be classified as a ‘clinical case’. 
That is, the patient must score below the ‘clinical’/‘non-clinical’ threshold on the relevant 
measures at the end of treatment to be placed in the category of ‘recovery’ or ‘moving to 
recovery’ (cf. NHS 2018). The concept of threshold (or ‘limen’) derives from nineteenth-
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century physiology where it was used to denote a boundary between perceivable versus non-
perceivable stimuli or responses (Young 2017). Subsequently, such ideas informed 
psychologists in the early twentieth century concerned with psychological assessment 
(‘screening’): threshold came to refer to the liminal point or ‘cut-off’ in diagnostic 
questionnaires that score a patient’s self-reported ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ experience. 47 
Psychological questionnaires, as Young (2017) has put it, became technologies for ‘numbering 
the mind’.  
The concept of recovery, as it has been taken up in IAPT, derived in part from psychiatry 
where it originally referred to the end of a particular period of illness caused by ‘substance 
abuse’ or ‘drug addiction’ specifically.48 The implementation of a recovery approach in the NHS 
followed several official publications on the topic, such as The Guiding Statement of Recovery 
by the National Institute of Mental Health in England (NIMHE 2005), which was supported by 
the Department of Health. Such documents conceived of recovery in terms of how ‘people 
experience themselves as they become empowered to manage their lives in a manner that allows 
them to achieve a fulfilling, meaningful life and a contributing positive sense of belonging in 
their communities’ (NIMHE 2005: 2). Recovery was further defined as ‘a return to a state of 
wellness’ and the ‘achievement of a personally acceptable quality of life’ (ibid.). One of the 
perceived values of this ‘recovery-oriented system of care’ was to enable ‘self-management, 
promote autonomy and, as a result, decrease the need for people to rely on formal service and 
professional supports’ (NIMHE 2005: 3). 
When IAPT was formally launched in 2008, it was in many ways intended to be a realisation 




‘We don’t talk about people’ 
Screening and recovery have become installed as central technologies of measurement for 
monitoring psychotherapy. Monitoring the provision and outcome of psychotherapy was a key 
 
47 Diagnostic questionnaires in clinical psychology are based on Thurstone and Likert scales (see Young 
2017).  
48 Its more recent usage in British mental health services was particularly influenced by the ‘psychiatric 
rehabilitation’ movement within the US during the late 1980s and 90s (Ramon et al. 2007). 
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feature of the IAPT initiative as envisaged by Richard Layard and David Clark and has 
remained a persuasive argument in establishing the legitimacy of the service: psychotherapy is, 
and should be, an accountable intervention. Accountability in IAPT has been constituted 
primarily through evaluations of clinical referrals, procedures and outcomes, but also through 
clinical guidelines, on which manualised treatment plans have been formulated. As indicated 
in Chapter 1, making the practice of psychotherapy amenable to a quantifiable evaluation 
framework was seen to be fundamental in accounting for the effectiveness of psychotherapy in 
scientific terms. We could say that a ‘trust in numbers’ (Porter 1996) undergirds IAPT’s self-
definition as an evidence-based service as much as it now informs a general pursuit of 
‘objectivity’ in psychology (a topic we explore further in Chapter 5).  
As in other contexts of accountability in the UK (see Hoeyer et al. 2019; Strathern 2000), 
regulatory practices in the form of standardisation, reporting and evaluation have been key to 
the notion of accountability in IAPT. Such practices of monitoring and audit – in particular, 
the laborious collection and submission of datasets (e.g. reporting on ‘recovery outcomes’) – 
have not been easy tasks to perform and therapists regularly complained to me about the ‘harm’ 
it had caused to the ‘quality’ of their work with patients. Surprisingly, these issues were not 
addressed at any of the professional IAPT conferences I attended, but they were discussed at 
length behind closed doors in internal office meetings, during lunch breaks and at the pub after 
working hours. A few (former) IAPT therapists have also reported in professional mental 
health journals on the problems caused by the extent to which they were required to audit their 
day-to-day, session-by-session therapeutic work (see e.g. Binnie 2015).  
In all of this, monitoring psychotherapy was often deemed so time-consuming and all-
encompassing to the extent that therapists frequently felt that they were ‘neglecting’ their 
patients. The burden of managing and meeting ‘outcome targets’ was felt widely throughout 
the services I encountered in my fieldwork. At times, these experiences were apparently so 
commonplace amongst therapists that some felt it had become banal – ‘too obvious’ – to even 
raise it as an issue in their own staff meetings. Therapists nevertheless still worried about the 
extensive monitoring of clinical practices. ‘Patients’, I was told on more than one occasion, 
‘have become numbers’. 
IAPT’s mass generation of data as part of accountabilities in British mental healthcare was 
aimed at making the ‘effectiveness’ of psychological therapy accountable alongside biomedical 
treatments provided by the NHS. As a result, psychological therapy was firmly established as 
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an equally valid and reliable intervention on an equal footing with psychopharmaceuticals in 
the treatment of mental health problems. Part of this reported success was thus perceived to 
have been achieved through a rigorous practice of accountability and audit. As we saw in 
previous chapters, it was likewise through accounting for CBT’s ‘effectiveness’ that its 
promoters subsequently claimed to have demonstrated a type of psychological therapy (CBT) 
that was said to be far more cost-effective than anti-depressants in the treatment of depression 
(cf. Clark and Layard 2014). Monitoring psychotherapy therefore also made the reputed 
success of IAPT ‘countable’ in economic terms (Pickersgill 2019a). These articulations of 
‘successful accountability’ were displayed to me through a range of statistical figures in the 
IAPT conferences I attended, with some of these conferences hosting David Clark as the 
keynote speaker to deliver the annual evaluation results of the service. It was a rare occurrence, 
however, to meet an IAPT therapist in these conferences who was not anxious about their 
collection and submission of data relating to ‘outcomes’ to fulfil the periodic target goal of 
recovery rates demanded of the local IAPT service in which they were employed. 
When I did fieldwork in a CBT training course at a university in Northern England, I met 
Rosie, a lecturer in psychology and a practising therapist. Rosie’s job was divided between 
training CBT therapists at the university and working as a psychotherapist herself in one of the 
local IAPT services. During one of our meetings, she described how she frequently worried 
about the direction IAPT was going in and, like others I spoke to, was happy for her words 
(albeit with her name changed) to go on record: 
 
First, there was all this excitement about improving access to mental health services. And it was 
exciting, I mean it’s fantastic! IAPT was trying to counter the imbalance of all the resources that were 
being ploughed into physical healthcare and the neglect of mental healthcare in the NHS. In that 
sense, the initiative of IAPT is really good. […] But IAPT is becoming more exclusive… it is based 
on exclusion [criteria]. 
 
Rosie was concerned about the patients who end up being excluded from seeing a 
psychotherapist because of how diagnostic criteria are deployed. ‘There are too many areas in 
the provision of psychological therapy where that person doesn’t fit into this or that category. 
That’s been my experience of working in IAPT so far.’ I met many practitioners like Rosie who 
had trained as CBT therapists because they wanted to work with patients therapeutically. They 
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wanted to help people get well through evidence-based psychotherapy like CBT. Rosie was 
attracted to CBT for its ‘rational’ and ‘efficient’ approach: 
 
It’s a form of psychotherapy that focuses on the present, it’s problem-oriented and offers concrete 
solutions. CBT is a set of techniques – everyone can learn them. It teaches you to become your own 
therapist, to manage life […] But even so, like any other talking therapy, you need a good therapeutic 
relationship [with your patient] for CBT to work. 
 
However, Rosie was unsure if psychotherapy would be feasible in the future with the increasing 
constraints put on IAPT therapists. She deplored that she often felt restricted when it came to 
helping patients she considered most in need of psychological care because of the demands of 
meeting ‘outcome’ targets: ‘You see, the more complex cases we ascribe to our services, the 
lower the target and recovery rates. Seeing more complex patients means that you are less likely 
to keep your job.’ 
Back in London at the community centre, I had met IAPT professionals with similar 
concerns. ‘The financial implications matter more to the CCGs [Clinical Commissioning 
Groups] than the quality of healthcare’, one therapist sighed. Another complained that too 
many of his clinical working hours were spent on laborious administrative tasks in meeting the 
‘target goals’ stipulated by the CCG. Others reported how they had to ‘move around patients’ 
in the stepped-care system ‘to cope with the pressure’. Consequently, many therapists were 
particularly worried about the daily monitoring of outcomes as part of the auditing of recovery 
rates, including the management of waiting lists. ‘It leaves me with inadequate time to care for 
my patients and do my work properly as a therapist’, one said regretfully after one of her weekly 
team meetings with members of the local CCG: 
 
We don’t talk about people in our meetings anymore. We talk about numbers and recovery rates. 
People – the patients – are gone from our conversations. If someone attended my team meetings, 
they probably wouldn’t realise we were talking healthcare. 
 
This seemed to be a common sentiment. Practitioners’ experience of the loss or absence of the 
relationship in psychotherapy directs us to the prevalence of accountability and audit through 
practices of quantification whereby ‘patients become numbers’. We turn now to the language 
of the ‘factory’ as experiential confirmation of this.  
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‘A factory of therapy’ 
Many psychotherapists feel they are now working in services that operate like ‘factories’, for 
better or worse. The institutionalisation of new psychotherapeutics with the introduction of 
IAPT has prompted many practitioners to see the disciplines of clinical psychology and 
psychotherapy as participating in a ‘needed’ expansion of psychological services on a national 
scale. Others have criticised IAPT’s seeming ‘de-professionalisation’ of the practice of 
psychotherapy as detrimental to both practitioners and patients (Rizq 2012; Lees 2016). A 
language of ‘factory’ and ‘industry’ has come to describe therapists’ own experience of the 
effects of IAPT in the practice of psychological therapy and in the institutional structures in 
which the service operates.  
The metaphor of the factory is important as it lends an understanding of IAPT as an 
organisation that expeditiously produces a great quantity of a specific service or product; which 
is exactly what therapists tended to experience and recount. Psychological care has become 
increasingly standardised and manualised with the institutionalisation of IAPT and related 
journals and conferences. Rapid growth in the demand for psychological therapies has required 
‘effective’ provision of care. As a result, some professionals feel that the accountabilities under 
which IAPT now operates have compromised ‘the quality’ of the care provided; others argue 
that the service has proven both ‘necessary’ and ‘effective’. 49  This section describes and 
examines some of these professional tensions. 
The position of clinical psychologists in response to IAPT has clearly been ambivalent. 
There seems to have been overall support of IAPT, at least at its early inception, with some 
psychologists pointing out that their profession has worked in close collaboration with the 
programme at every stage of its implementation (Parry 2015). However, I met many clinical 
psychologists who were critical: they expressed explicit concern about the ‘industrial’ training 
format of IAPT practitioners in the context of providing the NHS with a psychotherapeutic 
workforce within a ‘cost-effective’ framework. In the meantime, other psychologists have 
pointed out how greater access to psychological therapies inevitably has meant the need to 
deliver them on an ‘industrial scale’, drawing an analogy to the historiography of a supposed 
 
49 For discussions of the disciplinary changes and perceived challenges for clinical psychology in the wake of 
IAPT, see Hall et al. 2015. 
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industrial revolution whereby ‘the therapist becomes a technician within the prespecified 
machinery of delivery rather than a cottage industry of artisan practitioners, customising 
interventions for each individual’ (Parry 2015: 193). Clinical psychologist Glenn Parry argues 
that the misgivings of many clinical psychologists about IAPT concern the new arrangements 
in the provision of psychological healthcare which might undermine their role as therapists by 
offering a less expensive alternative (Parry 2015: 191).  
Some psychologists have thus seen IAPT as ‘a threat’ to their profession (e.g. Marzillier 
2004). Others have expressed optimism. Parry himself contends that the discipline of ‘clinical 
psychology has always succeeded in adapting to new contexts, evolving to respond to the needs 
of the healthcare system through innovation and reinvention’ (Parry 2015: 193). He urges 
clinical psychology to assert its relevance as an applied science in public health in response to 
IAPT. However, sentiments like Parry’s seemed to bypass the point that one of the two 
inventors of IAPT, namely David Clark, is a clinical psychologist himself; IAPT might thus be 
seen precisely as an undertaking to ‘innovate’ and ‘reinvent’ psychology as an ‘applied science’. 
Clark himself seems to suggest this has been achieved through the invention of IAPT (cf. 
Layard & Clark 2014; Clark 2018) as it demanded psychological therapy to be taken seriously 
in order to respond, as Parry puts it above, ‘to the needs of the healthcare system’.  
However, this particular ambition to further the scientific standing of clinical psychology in 
public health has also taken a rather ironic form: the institutionalisation of IAPT in England 
has meant that clinical psychologists have been largely sidelined since the provision of 
psychological therapy is provided predominantly by PWPs and CBT therapists – most of whom 
are not clinical psychologists. The role of CBT therapists and the new therapeutic profession of 
PWPs seem to have been shaped by a concern to provide a ‘cost-effective’ workforce 
(Department of Health 2010). The issue at hand was summarised bluntly by an IAPT director 
I accompanied in a conference: ‘the problem with clinical psychologists’, she said, ‘is that they 
are too expensive to employ’. Even though this often seemed to be the case in practice, this 
director also insisted that CBT therapists were just as competent as psychologists in providing 
evidence-based psychotherapy: ‘There’s simply no evidence that clinical psychologists do a 
better job at CBT than CBT practitioners themselves’. 
Apart from clinical psychologists, other mental health professionals working in IAPT have 
similarly taken issue with the seemingly ‘industrial’ aspects of the service. The training of 
therapists and the provision of care was summed up as IAPT having become ‘a factory of 
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therapy’. It was seen to compromise heavily on therapeutic training, providing psychotherapy 
of ‘inadequate quality’. Other CBT therapists I met through the university training course – 
many of whom had first trained as PWPs – expressed their dissatisfaction with the ‘insufficient, 
short-term training’ they had initially received when qualifying for the position of PWP 
providing low-intensity treatment in IAPT. They felt that the clinical skills and knowledge they 
had obtained did not meet the therapeutic needs they were required to deal with in their daily 
clinical work: ‘I am dealing with many patients that far exceed my therapeutic expertise in 
psychotherapy’, said a former PWP who went on to train as a CBT therapist: 
 
Looking back on my work in IAPT, I find myself thinking: what on earth were we doing? I think we 
all thought we knew what we were doing. You see, we were working on step 2 for several years doing 
what we thought was CBT or a CBT-type model. But then we learned CBT [on this course] and 
realised “Aha!” – a lot of the stuff we were doing was wrong. 
 
Another of his colleagues added:  
 
What I am doing now [as a CBT therapist] makes me question step 2. I feel sorry for them [the 
patients]. Because the therapy I was doing wasn’t the most effective. We weren’t following the 
protocols [of evidence-based therapy]. 
 
‘It’s because we kept receiving patients that weren’t suitable for step 2’, interrupted another. 
‘The thing is’, she explained, ‘we were getting referred step 3 patients and we were trying to 
treat them with step 2 interventions. All of us were working as PWPs but without step 3 training 
[CBT training].’  
Yet in the professional conferences of IAPT, it is generally maintained by senior 
professionals in the field that the programme has continuously trained well-qualified mental 
health professionals in the form of CBT therapists assisted by PWPs. Such advocacy has been 
supported in several reports published by the Department of Health (e.g. 2010; 2015). 
According to David Clark and Richard Layard, the combined workforce of PWPs and CBT 
therapists has been designed to deal with the increasing demand of psychological healthcare on 
a national, large-scale level and, they argue, the programme has proven to be effective and 
meaningful in both clinical and economic terms (Layard & Clark 2014). They readily 
acknowledge that there is room for improvement in IAPT but have contended that it remains 
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a successful public health service in providing evidence-based psychological therapies – a 
conviction that appears to be publicly backed up by other senior spokespersons in clinical 
psychology.50 Contrary to the concern of many IAPT therapists, then, many of whom see 
themselves involved in a ‘factory of therapy’, IAPT’s short-term training and short-term 
therapy are, for these senior practitioners amongst others, both necessary and effective changes 
to improve access to psychological therapies.  
Critiques of IAPT’s perceived shortcomings – whether such have been framed as lack of 
training and therapeutic competence (e.g. Lees 2016), for instance, or the model of care itself 
(e.g. Rizq 2012; Binnie 2015) – have generally resulted in advocates justifying procedures as 
‘rational’ and ‘realistic’ (or framing decisions as ‘inevitable’, see Pickersgill 2019a: 642) and 
consequently characterising critics as uninformed and irrational or out of touch with reality 
(cf. Fonagy and Clark 2015). These justifications and responses to critique both internally and 
externally appear to resort to what we might call a pessimistic realism. Resorting to a discourse 
of rationality, inevitability and realism has helped Clark, Layard and their colleagues to deflect 
critique of the IAPT programme which in turn has prompted concerned therapists to confirm 
that IAPT is ‘not merely a way of developing public mental health’, as Pickersgill puts it (2019: 
642) but, on the contrary, ‘the only way’. In other words, although the mental health 
professionals I worked with at the community centre, as well as those I met through the CBT 
university course, were explicitly taking issue with various aspects of the IAPT service, there 
were others  equally keen to curtail a space of further critique, reminding themselves and each 
other ‘to be realistic’. 
Related to such critiques was another common response which highlighted the difficult 
institutional conditions under which the service operates. These conditions were often framed 
as fundamentally ‘economic’ and difficulties that arose in the provision of care were due to 
therapists being required to think in ‘business terms’.51 This has generated procedures seen to 
undermine psychotherapeutic care. As one therapist explained:  
 
 
50 See chapters 13, 14, 17 and 24 in Hall et al. (2015). 
51 Clinical psychology seems to have long struggled with its own self-defined ‘altruistic’ ethic which most 
practitioners feel are at the heart of psychotherapy vis-à-vis the fact that psychotherapeutic care remains an 
extremely high-priced form of treatment; these are uneasy contradictions pertaining to a ‘big-hearted 
business world’, as one psychologist once put it to me (Bruun 2013: 18-19). 
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There’s a strong business side to IAPT. The service isn’t going to work unless 80% of all the people 
who get referred go through step 2 – if you think about it as a machine with all the different costs. 
But, if you look at it clinically, 80% of the people referred aren’t step 2 [‘low-intensity’] patients.52 
They just get shoehorned into that [diagnostic category] because services are commissioned. That’s 
where the business aspect comes in. 
 
Another of his colleagues then commented, in terms more accepting of what was perceived to 
be not a matter of business but rather a case of ‘economic’ constraint: 
 
I think the idea of IAPT is great – but in my experience, there isn’t enough money to carry it out 
properly. I think that when the government first brought it out, they didn’t realise how many people 
were actually going to use the service. If it worked as it was originally set out to, it would be good. 
However, there are now so many issues [with the service] and not enough money to deal with them. 
For instance, we clearly need more investment in the training of step 2 and step 3 professionals to be 
able to deliver effective therapy. But now we’re just trying to get patients through the service as 
quickly as possible before waiting lists get too high. 
 
It was in this experience of either ‘business’ or the ‘economic’ that psychotherapy within IAPT 
was frequently felt to have ‘left behind’ some of its own principles in favour of a form of care 
required to be cost-effective, quantifiable, and amenable to auditing. If I asked if there was 
another way to make psychotherapy accessible as a national health service without abandoning 
its principles of care, the response was that one had simply to be ‘realistic’: ‘Psychotherapy must 
deal with the economic facts of society.’ It has been common in Europe to think of the 
‘economic’ as fundamental to ‘society’, a base on which all rests (McDonald 2012b). The 
economic poses as a metaphor of the ‘real’ and the factory has long offered a related metaphoric 
(Daston & Galison 2007).  It was reasoned by more than one self-consciously ‘realist’ therapist 
that ‘We need to acknowledge the factory-like model as a necessary condition of public 
healthcare’. The language of ‘management’ was therefore not uncommon either:  
 
 
52 ‘Low-intensity’ treatment is provided to 80% of everyone who is referred to the service and consists of 
‘guided self-help’ whereas ‘high-intensity’ treatment offered to the other 20% consists of one-to-one 
consultation in the form of twelve CBT sessions with a qualified psychotherapist or clinical psychologist. 
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… the heavy reliance on the DSM diagnoses are probably the only way to manage a large-scale 
service for a large population like the UK. Because how else would you do it? Without spending too 
much money, of course. Or not being able to justify the spending because psychotherapy takes time.  
 
There were critiques that amassed realism to their side – but so could defence of the service: 
 
The reality is that nobody in government or the commissioning groups are going to give you money 
if you are telling them: “Actually, people sometimes leave psychotherapy feeling more distressed 
than when they arrived because they are exploring their sense of self and who they are in the world, 
and it is often very painful.” Getting well takes time, and, even if you successfully complete twelve 
consultations, life doesn’t stop being shitty – and you certainly don’t “recover” from it. 
 
In the metaphoric rendering of IAPT as ‘a factory of therapy’, specific political-economic 
understandings are put to work by the professionals themselves.53 IAPT therapists are not alone 
amongst professionals of various kinds in Europe in encountering such a sense of mismatch or 
conflict of concerns in the context of new accountabilities (see e.g. Shore and Wright 2000; 
McDonald 2000; Stein 2017). 
 
‘A politically-driven monster’ 
‘I think the problem with IAPT is all these arbitrary measures that are being put into effect’, 
says Georgia as we sit down in her university office before one of her lectures on evidence-
based therapy. She looks worried. Georgia is an energetic woman in her 40s who trained as a 
CBT therapist before taking up a lectureship at the same university where she did her training. 
Like many other psychology lecturers, Georgia’s working hours are divided between academic 
and clinical duties; apart from lecturing and supervising students, she is also the director of a 
local IAPT service in the town where she lives. She still works as a practising therapist, seeing 
patients weekly. 
 
53 Some anthropologists might want to inject a Marxist critique here, such as the theory of the alienation of 
labour. Although such analytical possibilities are not explored further here, it seems important to note that 
one of the features of the factory model is that the division of labour – e.g. people as products being divided, 
in the ethnography, between PWPs, computerised technologies, etc., on the assembly line of assessment and 
care – means that no one worker (‘therapist’) crafts their ‘creative energy’ into the working object (‘the 
patient’) and creates with them in that process (e.g. ‘relational’ or ‘long-term therapy’). There is an interesting 
comparison here between marxisms and the claims of some psychotherapists who argue that the ‘creative’ 
process is in the (therapeutic) relationship. 
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‘It’s a really tough part of the country to work in’, she tells me, looking up from her computer 
screen and turning her chair to face me. ‘This NHS region has one of the most appalling mental 
health statistics in the UK.’ I ask her what exactly she thinks is ‘arbitrary’ about the measures 
in IAPT. She often experiences a lack of therapeutic ‘clarity’ and ‘coherence’ in the referral of 
patients, she explains, and in the performance of assessment and treatment within the stepped-
care model. Some patients are referred to as ‘complex patients’: ‘complex’, because they exhibit 
a range of symptoms that do not match up in any therapeutically straightforward sense, or 
because the patient does not seem to get any better despite various initial treatments. Georgia 
was also of the opinion that everyone has complex personal histories, as she put it, and that 
there are complex reasons for ending up depressed. ‘But at the end of the day,’ she told me, ‘to 
see a therapist in the NHS, you need to fit into a category.’ 
It was not uncommon to hear that some people fail to ‘measure up’ to any of the available 
therapeutic ‘steps’ in IAPT: ‘they don’t fit here nor there’. The measures used were not arbitrary 
because the patients in question do not have mental health problems but because their 
problems are too ‘complex’ to fit the measures. The circumstances of many patients’ 
psychological distress was not adequately accounted for, it was felt, in IAPT’s assessment and 
treatment procedures. A characterisation of IAPT through reference to ‘arbitrary measures’ 
can seem therefore somewhat paradoxical or ironic. 54  The arbitrariness articulated – the 
experience of capricious, random, unjustified or unreflecting clinical practice – was a product 
of an epistemic logic of measurement (in the form of IAPT’s self-referential system of 
diagnostic measures, outcome measures, performance measures, and so on), with this more 
generally seen to be systematic, rational, empirically supported, accountable and critical.  
 Due to IAPT therapists’ auditing of their clinical practice, which was required of them to 
meet the recovery targets of their services, Georgia and others had seen how ‘complex patients’ 
– people whose mental health problems required more intensive care and skill because of 
contextual and clinical intricacy – had become increasingly excluded in IAPT. This exclusion 
of complex patients might come as a surprise to some people, it was felt, ‘but it’s a common 
strategy among clinicians in the mental health service’.  It was explained to me that when IAPT 
therapists take on more complex cases, their service’s recovery rates decrease markedly:  
 
 
54 If we consider the very practice of measuring as prevention against arbitrary decisions, then ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘measures’ appear rather antithetical.  
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Seeing more complex patients means lower recovery rates; and if I am not meeting my targets, why 
should the services keep me? I’m too expensive. [The IAPT service in] Croydon just got cut half of 
their staff, because they didn’t meet their recovery targets.  
 
Psychotherapy is not always a ‘quick fix’, Georgia asserted, even if IAPT therapies, from CBT 
to mindfulness, are often presented as such; another lecturer at the university whose classes I 
had followed had told his students how evidence-based psychotherapy was about ‘getting a 
diagnosis; then a treatment; and then move on with your life’. Georgia was similarly critical of 
the language of psychology more generally. It was often a means to disguise ‘politics’. Others 
in the service had already described IAPT to me as a ‘politically-driven monster’. The ‘political 
interest’ in psychological therapy had seemingly undermined its clinical relevance.  We might 
note that it is not uncommon in this professional world – as elsewhere in Europe – for ‘politics’ 
to be seen and cited as a domain that gets in the way of science and, by the same token, one 
common way of criticising the quality of  both science and care is to situate them in the service 
of politics (McDonald 2012a; 2017). Georgia had told me how evidence-based psychological 
therapies like CBT and mindfulness were serving, more specifically, a ‘neoliberal’ agenda: 
‘people are somehow required to take responsibility for their own lives no matter what has 
happened to them…’, she paused, ‘but it is not always a therapeutic responsibility’.  
The issue of ‘complex patients’ was presented to me as a case in point: psychological 
therapies do not always address other causes of people’s distress or suffering. By ‘other causes’ 
were meant all other circumstances in a person’s life that could not be reduced solely to a 
therapeutic matter: ‘Not all mental health problems can be treated with mental healthcare’. As 
lecturer and therapist, Georgia ideally wanted a broader context: any potential patient, she 
stated, had to be understood in their ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ contexts. It was not clear what each 
of these might contain, but the more general hope was that the IAPT service would eventually 
take into account all such other ‘external factors’ as causes of the experience of ill-health. 
Georgia remained committed to the IAPT service in her capacity as an IAPT director and 
therapist, but she also insisted that she was not ‘one of those’ who were ‘wilfully blind’. She, like 
others, was a realist and it was important to acknowledge that there were patients for whom 
medication or CBT or mindfulness just ‘doesn’t cut it’:  
 
Any one of these therapies might help a little or go some way to resolve some personal issues, but 
you are clearly not going to “recover” if your mental distress is caused by not having enough money 
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to feed your children, or because you are homeless after the city council sold your flat to a housing 
development company. 
 
Such ‘realism’ demanded critical assessment of the limitations of ‘psychological therapy’ for 
issues faced in the daily work with patients. Many of these professionals were ready to comment 
on ‘structural inequalities’ in the context of increasing focus on public mental healthcare. They 
feared that ‘social’, ‘economic’, or ‘political’ problems were often being converted into a 
‘therapeutic responsibility’ of mental health professionals.55 According to Georgia amongst 
others, increasing austerity in the UK meant that a social responsibility of the Government to 
ensure basic ‘economic welfare’ had been ‘disguised’ as the therapeutic responsibility of mental 
health professionals, such as herself, and the moral obligation of individual citizens to ‘get well’ 
no matter their circumstances. ‘Of course, it’s my responsibility as a therapist to help you as a 
patient’, Georgia said resolutely, ‘but the moral obligation to get well – at least well enough to 
work – is yours.’ Similar critiques have recently been widely reported on (or published by 
practitioners themselves) in newspapers, online blogs and journals; one title, for instance, in a 
recent article published by the professional CBT journal in the UK, asks: ‘Has IAPT become a 
bit like Frankenstein’s monster?’ (Roscoe 2019). Another article published by an IAPT therapist 
four years earlier asked disapprovingly: ‘Do you want therapy with that?’ (Binnie 2015).56 
These therapists’ critiques of issues about their professional world and how they have tended 
to be contextualised are evocative of recent anthropological debates on the topic of 
‘responsibility’ in the proliferation of psychological therapies and healthcare more generally. 
Anthropologists working in the fields of public health and care are well-acquainted with such 
critical evaluations of, for instance, the economic constraints put on healthcare services; and 
many anthropologists reproduce similar critiques in their own analyses (see e.g. Castro & 
Singer 2004). There are often good empirical reasons to follow a line of critical enquiry that 
seeks to identify and unpack the ‘political-economic’ context of the maladies that people 
experience and convey.  
 
55 Similar critiques of IAPT have also been debated by psychotherapists in a recent academic publication: see 
chapters in J. Lees (ed.) The Future of Psychological Therapies. London: Routledge, 2016.  
56 For other recent examples, see e.g. discussions in B. McInnes (2019) ‘Is IAPT “too big to fail”?’, Therapy 
Meets Numbers [published 18/02/2019]; P. Marzouk (2019) ‘Has “IAPT” eaten itself?’, Mental Health Today 
[published 07/01/2019]. 
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We could thus feasibly argue that a tendency to psychologise social or economic problems is 
a deeply political move that locates responsibility elsewhere. Such a critique might suggest that 
the responsibility of governments (a responsibility that might be deemed to be intrinsically 
‘political’, ‘economic’, ‘social’ or ‘moral’ – or a combination of these) is in danger of being 
construed solely in terms of the therapeutic responsibility of healthcare practitioners (and thus 
also eclipsed by it) and other caregivers (or ‘the services’ they represent) or the moral 
responsibility of ‘the individual’, construed as a patient or service user. The perceived 
psychologisation of issues deemed otherwise to be ‘social’ or ‘political’ or ‘economic’ – such as 
homelessness, urban deprivation, lack of education or carers, cuts to disability benefits, and so 
on – might, in an ideal world, be pointing to different solutions but we might note here that it 
turns on an analytical attempt to contextualise and explain ethnographic worlds by virtue of 
analytical referents felt to be more ‘real’ (in the sense of getting to the ‘reality’ of things). There 
is also a latent critique of reductionism at play here similar to that which it claims to do away 
with, namely a critique of ‘reducing’ (social, economic, political) problems to ‘psychological’ 
disorders. 
Perhaps the solution is not to attest, once again, that underneath it all – the ambitions of 
IAPT, the objectives of psychotherapies, etc. – it was ‘politics’ all along. When we introduce 
this critique – say, if we pursue an argument along the lines of suggesting that what gets 
constructed as ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ is really the result of ‘political’ and 
‘economic’ interests – we are inevitably employing and reinforcing a language which is already 
important to many of those actively working as mental health professionals. It also tends, in 
anthropology, to be a ‘debunking’ language with which to critique psychology, but which might 
soon run out of steam (cf. Latour 2004). 
It is not pertinent to decry or to repeat such a language of critique in this thesis, I think, 
although it may contain many valid concerns. Instead, I find it interesting that ‘the political’ 
and ‘the economic’ always tend to gain the analytical upper hand over other ‘factors’ in many 
of these debates, and that anthropological analyses of this kind often do not differ significantly 
from what the people studied might themselves report in their own critical voices. For many 
IAPT professionals, ‘the political, economic, social and cultural’ were all contexts already very 
much part of their commentary on the nature of mental health problems. This language could 
be, and was, mobilised as a technique of both contextualisation and critique. 
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A question of responsibility? 
I have indicated that recent debates amongst psychologists and psychotherapists share some 
similar assumptions and resolutions with a social science literature that deals with what we 
might call psychologisation.57 This term summarises a collection of related arguments which 
posits that certain problems – revealed to be otherwise different from what they claim to be – 
get construed as intrinsically psychological problems and hence objects of psychological 
knowledge and intervention; and that such a process disguises the ‘real’ causes of the problems 
at hand. In the wake of IAPT, both psychologists and social scientists were arguing – albeit with 
varying degrees of finesse and crudeness – that the institutionalisation of psychological 
therapies in the UK (indeed, psychotherapy itself) serves inherently ‘political’ ends (see e.g. 
chapters in Lees 2016). 
One very common set of contemporary critiques asserts that the enthusiasm for 
psychological therapy in the guise of CBT and mindfulness forms part of a ‘neoliberal’ tactic of 
individual self-government in which people construed in psychological terms are rendered 
responsible for their own wellbeing (see e.g. Davies 2015).58 Critical comments of this kind 
concerning ‘neoliberalism’ are largely owed to Foucault’s prominent work on 
‘governmentality’, although the specific attention to psychology draws on key arguments in the 
work of Nikolas Rose, Ian Hacking and other scholars in the 1980s and 90s who took Foucault’s 
insights in different directions. 
We could summarise many such critiques as situating psychological therapy in the service, 
not of therapeutic care, but of an ‘underlying’ political structure or ideology. The ‘political’ has 
often appeared in this way as the real source of the persuasiveness of what might otherwise be 
seen and experienced as psychological realities. We are again reminded of Rose’s genealogical 
critique of the discourses and practices of ‘psy’ (1989, 1996). Anthropologists’ increasing 
attention to ‘responsibility’ appears also to have emerged in the decades after Foucault’s death 
in 1984, following the many posthumous publications of his interviews and lectures into 
English (e.g. Foucault 1991; see also Laidlaw 2018); anthropological suspicion of neoliberalism 
 
57 ‘Psychologisation’ is a term derived in part from the much more familiar concept of medicalisation (see 
Chapter 1).  
58 As Tejaswini Ganti [2014:1] has pointed out in an Annual Review of Anthropology article: ‘Although 
neoliberalism is a polysemic concept with multiple referents, anthropologists have most commonly 
understood neoliberalism in two main ways: as a structural force that affects people’s life-chances and as an 
ideology of governance that shapes subjectivities.’ 
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seems, in turn, to have sparked further suspicion of everything ‘psy’ as a western exemplar of 
neoliberal subjectification. Not all anthropologists have found this kind of critical stance a 
useful starting point in their analyses of psychotherapy (Luhrmann 2000; Davies 2009; 
Calabrese 2013) 59  but, more generally, anthropologists have still tended to present their 
ethnographic approach to ‘psy’ in a way that either confirms or negates governmentality or 
neoliberalism more broadly (see e.g. Cook 2016; chapters in Patton 2010). This also limits the 
analytical affordance of the category of ‘neoliberalism’ itself (for a recent review in 
anthropology, see Ganti 2014). 
Although ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neoliberal’ remain organising concepts in much 
anthropological writing, they have been increasingly criticised as notions sustained by an 
apparently totalising form of contextualisation and critique. The concept of neoliberalism has 
been charged with failure to account for ethnographic particularities or to account for its 
articulations with other ‘political-economic’ formations (cf. Ong 2007; Kingfisher & 
Maskovsky 2008; Ganti 2014; and references therein). Some anthropologists have argued that 
not all individual choice stems from neoliberal politics, nor is in the service of it. Whilst some 
of these contemporary critiques could be said to have resurrected older issues in anthropology 
summarised as the structure/agency debates, we shall turn now to some of the new 
ethnographic directions in which these debates have been taken – towards psychological 
therapy.  
Reflecting on the increasing political interest in evidence-based psychological therapy in the 
UK, Joanna Cook (2016) argues for other forms of responsibility and reflexive self-governance 
beyond ‘neoliberal responsibilisation’ (Cook 2016: 151). The focus here is not CBT, but 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), or ‘mindfulness’ for short – based in part on 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy – which has become part of the IAPT service. Cook echoes 
other anthropologists who have argued that not all forms of individual responsibility and 
choice (or ‘freedom’) are born of neoliberal politics. As Cook puts it: ‘A danger of theorizing 
practices of subjectification as neoliberal is that they come to be read as always already in the 
 
59 Tanya Luhrmann, for example, condemned Foucault for having romanticised mental illness in such a way 
that ‘did at terrible disservice to is pain’ (2000: 11). According to Luhrmann’s reading of Foucault’s work on 
psychiatry (especially Madness and Civilisation, 1988 [originally published as Folie et Déraison: Histoire de 
la folie à l'âge classique in 1961]), he argues that earlier psy institutions like asylums were embodiments of 
nineteenth-century middle-class morality and a kind of ‘gigantic moral imprisonment’ (Foucault 1988a: 
278). Luhrmann reads Foucault as suggesting that the psy discourses ‘dampened the free intensity of mental 
illness into “the stifling anguish of responsibility”’ (Luhrmann 2000: 10-11, quoting Foucault [ibid: 247]). 
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service of a neoliberal agenda’ (ibid.). She pitches her argument against Rose’s earlier historical 
and sociological work in particular (Rose 1989, 1996) but also against other social scientists 
who have followed in similar Foucauldian footsteps (e.g. Davies 2015).60 
We can summarise Rose’s critique of therapeutic knowledge regimes — the ‘psy’ disciplines, 
in his terms — as demonstrating how liberal democratic government has come into being 
through technologies of responsibilisation and autonomisation (Rose 1996). New forms of 
‘governmentality’ have been constituted through these rationalities of self-governance by 
which we are required to act and understand our ‘selves’ in particular ways. Governance is 
psychologised, individualised and internalised. Importantly, in Rose’s account, certain aspects 
of ‘the social, political and economic’ have been transformed in a therapeutic direction, as new 
forms of clinical expertise and a range of conditions that require ‘psychological intervention’ 
have been invented.  
One could briefly illustrate Rose’s argument by way of describing how the reputed ‘national 
mental health crisis’ in the UK has been construed as an object of and for psychological 
knowledge and expertise in the form of a national public healthcare service (IAPT) whereby 
other possible causes or circumstances of such a ‘crisis’ are disguised (hence the concept of 
‘psychologisation’ referred to above). If we were to follow this kind of critical enquiry, one 
could likewise proceed to describe how ‘depression’ – through psychotherapeutics such as CBT 
and mindfulness – has become a ‘mental health problem’ linked to a perceived psychological 
interiority, with both the cause and solution to this problem located and explained with 
reference to ‘cognition’, ‘the mind’ or ‘the brain’. Following Rose (1989, 1996), it is partly 
through such instances of subjectification that modern political governance has succeeded in 
rendering people into responsible, autonomous agents in the name of their own ‘mental health’ 
and ‘freedom’. 
For our purposes here, let me highlight two inferences from Rose’s critique more explicitly. 
First, this strand of theorisation suggests that the disciplined capacity for self-reflexivity and 
self-responsibility was crucial to the formation of the human subject in modern liberal 
democracies from the twentieth century onwards and that the ‘psy’ disciplines played a key role 
 
60 It should be noted that Cook does not mention that this particular body of Rose’s work was concerned 
with what he termed the transformation of political power in liberal democracies, showing how the psy 
disciplines played a significant role in shaping new forms of governance and its subjects (Rose 1985, 1989, 
1996). Rose’s work differs, therefore, in some important historical and analytical respects from the giant of 
‘neoliberalism’ that anthropologists have more recently seen themselves in battle with. 
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in cultivating and demanding this capacity; so much so that, secondly, the very notion of the 
self-governing individual in pursuit of their own ‘wellbeing’ and ‘truth’ (e.g. ‘my true self’, ‘a 
healthy body’, ‘mindful living’) is a fundamental condition of contemporary political power 
relations in liberal or neoliberal democracies. It is this kind of analysis that some 
anthropologists have charged with being totalising and inadequate. Totalising because it does 
not seem to leave much space for subjectification practices of another kind beyond (neo)liberal 
subjectification; even if, indeed, such practices appear but exemplary of neoliberal self-
governance – like the UK Government’s recent interest in psychological therapies. 
 
Multiplicity 
In contrast to Rose and others who have presented various versions of the kind of critique 
sketched out above, Cook’s (2016) approach claims to offer an empirical grounding for the 
professional concerns of mindfulness advocates and politicians through an ethnography of the 
political interest and ‘inquiry process’ into mindfulness. This inquiry took place through 
meetings and seminars on ‘mindfulness’ held in Westminster. She argues that the multiplicity 
of concerns and the breadth of subjectivities involved in the practice of mindfulness take us 
beyond the ‘neoliberal critique’ associated with Rose and others. Rather than insisting on the 
emergence and prevalence of mindfulness as another instantiation of neoliberal discourse and 
governance, Cook contends that therapeutic interest in self-governance does not preclude what 
she describes as ‘social, political or economic issues’; on the contrary, she argues that ‘politico-
economic concerns’ remain central to the professionals she studied. Cook makes the case 
therefore that, ethnographically, practices of subjectification are never totalising; that the 
specific subjectification practices of mindfulness ‘may hold multiple and/or diverse meanings, 
and that the maintenance of this multiplicity is a motor of political process’ (ibid: 141). 
Cook thus mobilises the concept of ‘multiplicity’ by arguing that the ‘breadth of 
subjectivities’ and the notions of ‘responsibility’ and ‘self-governance’ involved in the political 
inquiry process in Westminster, as well as the therapeutic practice of mindfulness itself, both 
go beyond the influence of neoliberal subjectification. She stresses that the multiplicity of values 
and meanings for the people involved (the patients, practitioners and politicians) was witnessed 
in the political inquiry process into mindfulness therapy in Westminster, as it brought together 
what Cook describes in her ethnography as ‘multiple levels of reality’, on the one hand (e.g. 
‘statistics and personal testimonies’ [Cook 2016: 156]), and ‘multiple realities’, on the other 
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(i.e., ‘the experiences of people in diverse parts of civil society dealing with different problems’ 
[ibid]). Through this political inquiry, Cook describes how multiple meanings of mindfulness 
and societal problems were orchestrated into one coherent endeavour and dialogue in which 
diversity was still maintained. 
In this process, multiple and diverse problems and experiences were recognised, according 
to Cook, and ‘[e]vidence was presented which suggested that mindfulness-based interventions 
might be of benefit for a range of different problems […] without reducing them to the same 
problem’ (ibid: 152). We might note here how an appeal to the scientific ‘evidence’ does the job 
of fitting a variety of concerns, problems, and experiences under the same banner of 
‘mindfulness’ – and how ‘multiplicity’ or ‘diversity’ is reduced to the shifting contexts of its 
mobilisation. Cook herself notes how the contributions of the members of the Mindfulness 
Initiative ‘were smoothed into a single voice’ with ‘no authors named in the final document’ 
(2016: 146) when the Initiative was presented in the official report in Parliament on October 
2015.  
In an important sense then, the discerned ‘multiple realities’ of mindfulness was held in 
place by a noticeably singular objective: the promotion of the therapeutic effectiveness of 
mindfulness to a range of reported problems in British civil society. Despite the apparent 
multiplicity of societal contexts and professional concerns which was, according to Cook, 
intrinsic to the political inquiry into mindfulness, it nonetheless resulted in the production of 
a single authoritative report: ‘Mindful Nation UK’ (MAPPG 2015). We might contend, 
therefore, that the report was an effort to coordinate multiple voices into a single expert voice 
– The Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group (MAPPG) – thus eclipsing the multiplicity 
of its own production. Importantly, the report sought to deliver an impartial evaluation of the 
effectiveness of mindfulness within the framework of ‘evidence-based psychological therapy’. 
It thus presented an evidence-base for ‘Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy’, in the singular, 
as a psychological intervention. As such, Cook’s ethnographic case of what she terms ‘multiple 
realities’ seem nevertheless to have been coordinated into a distinct psychological epistemology 
with a claim on ‘reality’ (again in the singular): the effectiveness of mindfulness. 
Cook’s study shows how ‘mindfulness’ has indeed become a matter of concern beyond the 
clinical context of treating specific mental health problems. However, her ethnographic 
account of the political interest in psychological therapy does not make clear why a ‘multiplicity 
of contexts’ in which mindfulness has been put to work (i.e., ‘health, education, workplace, and 
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the criminal justice system’; cf. Mindful Nation UK [MAPPG 2015: 8]), moves us beyond Rose’s 
account of how (neo)liberal governance has been transformed in a therapeutic direction. One 
key conclusion of Rose’s genealogy of the ‘self’ was, after all, to point out how psychological 
epistemologies and psychotherapeutics became constitutive of a multiplicity of contexts and 
problems in liberal democracies. And, importantly, how this mutual constitution in political 
governance and selfhood succeeded in claiming ‘psychological’ authority over a range of 
concerns – or ‘multiple meanings’ – beyond clinical contexts.  
Certainly, as Cook’s critique of Rose seems to imply, there is more to be said in our 
ethnographies from an analytical stance other than reporting on neoliberal subjectification. 
However, the Mindful Nation UK (2015) report and the psychological authority with which it 
promotes mindfulness as a therapeutic solution to a range of concerns and contexts would 
seem to lend empirical confirmation to Rose’s earlier work and its predictions (see, especially, 
Rose 1996). 
What about the question of ‘subjectification’, then, and its ethnographic specificity? We 
might readily concur with Cook when she argues that mindfulness as a practice (and indeed, I 
would add, evidence-based psychological therapy more broadly) involves multiple meanings 
and experiences for the people involved; that the practices of subjectification involved in 
evidence-based psychological therapies cannot all justly be reduced to the workings of 
‘neoliberalism’ and that this category itself is often suggestive of a problem in anthropological 
analyses.61 This assessment seems important but the seeming ‘multiplicity’ observed in the 
proliferation of mindfulness in the UK does not take us very far beyond the genealogical 
critique outlined by Rose and others. Practices of self-responsibility and self-management 
which mindfulness and CBT might seem to encourage may not always be in the service of 
‘governmentality’ – but this kind of critique appeared monolithic and inadequate even to 
Foucault himself (1988, 1997; see also Laidlaw 2018).  
Rather, I would suggest that it is precisely by virtue of an ethnographic attention to 
‘multiplicity’ and ‘diversity’ articulated by the mindfulness advocates that The Mindfulness 
Initiative with its Mindful Nation UK report (which is, we recall, a Government-funded 
implementation plan) appears to be an attempt to coordinate different ‘social’, ‘economic’ and 
‘political’ contexts and concerns into a singularity (‘mindfulness’) deemed necessary and non-
 
61  Rephrasing this point, we could say that the ethnographic multiplicity is not exhausted by the 
anthropologist’s analytical category of ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘neoliberal’.   
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political. We might well want to challenge the limits of the prevalence of neoliberal framings in 
our approaches to psychological therapy, as Cook seems to suggest. But, within those same 
concerns over ethnographic sensitivity, it is pertinent to note that the Government-funded 
initiatives of a public health provision of mindfulness and CBT are happening in multiple 
contexts — schools, hospitals, workplaces, prisons, and universities — of increasing precarity 
in the UK. Indeed, it is this mobilisation of multiple but particular contexts and concerns – ‘in 
diverse parts of civil society dealing with different problems’ (Cook 2016: 156) – which is 
evocative of a governmental politics of ‘life itself’ (Rose 2006). 
We have thus returned to an ethnographic point made earlier in this chapter in Georgia’s 
critical assessment, as lecturer and practitioner, of IAPT’s significance. Despite her obvious 
commitment to CBT and the IAPT service, she felt nevertheless that certain ‘problems in 
society’ had been recast as ‘psychological problems’:  
 
We are now asked to teach people CBT and mindfulness in contexts where serious political problem-
solving is clearly needed. It’s the job of policy-makers and politicians, not psychotherapists. 
 
Certain aspects of the IAPT service thus failed to address, according to Georgia, ‘some of the 
real causes of psychological distress’, such as ‘economic deprivation’. Like other 
psychotherapists I met, Georgia felt that the political interest taken in psychological 
interventions, such as CBT and mindfulness, risked obscuring political interventions. ‘If we are 
going to justify a national psychotherapy service like IAPT with its introduction of CBT and 
mindfulness into all public sectors’, she told me resolutely, ‘then we need to make sure that we 
are treating people for all the right reasons’. 
 
Towards a different diagnosis? 
Providing effective psychotherapy is what most therapists expect to do when they train as IAPT 
professionals. Upon graduating from their university, many therapists find that a focus on 
psychotherapeutic care and patients is no longer what they can expect to do in practice. In other 
words, when IAPT-trained CBT therapists take up positions in the IAPT service, commencing 
their work as fully-fledged clinicians, their acquired understanding of what constitutes 
evidence-based therapy does not easily match up with the institutional requirements of putting 
‘evidence-based’ therapy into practice. Consequently, a disturbing sense of discrepancy 
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emerges amongst new therapists who experience a lack of fit between their psychotherapeutic 
training and the kind of work which is demanded of them in the IAPT service. 
Therapists are taught that ‘the patients come first’, even if they ‘know’ that this might not 
always be true. ‘Patients’ or ‘people’ are nevertheless what therapists are taught to care about. 
‘The basic goal’, as the supervisor often reminded us in the training course I followed, was 
‘helping people get better’. It is also the reason most people enter the psychotherapeutic 
professions (e.g. Luhrmann 2000; Davies 2009). But not only does this therapeutic ‘helping’ or 
‘care’ take many forms when put into practice, as we saw in Chapter 1, its significance and 
meaning shift radically into other matters of concern when we enter the institutional context 
of IAPT. Other circumstances are present here, other things matter: ‘the national economy’, 
‘the NHS’, ‘unemployment’, ‘waiting lists’, ‘transparency’, ‘funding cuts’, ‘recovery rates’, and 
so forth. Many of these circumstances, whether seemingly abstract or concrete, were not easily 
reconciled with the therapists’ daily efforts, in their own words, to care for their patients. 
Monitoring psychotherapy was therefore not what most psychotherapists expected to do 
when they started working in the IAPT service. Aspects of accountability were deemed 
especially burdensome, including the daily session-by-session auditing of clinical data to 
accumulate ‘recovery’ outcomes in an attempt to meet the stipulated target goal of patient 
recovery. When IAPT therapists described to me why they had trained in evidence-based 
psychotherapy they highlighted what they saw as the ‘rational’ and ‘relational’ aspects of 
practising CBT, but it was the burden of accountabilities and other ‘arbitrary measures’ that 
were deemed to be obstacles to their clinical work. These practitioners felt that the therapeutic 
rationality of CBT and the therapeutic relationship with patients had been increasingly 
undermined.  
Ironically perhaps, it was precisely the accountability and measurement of psychotherapy 
that Richard Layard and David Clark had claimed demonstrated the ‘mass public benefit’ of 
the IAPT service (Clark 2018). Such new accountabilities at the heart of the service have been 
summarised as extending across ‘economic, epistemic, and clinical’ aspects of governance 
(Pickersgill 2019a: 642). We could say that they have been constitutive of IAPT in a way that 
enabled its founders and advocates to present it as simultaneously ‘scientific’ and ‘cost-
effective’ – serving both ‘psychological’ and ‘economic’ interests – which has consequently 
allowed them to frame any critics as uninformed and unrealistic opponents of evidence-based 
practice (cf. Fonagy & Clark 2015; Layard & Clark 2014). 
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IAPT therapists quickly get to know, therefore, that their educated trust in evidence-based 
psychological therapy must – in the institutional settings wherein such therapy is put into 
practice – shift into a ‘trust in numbers’ (Porter 1996). Therapists are thus required to be 
persuaded by new strategies of quantification and impartiality. New sensibilities must be 
acquired. The therapists who have not already acquired such sensibilities – who might, in their 
colleagues’ terms, fail to get ‘realistic’ about their jobs – might well find themselves questioning 
the ‘quality’ and ‘goal’ of IAPT whereby, as more than one practitioner told me, ‘patients are 
numbers and therapists are managers’. The accountability that imbues the provision of 
psychological therapies is thus not always felt to account for the reality of psychotherapeutic 
care with which many psychotherapists are familiar and might anticipate. Psychotherapeutic 
care did not seem to translate seamlessly into a professional world in which care practices are 
fundamentally construed as quantifiable, measurable entities that end up as numbers on a page. 
As we have seen, this monitoring of psychotherapy is the reason many practitioners now feel 
that IAPT is like a ‘factory of therapy’. 
Psychotherapy can seem, therefore, to collide with managerialist measurements of 
performance in the institutional setting of the NHS. Attempts to deal with this tension is 
apparent in the day-to-day working lives of practitioners, such as when therapists explicitly 
criticise or worry about the ‘quality of care’ or the therapeutic ‘relationship’, a disquiet which 
is then met with instructions from peers or superiors to be ‘realistic’. When IAPT is criticised, 
a moral discourse of ‘inevitability’ (Pickersgill 2019a: 642) appears to deflect critique: ‘the IAPT 
model is the only way to do it [i.e., provide public psychological healthcare]’ (see also Chapter 
1). Such rectifications might later be accompanied by an acquired self-conscious ‘pragmatism’ 
on the part of the same concerned therapists, reminding themselves and others to ‘just do our 
best’ in the face of an ‘unmanageable’ management model of psychological healthcare. 
Such affirmations by IAPT professionals and the general deflection of critique by its 
founders and advocates have served to both obscure and prevent certain forms of critical 
scrutiny through which other models or approaches to public psychotherapeutic care could be 
appropriately envisaged and enacted. There has been some resistance more recently though, 
with other psychological ‘futures’ delineated (see Lees 2016). However, depending on how 
IAPT catches any critical light reflected upon it, its self-definition as a scientifically-informed 
programme – constructed through both ‘psychological’ and ‘economic’ justifications (see 
Chapters 1 and 2) – can reflect back. As a result, for professionals working within IAPT, 
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‘occupying the available [critical] space’ (McDonald 2006) would mean joining the ranks of the 
ill-informed, unrealistic and misguided. 
 
This chapter has attempted to foreground common critiques of IAPT and psychological 
therapy. We have seen how social scientists have more recently joined the debates. However, 
the critiques of social scientists do not always differ significantly from the IAPT therapists I 
worked with, nor the critiques contained in the professional psychology literature I have cited.  
One obvious reason for this apparent commonality is the fact that many people featuring in 
this ethnography are (if not professional academics themselves) often academically educated 
in some branch of critical theory. Foucauldian theories of governmentality and subjectification, 
including critiques of these theoretical orientations, could be said to have encouraged 
anthropologists and psychologists alike: they have become part of the way in which 
anthropologists might contextualise psychological realities, as much as they have informed 
practitioners’ own understandings (see e.g. Binnie 2015; Lees 2016; Marzouk 2019). So much 
so that an anthropological study of psychologists might easily run into the ethnographic wall 
of re-instantiating critical understandings shared amongst the psychologists themselves. This 
is not necessarily a problem – some anthropologists might even be tempted to call it 
‘ethnographic theory’62 – but the anthropologist studying psychologists might want to bring 
something else to the conversation.63 I return to this point in the final chapter of this thesis. For 
the moment, we might want to pause and think critically about critiques, as Latour has 
reminded us to do (2004). The concept of neoliberal subjectification has often been used to: 
 
jump straight ahead to connect vast arrays of life and history, to mobilize gigantic forces, to detect 
dramatic patterns emerging out of confusing interactions, to see everywhere in the cases at hand yet 
 
62  There has been written a great deal in recent years about what exactly ethnographic theory entails, 
following the launch of HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory in 2011 and its subsequent publications, as 
well as the proliferation of ‘ontological turns’ in the writings of Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen 
(e.g. 2017). The point here is that whilst anthropological theorisation might well be a reconstitution, 
reformulation or even ‘recursive’ transformation of ethnographic material, the British professionals 
presented here, including their theories and critiques, might still feel less ‘ethnographic’ to some 
ethnographers than, say, Mongolian shamans. 
63 The relationship between analysis and ethnography, or, anthropological theory and ethnographic data, 
including that distinction itself (see Heywood 2018; Candea 2018c), is an interesting one but will not be 
further interrogated in the following, except from stressing that our own anthropological theories are of 
course as much available for ethnographic treatment (as Heywood [2018] has recently demonstrated) as are 
any other theories encountered elsewhere in the world. 
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more examples of well-known types, to reveal behind the scenes some dark powers pulling the 
strings. (Latour 2005: 22; cited in Bell & Green 2016: 239) 
 
The anthropological injunction to direct our analytical gaze to complexity or multiplicity has 
perhaps offered a way out of such ‘gigantic forces’, as Cook amongst others seems to suggest.64 
However,  ‘multiplicity’ and ‘complexity’ have also reappeared ethnographically in this chapter: 
as notions that therapists mobilise to come to terms with the perceived problems and 
restrictions of the IAPT service. (For example, whilst the notion of the ‘complex patient’ was 
deployed as a clinical concept referring to a lack of fit between a patient and the diagnostic 
‘measures’ of IAPT, it also became an instructive metaphor of the ‘complexity’ detected by 
practitioners in their own critical assessment of the role and significance of psychological 
therapy: for whom or what is IAPT good for? Why psychotherapy? Who is responsible? And 
so on.)  
Practitioners and commentators alike have been keen to contextualise psychological therapy 
with reference to the ‘political’, whether it is framed as a matter of neoliberal (self-)governance 
or the displacement of ‘responsibility’ (e.g. political responsibility disguised as therapeutic 
responsibility, as Georgia suggested). In all of this, the ‘political’ tends to gain the analytical 
upper hand, as much as the therapists themselves might feel that ‘politics’ is what gets in the 
way of their therapeutic work: we see the capacity of ‘politics’ to dominate both 
ethnographically and analytically (Candea 2011, 2014; McDonald 2017). 
Mindfulness and CBT, or any other type of psychological therapy, might of course be 
practised in multiple ways and involve diverse meanings for practitioners and patients alike. 
However, any such multiplicity is rarely what constitutes ideal clinical models of diagnosis and 
intervention – on the contrary, such models often seek universality and singularity (McDonald 
2017; Mol 2002; see also Chapter 5). The IAPT model of therapy has done the work of 
coordination here, subsuming multiple and diverse contexts and concerns under its banner. 
Recognising multiplicity in the way Cook suggests (as a form of ethnographic diversity 
beyond neoliberal subjectification) might seem to offer a way out of what we might call ‘the 
ontology of the political’, as Candea (2014) has incisively couched it. And yet it is interesting 
to note that it is once again the work of Foucault that is heralded in calls for multiplicity in the 
 
64  ‘Multiplicity’ has perhaps provided some anthropologists with a sense of analytical liberation as the 
(ontological) turn to ‘alterity’ also seems to suggest (e.g. Holbraad and Pedersen 2017).  
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way suggested here: the ‘reflective’ affordances of psychological therapy beyond 
governmentality, that is, as ethical self-cultivation and self-care (Cook 2015; Vogel 2017; cf. 
Foucault 1997, 1988c). As in other areas of social anthropology today, Foucauldian freedom 






























































Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
This chapter explores the education of therapists in evidence-based psychological therapy. We 
are following here the training of CBT therapists at a university in Northern England. The 
director of the CBT course there, a practising psychologist and lecturer, had granted me 
permission to follow the course and invited me to live with his family during term-time. I 
met his colleagues and students and I sat in on their classes, seminars, and clinical 
supervisions: I was committed to understanding how people become therapists. 
Psychotherapeutic training can be understood as a form of ‘situated learning’ (Lave & 
Wenger 1991), although this is not as straightforward as it may sound. The approach I take here 
‘situates the practitioner, right from the start, in the context of active engagement with the 
constituents of his or her surroundings’ (Ingold 2001: 5) and with all the circumstances of 
therapy.65  
In this chapter, we will see how students of CBT learn to work therapeutically through a 
dynamic process in which they could be said to be acquiring new bodies. This dynamic process 
is one through which new therapeutic models and affordances can also be constituted by 
students as they learn to be affected by all the new circumstances that constitute ‘Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy’. It is a complex process that mirrors in many ways the training of other 
kinds of therapists, notably medical doctors (see McDonald 2014; Hallam 2017; Olejaz 2017). 
This process is at once a corporeal and conceptual engagement as students learn through a 
simultaneity of theory and practice.66 
I suggest that psychological therapy, therefore, is not simply a case of ‘talking therapy’, and 
that analytical overemphasis in anthropology on narrative and ‘emplotment’ (Mattingly 1994) 
is not always an instructive approach. Psychotherapists are not simply learning to ‘talk’ as it 
were (and neither are patients); learning to be therapeutic is a process that is rather more 
complicated: it is a process that involves articulating bodies of various kinds.  
 
 
65 The approach I pursue here has benefitted greatly from McDonald’s (2014, 2015) ethnography of how 
medical students learn to practice anatomy relationally; Grasseni’s (2007) ethnography of cow-breeding 
experts in Italy and their shared aesthetic practice of ‘skilled vision’; Ingold’s work on the ‘education of 
attention’ (2001); and anthropological studies of scientific epistemologies (e.g. Cohn 2008, 2009; Candea 
2013; Hallam 2013). It has also been stimulated by my reading of Latour (2004a) and others cited in the text 
and discussed in more detail below.  
66 On the notion of corporeality, see Bruun (2020). 
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Training and fieldwork 
To become a CBT therapist in the UK, one must enrol as a student on a master’s programme in 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy at a British university. CBT therapists are formally educated at 
university level through a one-year M.Sc. degree or equivalent (i.e., HE Level 7). The CBT 
course consists of lectures, academic supervision, and supervised clinical practice. Students 
write a dissertation and must complete a ‘Practice Assessment Portfolio’. This portfolio 
documents the ‘practice units’ required to meet The British Association of Behavioural and 
Cognitive Psychotherapy’s (BABCP) training standards, which are necessary for professional 
accreditation.67 Accreditation is the professional recognition of the therapist as a ‘qualified 
practitioner’ and it is required for employment in the NHS. The CBT programme consists of 
five ‘core modules’, two ‘practice modules’ and a ‘qualificatory module’ over the course of a full 
academic year: 
 
1. Fundamentals of CBT 
2. CBT for Anxiety Disorders 
3. CBT for Depression 
4. Anxiety, Depression and Transdiagnostic Practice 
5. Dissertation 
6. Advanced Supervision of CBT Practice I 
7. Advanced Supervision of CBT Practice II 
8. Qualificatory Practice Unit: PgDip Advanced Practice of CBT 
 
The training of CBT therapists is thus structured around a combination of what is referred to 
as ‘academic’ and ‘clinical’ work. This pedagogical division of ‘academic’ and ‘clinical’ has been 
inherited by the psychotherapeutic professions from medical education through the discipline 
of psychiatry. The CBT course is thus part ‘taught’, meaning that students are trained through 
lectures, seminars and supervision, including the writing of termly assignments and a final 
dissertation; and it is part ‘practice’, referring to training through the practice of psychotherapy 
with patients, including clinical supervision and assessment of each student’s own therapeutic 
practice. This kind of training, therefore, takes place both within the university and within 
clinical settings. The syllabus I was given described the course as enabling students ‘to 
conceptualise underpinning theories and principles with practices in their own work setting’.  
This division of theory and practice follows common dichotomies of abstract and real, or 
 
67 BABCP is the professional association of CBT therapists in the UK. 
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‘academia’ and ‘the real world’, but the object of both here is ‘human psychology’: assessing and 
treating people with mental health problems. Workplace and clinical practice settings are 
external to the University and students are supervised by BABCP-accredited CBT supervisors. 
So, who are the students? Three main contextual points need highlighting here. The first 
point to note is that the majority of CBT students tend to have considerable professional 
experience working in mental healthcare services. Most students have trained and worked as 
Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners (known as PWPs) in the IAPT service before qualifying 
as CBT therapists. University courses on CBT generally only admit applicants who have PWP 
training or equivalent occupational experience.68 The profession of PWP is a recent occupation 
and it was specifically designed within the frame of the IAPT programme as a means to meet 
the reported demand for a ‘therapeutic workforce’ in NHS England (Layard and Clark 2014). 
Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners carry out the initial psychological assessment of patients 
referred to the IAPT service; the initial ‘screening’, as discussed in the previous chapter. They 
also provide CBT-based therapy to patients diagnosed with ‘mild’ to ‘moderate’ depression and 
anxiety. We will explore some aspects of what is entailed in learning this diagnostic classification 
in the pages below. It is also important to recall that the provision of psychological therapy in 
IAPT operates through a hierarchy and a division of labour between ‘Low Intensity’ (PWP) and 
‘High Intensity’ (CBT) practitioners.  
The second point to note is that some of the CBT students are trained professionals in other 
areas than mental healthcare; on the course I followed, I met nurses, prison officers and 
teachers. They often enrol on the course with some general experience of facilitating mental 
health support in their former employments. And finally, a small but significant number of the 
students I met already held Higher Education qualifications in mental healthcare such as 
counselling, clinical psychology, psychiatry, or in other schools of psychotherapy; these students 
usually pursue a master’s degree in CBT because some form of CBT training has become 
mandatory in many psychological and medical professions. 
I will speak here of the ‘students’ collectively but it is important to bear in mind that almost 
everyone who enters the course has trained and worked in the various healthcare professions 
indicated, and many come to train as CBT therapists on the basis of their professional work in 
 
68 A bachelor’s degree in a relevant discipline or a qualification equivalent to Higher Education level 6 is 
given as standard entry requirement. Applicants must also demonstrate that they have access to patients 
referred to CBT, including an external BABCP-accredited supervisor. 
 113 
IAPT. As a result, many students are already accepting of a not only basic, institutionalised 
mind/body divisions and a category of ‘mental health’ but are also familiar with psychological 
therapy. What students are learning through the CBT training can well feel like an ‘extension’, 
as some students put it, of their previous training and practice. To others, however, a certain 
amount of worrisome discontinuity was felt between the CBT course and their former IAPT 
training.  The unlearning of former models of care was part of becoming what the course 
director called ‘a real CBT therapist’. 
CBT training requires its students to work therapeutically: they are said to ‘learn by doing’, 
and they participate in the actual provision of CBT therapy in a mental healthcare service. This 
means that students are seeing a number of ‘patients’ over the course of their one-year training. 
Although they are ‘therapists-in-training’, they are expected to carry out work with patients as 
if they were already competent CBT practitioners. This provision of CBT therapy takes the form 
of one-hour long ‘sessions’, which become the students’ ‘practice hours’ in their clinical 
placements alongside their taught classes on CBT at the University. 
The academic classes are taught two to three days a week and students spend the rest of their 
time in the clinical placement where they see patients. Whilst the students’ clinical work settings 
are typically linked to the IAPT programme, in some cases they work in mental health services 
outside the NHS, such as in charities and non-governmental organisations. The academic and 
therapeutic work of the students is reviewed in weekly supervision with BABCP-accredited 
supervisors, some of whom are also university lecturers. To be awarded the master’s degree, 
students must achieve a total of 200 CBT practice hours with patients and a minimum of 70 
hours of supervision. Students must also undertake a minimum of 10 hours of personal CBT 
therapy with a qualified CBT therapist.  
Following the training of therapists entailed sitting in on introductory and advanced classes 
on CBT, along with seminars and group supervisions, provided by the University. In 
supervisions, I watched video recordings of students carrying out therapy sessions with their 
patients. Like the students, I took notice of the corrections and suggestions of supervisors. I 
listened to the many questions and concerns that students raised during their classes and 
supervisions, as well as the sudden insights or resolutions that often accompanied these 
discussions. I was also invited to follow the lecturers to their offices before and after classes. We 
would make coffee and sit down at their desks and they would talk to me about teaching 
materials and administrative tasks, student issues and accomplishments, the state of the IAPT 
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service and their own clinical practice – as opposed to teaching. I would go through the 
curriculum frequently, noting the pedagogical literature and catching up on reading. The 
theoretical and clinical CBT literature is extensive, and I spent a great deal of time learning 
disciplines known as the cognitive and behavioural sciences.69 When I was at the University 
attending classes, I would also have lunch with students in the canteen. I learned about their 
particular interests in CBT and in psychological therapy more generally. They would tell me 
about some of their concerns with the training course or their therapeutic work, but also the 
joys of being able ‘to help people’ and the sense of accomplishment when a ‘treatment plan’ (a 
set of therapy sessions) with a patient was successfully completed. I listened to some of the 
students’ growing disquiet with the ‘economic strains’ and ‘managerialist’ practices in the IAPT 
service where most of them worked and would seek further employment after qualifying as 
CBT therapists. 
Carrying out fieldwork in and around the CBT course was not self-explanatory nor was it 
without its problems. For example, the lecturers expected me to carry out structured 
questionnaire-based interviews with the students and would kindly offer to leave the classroom 
for an hour or two in order to let me conduct such research. I often had to explain to them that 
I was not really much interested in conducting interviews of that kind. Talking to students, 
hanging out with them, sitting in on the classes and supervisions, and so on, was more 
important to me: ‘it’s called fieldwork’. I tried to explain some of the basic tenets of this kind of 
research: it was empirical, but not in the same way as the research of psychologists. On my first 
day at the University, a senior lecturer turned to me in his office and said, ‘So, I am going to 
leave you with the students today for a couple of hours, so you can get on with your research’. It 
meant that I suddenly had to jot down a list of questions five minutes before meeting the class 
of students that I had hoped to join as a fellow trainee. There were many occasions like these, 
and I soon learned to come prepared not only as a student but as a researcher in their vision of 
what my research participation should entail: questionnaires and interviews.  
I had thought of my fieldwork as a sort of ‘apprenticeship’ in anthropological terms (Grasseni 
2007, 2009). Despite my efforts to explain my role as an anthropologist, I was immediately 
identified as a visiting researcher – an expert instead of an apprentice – as in their model of 
scientific research. One result of this perhaps deliberate misapprehension (after all, leaving the 
 
69 This literature is distinguished from the also vast ‘self-help’ literature on CBT. 
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students with me allowed the lecturers to catch up on administrative work) meant that I had to 
pretend to ‘get on’ with my research in a manner they would recognise as proper scientific 
research. Eventually, it became an interesting lesson: the position and stance as detached 
observe was in itself an introduction to ‘evidence-based’ research of the kind that I realised these 
practitioners-in-training were themselves pursuing.  
Taking up this position, however, I decided against the use of questionnaires and initiated 
instead some group discussions with the students, which allowed us to talk about their CBT 
training. These were discussions and conversations rather than formalised ‘interviews’ but were 
more structured, of course, than our casual chats during lunch breaks. They also moved beyond 
a discussion of academic work. I learned about the different clinical settings in IAPT in which 
students worked, some of the problems they faced on a daily basis, and much more. It turned 
out that such conversations also became an opportunity for the students to evaluate and reflect, 
in their own terms, on their progression as therapists.  
While the lecturers’ expectation and assumption about fieldwork defined my role as an 
outsider from the very beginning, I was still granted participation in the course ‘as if ’ I was a 
student. There were still certain limitations to my participation as a fieldworker, and my 
presence had to be routinely negotiated.70 Nonetheless, both students’ and staff ’s definition of 
me as a ‘researcher’ first and foremost, meant that my presence in classes and supervisions was 
deemed to be appropriately ‘ethical’ (see Simpson 2011); this status as visiting researcher from 
a recognised university provided the necessary ethical credibility that safeguarded issues of 
‘confidentiality’ (patients were discussed in supervisions, for example), which could otherwise 
have been an obstacle to fieldwork. 
 
Learning CBT 
‘What is the nature of human psychology? What are mental health problems? What exactly are 
we dealing with?’, asked the lecturer as he turned to his students in the classroom. It is a Tuesday 
morning and a group of fifteen students are attending one of their first introductory lectures on 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. We are learning about the ‘fundamentals of CBT’. ‘So, here we 
 
70 Negotiating fieldwork presence in clinical contexts is a common concern noted by ethnographers; for a 
discussion of some methodological issues, see Wind (2008).  
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have the classic model of CBT’, said the lecturer, pointing to the diagram on his PowerPoint 
presentation, ‘it is a general model of human psychology’ (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Cross-sectional model of CBT.71 
 
‘As we can see in this model’, the lecturer pointed to each of the four rubrics labelled ‘thoughts’, 
‘behaviours’, ‘emotions’ and ‘physiological reactions’, ‘in general psychological terms, we all 
consist of four primary functions and CBT deals with each of them.’ He continued:  
 
Now, there exists a constant interaction between these functions, and – zooming out – between a person 
and his or her environment. Our environments entail triggers and cues, and these are the inputs that get 
processed as we go about living our lives. 
 
He explained that ‘environments’ were ‘full of information, dangers, and surprises.’ In this 
model of the world, ‘the events or situations we are confronted with in our environment trigger 
our thoughts and how we come to experience the world.’ The lecturer looked around in the 
classroom to check that everyone was seemingly following him and explained that this point 
led us to ‘cognition’:    
 
 
71 Slightly different versions of this model can be found in the CBT literature, but the basic principles as 
described above are the same. All figures by permission of Psychology Tools (URL: 
http://psychology.tools/download-therapy-worksheets.html) © 2008-2014 Matthew Whalley. 
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Human cognition generates thoughts or what we might also call “cognitive processes” in more technical 
terms; some of these processes are particularly ingrained and form part of what we in CBT calls “core 
beliefs” or “schemata”. 
 
Core beliefs, he expanded, referred to ‘the central cognitive content or constructs that people 
hold about themselves, others and the world.’  These were central to the therapeutic model of 
CBT: ‘… it’s “the stuff ” of therapy’, we were told. But CBT necessarily meant the practitioner 
dealing in priority with ‘a person’s “negative” core beliefs, that is, the dysfunctional cognitive 
patterns that have become so ingrained that they lead to adverse behavioural habits and 
consequently emotional suffering.’ 
The lecturer presented his material in diagrams, which have become a hallmark of objectivity 
. The functions he described became objects with arrows between them that ‘demonstrated’ a 
relationship. Arrows connected four functions in a circular pattern (see Figure 2). We learnt 
that ‘our behaviours are often determined by our thoughts and the beliefs we hold about 
ourselves and others.’ In turn, our ‘cognitive and behavioural habits affect the ways in which we 
emotionally process events – how we come to experience what happens to us.’ It was stressed 
that this was a fundamental lesson in CBT: ‘it is not the event itself that causes suffering, but 
our experience of the event.’ The lecturer paused. The point he wished to convey here was that 
‘physical and emotional wellbeing rest on our cognitive and behavioural capacities to adapt to 
our environments in a positive way.’  That was one reason ‘why it’s called Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy.’ He summed up: ‘CBT is essentially about adjusting or changing maladaptive or 
dysfunctional cognitions and behaviours in order to thrive.’  
The introductory classes thus teach students to conceptualise personhood through four 
‘primary functions’ categorised as ‘thoughts’ (or ‘cognition’), ‘behaviours’, ‘emotions’, and ‘bodily 
sensations’ (or ‘physiological reactions’ or simply ‘the body’). Students are taught to think of 
these as distinct but ‘interconnected’ realities constituting what it means to be human in 
‘psychological terms’. There is a strong sense here, in the textbooks and in the classes, that we 
are dealing with universal human attributes. While the therapists might affirm that the ‘content’ 
of each function varies between ‘individuals’, in the content of individual ‘thoughts’, the 
categorical reality of ‘thought’ or ‘cognition’ as both function and structure assume human 
universality.72 In addition to the four primary functions, students were instructed that ‘human 
 
72 The language of ‘content’, ‘function’ and ‘structure’ in psychology is largely inherited from medicine. 
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beings inhabit environments that contain situations, events, triggers and cues’. The idea of 
‘human nature’ vis-à-vis ‘the environment’ has a long history in psychology as in other 
disciplines where the nature/nurture dichotomy is still salient and is allowed to frame 
discussions.73 ‘Thoughts’ or ‘cognition’ is usually given an elevated status in the diagrams, with 
‘emotion’ often featuring at the bottom (see Figures 2 and 3). ‘The environment’ is placed 
external to the complex of the four functions. As illustrated by an arrow in the model, the 
environment affects the person primarily through ‘cognition’. ‘The environment’ generates 
‘events’ which ‘trigger’ cognitive processes or thoughts (which in turn give rise to behavioural, 
emotional and bodily reactions).  
 
 
Figure 3. Belief-Driven Formulation Model of CBT. 
 
The correlation between cognition and the environment is structured by a person’s ‘core 
beliefs’ (the ingrained cognitive constructs that people hold about themselves or others). 
 
73 Anthropologists such as Christina Toren, educated in both psychology and anthropology, have long 
offered a critique of this nature/nurture or nature/culture dichotomy, which nowhere figures with any 
analytical status in her own approach (see e.g. 1990, 2012a). 
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Thoughts are understood to be influenced by the core beliefs that get ‘activated’ or ‘triggered’ 
by events or situations (see Figure 2). Students are taught that a person’s core beliefs give rise to 
‘cognitive patterns’, that is, the particular and entrenched ways in which a person processes and 
interprets inputs from the world. Cognitive patterns are understood to be ‘wired’ into the brain 
of a person. It is the ‘core beliefs’ that are the focus of much CBT work: by adjusting or changing 
a core belief that causes negative (behavioural, emotional, physiological) reactions, the person 
can develop healthier cognitive patterns. Core beliefs are adjusted or changed through ‘rational 
inspection’. This is usually done in collaboration with a therapist who teaches the patient to 
challenge their ‘irrational’ or ‘maladaptive’ beliefs in order to overcome negative behavioural, 
emotional and physiological responses. Because of the perceived ‘ingrained’ nature of our core 
beliefs, challenging them is understood to be a difficult and gradual process, and one which 
requires practical repetition. The person must learn to practise new ‘cognitive habits’ that will 
result in healthier cognitive patterns, causing positive instead of negative ‘feedback’. 
In the classes, when learning this model, students are encouraged to use themselves as 
exemplars of how the four functions work and the significance of core beliefs. The first step is 
to ‘identify’ the core beliefs that are maladaptive and lead to negative responses, such as feelings 
of sadness and anxiety or behaviours such as withdrawal or aggression, including any sensation 
that might be registered in ‘the body’. When a core belief is identified by the patient and 
therapist, it is often condensed down to an underlying self-statement, for example: ‘I am 
unlovable’. The next step is to rationally ‘evaluate’ and ‘challenge’ the core belief. This is often 
done by means of questioning, perhaps by asking ‘What experiences do I have that prove that 
this assumption is not true?’. The patient is then asked to note down all experiences that would 
challenge the core belief ‘I am unlovable’. The underlying assumption of the negative core belief 
is systematically examined by recording any ‘evidence’ which is inconsistent with it. This 
evidence or information is rendered into new ‘positive’ or ‘balanced’ core beliefs and these are 




Figure 4. Positive Beliefs Record. 
 
Thus, in CBT, patients are asked to observe and evaluate the contents of their thoughts (‘negative 
core beliefs’) in order to challenge them so they can be changed or adjusted to what is perceived 
to be more adaptive cognitive patterns (‘positive core beliefs’). The therapeutic relief is seen to 
reside in a self-consciously rational conception and enactment of new ‘cognitive habits’. The 
‘behavioural’ component here means instantiating these new cognitions in practice through 
various exercises.74 Students are taught that ‘balanced beliefs’ require ‘careful nurturing’ and 
‘self-affirmation’. As one lecturer told us: ‘affirm yourself by using positive self-statements, 
remind yourself of all the evidence against the unhelpful core belief.’ Gradually, through 
continued practice, these new core beliefs are understood to be integrated into the person’s 
‘belief system’, creating more ‘positive’ patterns of cognition. 
 
 
74 That is, the patient is progressively exposed to certain ‘events’ or ‘situations’ that are seen to trigger and 
reinforce negative beliefs or ruminations (e.g. a person who is diagnosed as suffering from social anxiety will 
gradually be asked to act out certain ‘behaviours’ in social contexts that are believed to trigger and reinforce 
a set of negative beliefs that cause the anxiety).  
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For the many students who had trained as Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners, and those 
who formerly worked in another therapeutic context such as psychiatry, becoming a CBT 
therapist involved a process of unlearning former models of therapy. This was at times a difficult 
process, not least because the ‘models’ presented by CBT were felt to subvert existing modes of 
therapeutic engagement and clinical skills previously acquired by the students. A few expressed 
their excitement about the fact that what they had practised in their previous professional 
capacity as therapists, and especially the ‘theory’ on which such practice was based, were taken 
up and criticised extensively in some of the classes, often for their many ‘inadequacies’. The 
students had to ‘step up’ their competencies and apply models of intervention thoroughly tested 
and ‘evidence-based’. Others, however, were visibly concerned, and some questioned the value 
of their former therapeutic work as Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners. These students felt 
somewhat betrayed by the promises of the IAPT programme to provide adequate training in 
evidence-based, therapeutic practice; they felt that the quality of therapy had been dispensed 
with as a result. 
When such unease was articulated by students who had first trained as Psychological 
Wellbeing Practitioners in IAPT (to which they wished to return as CBT therapists), the lecturer 
would often remind them that models of intervention commonly used by Psychological 
Wellbeing Practitioners or ‘Low Intensity’ therapists were simply built upon with more 
‘complex’ and ‘advanced’ theory and practice applicable to ‘High Intensity’ therapists. We were 
now learning ‘real CBT’, the lecturer explained, not a ‘watered-down version’ of it. This new 
teaching could then be incorporated as a natural learning curve from the simple to the complex, 
building up layers of therapeutic competence and skills appropriate for the expert role of the 
CBT therapist. Therefore, the models of theory and practice that many students had carefully 
exercised in their former therapeutic profession had to give way to more ‘authoritative 
knowledge’ – to more complex models of patients and treatments, and of CBT itself. However, 
an unease was voiced by students who felt nevertheless that their previous work as Psychological 
Wellbeing Practitioners was undermined by what they were now learning on the CBT course: 
they worried if they had, in fact, been practising CBT at all. 
 
‘Human psychology’: acquiring a diagrammatic vision 
Throughout the lectures and seminars, we were regularly instructed in CBT models of therapy. 
We would in turn learn to refer back to these models, where appropriate, in discussions of 
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patients or any problem we were trying to understand. These models were deemed, 
ethnographically here, to be ‘representations’ of reality, but they were also to shape that reality.75 
The cross-sectional CBT model (see Figure 2) was the principal referent. When put to work in 
this way, diagrams are talked about by practitioners as ‘representations’ that inform or explain 
different aspects of the practice of CBT. This kind of therapeutic training draws then on a 
scientific pedagogy which constructs universalised representations of its working objects 
through specific technologies of visualisation and standardisation. The model draws together a 
selection of categories (or ‘phenomena’, in psychological terms) and puts them in relation to one 
another. In the CBT diagram, the categories of ‘cognition’, ‘emotion’, ‘behaviour’, ‘the body’, and 
so forth, appear in correlation and retain the same position, which means that each category is 
also contained within a strictly organised semantic arrangement. The meaning of ‘cognition’ is 
constituted, therefore, in and through its relationship with other categories such as 
‘environment’. Diagrammatic representations of this kind make up a semantic network that 
students have to learn. The CBT model aims to constitute and account for a universal object 
which is perceived to be at once scientifically knowable and therapeutically workable: ‘human 
psychology’.  
The students thus learn ‘the nature of human psychology’ through a range of visual 
representations as illustrated in the scientific literature and in the lectures where models are 
drawn on a whiteboard or displayed in PowerPoint presentations. The models are usually two-
dimensional, chart-like diagrams. In psychology, the use of diagrams is part of the practice of 
objectivity, as it is elsewhere. The use of diagrams is also an important part of a simplification 
process that is common in the production of scientific working objects (see e.g. McDonald 
2014; Prentice 2005; Hallam 2013). Simplification in the form of a diagram is fundamentally 
visual (see Coopmans et al 2014), but psychological diagrams are usually accompanied by 
words: the charts, lines and figures are inscribed. Diagrams might simplify, but they are rarely 
self-explanatory and will often require further written or verbal explication in the classroom. 
Over the course of these classes, we were presented with more and more complex diagrams. 
These represented psychological therapy in practice, both disorders and treatments, or 
therapeutic processes and their theorisation. Such diagrams are often accompanied by lengthy 
elaboration in textbooks or by instructing lecturers. The persuasiveness of the diagram lies in 
 
75 This is a common but important point noted about scientific practice in anthropological studies of science, 
see e.g. Cohn 2004; Edwards et al. (2007); Candea (2016); McDonald (2012); Coopmans et al. (2014).  
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how the representation comes to ‘fit’ the reality it seeks to represent; the extent to which the 
representation seems so self-evident. 
The use of diagrams as a representational device in the sciences was a result of scientific 
image-making that developed in the nineteenth century and which became instructive in the 
invention of a particular kind of ‘aperspectival’ objectivity (Daston & Galison 2007: 123). The 
two-dimensional diagram has no shadows, suggesting a view from nowhere (McDonald 2014: 
132). The diagrammatic vision implies a disembodied or transcendental vision, seeing 
everything from nowhere – what Haraway calls the ‘god-trick’ of scientific objectivity (Haraway 
1988: 581). The invention of ‘a-view-from-nowhere’ objectivity, in which diagrams played a 
significant role, gave further impetus to the notions of scientific distance and detachment on 
the part of the scientist-as-observer. This was, and is still, an epistemic stance, or ‘epistemic 
virtue’ we might say (cf. Daston & Galison 2007), that sought to eradicate ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘particularity’ as defined in opposition to ‘objectivity’ and ‘universality’. We turn to these 
inventions in the context of evidence-based therapy in much more detail in the next chapter 
(see Chapter 5). In the meantime, we might want to note here that CBT diagrams bring these 
epistemic ideals together – objectivity, universality, and detachment – in their depiction of 
complex, epistemic objects such as ‘human psychology’. 
Throughout the therapeutic training, this epistemic object takes various forms. Importantly, 
‘human psychology’ here refers not to the discipline of psychology but to the object of study: 
namely, the psychological traits of the human species. The universalist and biological terms are 
deliberate and very much part of what students are learning when studying psychology through 
the lens of CBT. The categories of ‘mind’ or ‘cognition’ can be said to emerge here as aspects of 
what it means to be human in psychological terms – that is, they feature as constituent parts of 
human psychology. And yet these various abstractions were not always discussed or enacted in 
precisely these terms. Theoretical concepts were often brushed off as being too far removed 
from the nitty-gritty of clinical work. However, all the diagrammatic representations that were 
used every working day – themselves often highly theoretical and abstract – were seldom 
questioned in the same way. It appeared instead to be the therapeutic language that put these 
diagrams to work in clinical contexts which had to reflect a commitment to the more practical 
and concrete reality of ‘doing CBT’. In the supervision, as in the classroom, we learned to simply 
talk of ‘mental illness’, ‘people’ and ‘patients’, drawing our attention to the diagrams as models 
of the therapeutic object, subject and process. 
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Learning to be therapeutic 
‘What is wrong with the patient?’ 
CBT therapists, like medical doctors and psychiatrists, are taught that treatment follows from 
‘diagnosis’. Providing the right kind of treatment means giving the right diagnosis. Without a 
diagnosis it is uncertain what exactly is being treated. ‘What is wrong with the patient?’ is the 
basic diagnostic question, and the answer dictates the therapeutic intervention. CBT students 
are trained to answer this question, but this is not always an easy task, even with many years of 
experience working with psychotherapy. Over the course of my fieldwork it became apparent 
that the word ‘diagnosis’ was sometimes felt to be inappropriate – ‘too medical’. Some therapists 
told me they were wary of a ‘diagnostic approach’ as it restrained the therapeutic encounter in 
ways that inhibited the effectiveness and value of psychotherapy.  
One of the psychologists, a former practitioner in the IAPT service who had left to establish 
her own private practice, was passionately opposed to the idea that psychotherapists should be 
diagnostic practitioners in the style of physicians. ‘Diagnosis often results in the therapist 
approaching their patient as a diagnostic category rather than a person’, she told me. Diagnosis 
evoked a world in which ‘the patient becomes “depression” or “depressive symptoms” rather 
than an individual with a history and a life which is more complex than a diagnostic label or a 
set of symptoms.’ Instead, this therapist wanted to meet ‘patients on their own terms – and to 
really understand what you’re dealing with you need to meet the person.’   
In some ways, this is evocative of a common critique of diagnosis within primary care 
medicine in the UK, in which ‘the whole person’ is sought rather than the ‘patient’ with a 
diagnostic tag (see e.g. Mol et al. 2010). That ‘person’ or ‘self ’ often remains elusive, however, 
posing therefore as a pervasive resource of critique and ambition (Bruun 2014), and it is 
apparently similar in this arena. A fuller understanding of the patients’ ‘suffering’ is sought but 
only within the existing models, which necessarily constrain. Psychologists and 
psychotherapists often echoed to me the sentiment that a ‘diagnosis’ could prejudge and limit 
an encounter. In one of the supervisions, for instance, students were told that: ‘if you give a 
diagnosis at the outset of the therapeutic encounter, you are forming a relationship with patients 
based on preconceived notions about the nature of their suffering.’ However, within the 
institutional framework of the NHS in which evidence-based psychological therapy is provided, 
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failing or refusing to identify a patient’s problems in diagnostic terms is more likely to be 
considered a breach of professional responsibility. The medico-legal demands of IAPT as a 
national public health service mean that diagnosis is deemed necessary in the provision of 
psychological therapy and it is actively sought in this context of mental healthcare. 
Consequently, CBT therapists and all other IAPT psychotherapists are required to work 
diagnostically. In the classes I followed, a significant amount of CBT training involved learning 
to identify and evaluate symptoms and to classify them in order to arrive at a diagnostic 
category. This practice is generally referred to as ‘assessment’. Assessment is intrinsically 
diagnostic. The therapist carries out an assessment as part of their first consultation with a 
patient. (Although an initial assessment, known as a ‘screening call’, and conducted by a 
Psychological Wellbeing Practitioner on the telephone, usually takes place prior to consultation 
with a CBT therapist.) The purpose of the assessment is to identify one or more ‘mental health 
problems’ or ‘disorders’ and to determine the severity of the patient’s condition. This involves 
classifying a condition in accordance with three definitions of the degree of psychological 
acuteness: ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ or ‘severe’. The assessment of the severity of the condition assigns 
the patient to one of three ‘care pathways’ or ‘interventions’ within the stepped-care model of 
IAPT. Assessing the severity of a condition is determined by three factors: ‘symptom severity’, 
‘duration of symptoms’, and associated ‘functional impairment’, with the last here referring to 
the impairment of vocational, educational, social or economic functioning. According to NICE 
guidelines, the diagnostic classification of the severity of mental health problems is defined as 
follows: 
 
1. ‘Mild’ generally refers to relatively few core symptoms (although sufficiently present to achieve a 
diagnosis), a limited duration and little impact on day-to-day functioning. 
2. ‘Moderate’ refers to the presence of all core symptoms of the disorder plus several other related 
symptoms, duration beyond that required by minimum diagnostic criteria, and a clear impact on 
functioning. 
3. ‘Severe’ refers to the presence of most or all symptoms of the disorder, often of long duration and 
with very marked impact on functioning (for example, an inability to participate in work-related 
activities and withdrawal from interpersonal activities).76  
 
 
76 As cited in NICE (2011: 45); this document provides an outline of the assessment procedure for ‘common 
mental health problems’. 
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When CBT students are learning to assess patients, they are therefore learning to identify, in 
psychological terms, the nature of a pathological condition (‘mental health problem’ or 
‘disorder’) by the examination of symptoms. Psychological assessment relies on the use of 
diagnostic categories of psychopathology which are determined by the publication of 
international diagnostic standards for teaching and treatment informed by the DSM-5 (The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th ed.) – published by the American 
Psychiatric Association (2013) – and the ICD-10 (The International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th ed.) published by the World Health Organization 
(2017). These two main publications – together with the professional conferences and 
institutional regulations that accompany them – stabilise and officialise international 
classification standards (cf. Bowker & Star 2000) for identifying different forms of ‘mental 
disorder’ which serve to establish a shared language of psychopathology across different mental 
healthcare professions. 
  In the National Health Service of which IAPT is part, therapists are required to conduct a 
psychological assessment then – using ‘diagnostic identification tools’. These tools are 
algorithmic questionnaires and scales; they provide a diagnostic score following a calculation 
based on the quantification of answers to a set of questions. The use of scales and more general 
quantification are themselves marks of objectivity (Porter 2001, on ‘trust in numbers’). The 
questionnaires as well as the scales deployed in IAPT have achieved scientific consensus as 
‘validated measures’ for specific disorders. Learning to do ‘assessment’ in CBT involves then 
learning to use a set of questionnaires with a patient, to an objective end. In the UK, the 
‘validated measures’ used to diagnose the two most common mental health problems – 
‘depression’ and ‘generalised anxiety disorder’ – are the PHQ-9 [9-item Patient Health 
Questionnaire] and GAD-7 [7-item Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale]. Other mental health 
problems treated by CBT therapists, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), social 
phobia (agoraphobia), health anxiety (hypochondria), panic disorder, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) each have their own ‘measure’.77 
The identification of disorders in CBT, as in clinical psychology and psychiatry, thus derives 
from the use of patient questionnaires where diagnoses are presented as a checklist of criteria. 
This is a particular technology of quantification. Questionnaires as numerical scales are 
 
77 For an outline of these patient questionnaires, see The IAPT Data Handbook version 2.0.1 Appendices 
(2011: 22-39). 
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designed to render a person’s experience of suffering into an observable and measurable 
condition. The basic task of the questionnaire is to either confirm or disprove the existence of 
a disorder. Without the questionnaire, the question of ‘what is wrong with the patient?’ remains 
unanswerable and the patient’s suspected condition escapes observation. It is perhaps not 
surprising, therefore, that to some untrained students who have not yet been exposed to and 
acquired the perceptive capacity of the assessment tools, ‘psychopathology’ (‘the study and 
diagnosis of mental disorders’) feels unnervingly ‘ambiguous’. That is, ‘mental disorders’ often 
seem undiscernible to the novice practitioner. Anxiety and depression are not apparent and 
apprehensible in a way that a broken arm might be to a non-expert, nor are they as readily 
distinguishable as a fever is from a bleeding finger. However, over the course of 
psychotherapeutic training, ambiguity seems to disappear in practice. By the time students have 
completed their introductory classes and are well into the course, they have already assessed 
several patients, formulated diagnoses and treatment plans, and they are increasingly proficient 
in discerning a disorder immediately, as if they were inspecting a broken arm. The CBT students 
come to talk about ‘mental health problems’ and ‘disorders’ as if the assessment tools detected 
conditions that were both clearly observable and discrete entities.  
Students learn this therapeutic epistemology through repeated practice in the classroom, in 
their sessions with patients, and in supervision. They learn to memorise and in turn perform 
the questions, the checklist of criteria and symptoms, the diagnostic scores, and so forth, and 
the accumulation of this learning process is the acquired ability to ‘know’ what is wrong with 
the patient. The students come to ‘see’ the problem or disorder with the certainty of the eyes of 
the measure (Cohn 2004; Luhrmann 2000). In this sense, the use of these measurement 
technologies is how therapists are ‘doing’ disorders (Mol 2002). The questionnaire becomes the 
reality of the disorder in practice by way of rendering ‘it’ visible and workable: human 
experience of distress becomes a quantity, a document, an observable object. This is how the 
students, by the time they have finished the CBT training, can see a patient for an incisive 20 
minutes and with confidence conclude: ‘you are suffering from moderate depression’. 
 
Beyond ‘talk therapy’ 
Psychotherapeutic care of the sort that CBT promotes has many shared features with 
psychodynamic psychotherapy (see Bruun 2014), one of which is the understanding of 
therapeutic treatment as an essentially heuristic and interpretive task: the therapist’s job is to 
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enable another person to discover and learn something for themselves, and about themselves. 
In CBT and other IAPT therapies, this aspect of therapeutic work is commonly referred to as 
‘psycho-education’ and ‘guided self-help’. In a recursive manner, the training of CBT therapists 
is also intrinsically heuristic in these terms. For example, the teachers’ job is to enable the 
students to discover and learn for themselves how to do CBT, what it means to work 
therapeutically, the effects of CBT on certain conditions, and so on. From this perspective, 
psychotherapeutic treatment can be understood as a highly interpretive exercise that works 
through the construction and use of narratives, and one which the therapist is meant to teach 
patients to do: it was stressed to us all in the classes that the patient, too, must learn, in a sense, 
to become a ‘competent CBT therapist’. One of the purposes of CBT therapy was thus to enable 
patients to manage and change their ‘negative beliefs’ (the contents of their thoughts) through 
cognitive and behavioural techniques. However, we were frequently reminded that the purpose 
of therapy is not to ‘get rid of negative thoughts’, as it were, but to learn how to deal with them 
when they arise. It is often stressed that CBT does not restore you to a permanent state of 
‘wellbeing’ but that it enables you to work with whatever challenges life throws at you. In this 
sense, CBT therapy teaches patients and practitioners alike to become ‘their own therapist’. 
These ideas are evocative of mainstream theories of the effectiveness of psychotherapy in 
both psychotherapeutic and anthropological writing about why psychotherapy might work, and 
why it might work well (when it works). In psychological and medical anthropologies, one 
dominant strand of this theorisation is known as ‘symbolic healing’ which looks at the 
relationship between narrative or ritual symbolism and healing in specific cultural contexts 
(Dow 1986). Another anthropological strand related to this work is the notion of ‘narrative 
reasoning’ and ‘therapeutic emplotment’ (Mattingly 1994). These approaches theorise 
(psycho)therapeutic practices as cultural modes of storytelling, as healing practices whose 
effectiveness works through symbolic and narrated imagery and plots. A central argument in 
the anthropological literature is that humans have a universal ability (and a propensity) to come 
to terms with what is variously described as their emotional and cognitive experiences – their 
inner world or sense of self – through an external rendering of this perceived internality. Such 
a stance would, in general terms, require us to theorise psychological therapy, or CBT more 
specifically, as a cultural and collaborative construction or reconstruction of a person in a 
narrative by means of a series of consultations that aim at providing appropriate externalisations 
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through which people can find and come to terms with the cause and meaning of their 
suffering. 
Anthropological theorisation of this kind resonates with a number of conceptualisations of 
the therapeutic value of the use of symbols and different forms of narrative found in 
psychodynamic traditions (see e.g. Axline 1974; Winnicott 1971) including CBT (e.g. Rhodes 
2014). Lévi-Strauss is credited with having brought this insight concerning the use of narrative 
and symbolic imagery to the fore in anthropology with his influential chapter entitled ‘The 
Effectiveness of Symbols’ (Lévi-Strauss 1963), which contains a comparative analysis of 
psychoanalysis and shamanism. Lévi-Strauss’ central conclusion was that both the shaman and 
the psychoanalyst interpret and translate (albeit in different ways) their patients’ feelings, 
experiences or sensations into words and symbols in order to manipulate them; a process in 
which therapeutic relief is achieved through the very effectiveness of ‘external’ symbols. Lévi-
Strauss’ theory has been revised and elaborated by anthropologists studying different contexts 
of the (psycho)therapeutic as particular cultural discourses that construct and work through 
the symbolic, the narrative and the mythic (e.g. Calabrese 2008; Davies 2009; Dow 1986; 
Mattingly 1994). In these ethnographies, therapists (and their patients) tend to become 
narrators, symbolists and interpretivists par excellence. Many such approaches often contribute, 
therefore, to a vision of psychotherapists as skilled in the performance of ‘externalisations’ –
namely storytelling, plots and symbols – of some sort of internal, individualised subjectivity or 
‘inner world’ where emotions and thoughts are located. They often imply, much like Levi-
Strauss, that the effectiveness of psychotherapy is inherently symbolic and lies in the story.78  
I do not wish to dismiss the ethnographic significance of the narrative and the symbolic as a 
way of understanding psychotherapy.79 However, I want to suggest that there is more going on 
in the training and practice of psychotherapy in both empirical and theoretical terms. There is 
more to psychological therapy ethnographically than ‘talk therapy’, and analytical overemphasis 
 
78 There are many (psychological) anthropologists writing in this psychoanalytic or Levi-Straussian vein; I 
quote Tanya Luhrmann (1989: 249) here as an example: ‘[Psycho]therapy seems to work when someone 
externalises, or labels, some internal feeling and then is able to transform it … Narratives could be therapeutic 
because of the way in which someone finds a central character or symbol moving, the way in which they 
identify with it. The person would imagine herself as that character by using her own experience as the 
ground. … If that character has emotions which you have repressed within you, your identification may help 
you experience these feelings more directly. … The narrative then becomes the practice-ground, a dry-run 
to handle feelings and responses in new ways.’ 
79 I have explored some aspects of this elsewhere (see Bruun 2013).  
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in anthropology on narrative is not always a helpful approach. Psychotherapists are not simply 
learning to ‘talk’ as it were (and neither are patients); learning to be therapeutic and to work 
therapeutically involves dynamic processes that are rather more complicated, taking us beyond 
narration, symbolic healing, and emplotment. 
 
Articulating bodies 
Becoming a skilled therapist requires apprenticeship in a particular learning environment. I 
have indicated earlier that we might understand the training of therapists as a form of ‘situated 
learning’ (Lave & Wenger 1991). It should be noted, however, that the concept of ‘situated’ 
learning does not refer merely to how people are located in space and time, as Lave and Wenger 
make clear (1991: 33). Nor is it simply a term for ‘social’ action in the sense of involving other 
people and specific settings. Acquiring knowledge and skills is, of course, a process constituted 
in shared contexts (demarcated temporally and spatially) that occasion ways of learning. My 
approach takes such general theoretical assertions further.  
Approaching learning as ‘situated’ aims to reveal the intrinsically relational feature of 
knowledge acquisition and attends to how meaning takes shape in activities at once practical 
and conceptual, in which contradictions or tensions require careful negotiation and 
coordination. There is no activity that can be said to be unsituated (Haraway 1988; Mol 2002) 
or not historical (Toren 2012b). Learning is not a transmission of ‘mental representations’ or a 
matter of innate ‘cognitive predispositions’, and it is certainly not an activity in which a discrete 
brain-subject simply ‘receives’, ‘processes’ and ‘applies’ knowledge about the world as it is.80 
Such computational, evolutionist and cognitivist ideas are rejected here (for anthropological 
critiques on some of these points, see Laidlaw 2007; Toren & Pina-Cabral 2011). What it means 
to learn, to acquire skills, and to engage others in processes of skilled learning and knowledge 
acquisition cannot be reduced to a set of genetically modulated cognitive mechanisms, 
dedicated to discrete computational tasks, even if this framework has become particularly 
persuasive to some  psychologists and anthropologists alike (cf. Whitehouse 2001), as 
metaphors of ‘knowledge’, ‘the brain’ and ‘computers’ have joined forces (Cohn 2004, 2009; 
 
80 Such and similar assumptions are foundational to theories of learning, especially in cognitive anthropology 
where many of these ideas are owed to evolutionary psychology. For anthropological examples, see e.g. 
chapters by D. Sperber and P. Boyer in Whitehouse (2001). For critical reflections on cognitive science vis-
à-vis social anthropology, see Laidlaw (2007).  
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Dumit 2004; Rose & Abi-Rached 2013). We might instead theorise learning as an activity in 
and with the world, which entails learner(s) and teacher(s) and all circumstances of the learning 
environment as mutually constitutive. Even the acquisition of knowledge in the form of an 
abstraction – ‘human psychology’ – is itself a practical configuration reliant on specific 
technologies of learning in specific circumstances.  
Becoming skilled in psychological therapy then is the result of ongoing training and 
experience in the engagement and enactment of a particular activity in which all implicated 
circumstances constitute what it means to work therapeutically. Some therapists might in their 
own terms say that to learn to do psychological therapy is a matter of an individual student 
developing ‘competencies’ specific to a clinical context or problem, including ‘social and cultural 
competencies’ ; an understanding that has not differed greatly from anthropological analyses of 
professional learning in clinical settings (e.g. Kleinman 1980). However, to this anthropologist, 
becoming a psychotherapist is not simply a case of individuals developing ‘competencies’ or a 
set of professional skills achieved through institutional ‘socialisation’ or ‘cultures’, as 
anthropologists of psychotherapy have suggested elsewhere (cf. Davies 2009, on institutional 
‘socialisation’; Luhrmann 2000, on professional ‘cultures’). The capacity to develop such 
‘competencies’ means acquiring a particular body that is learning, and has learnt, to be affected 
(Latour 2004a) by the circumstances of therapy. Drawing in part on the work of Isabelle 
Stengers (1997) and Vinciane Despret (1999), as well as William James’ ‘radical empiricism’ 
(1976 [1906]), Latour argues: 
 
To have a body is to learn to be affected, meaning ‘effectuated’, moved, put into motion by other 
entities, humans and non-humans. [The body is] an interface that becomes more and more describable 
as it learns to be affected by more and more elements. The body is thus not a provisional residence of 
something superior – an immortal soul, the universal or thought – but what leaves a dynamic 
trajectory by which we learn to register and become sensitive to what the world is made of. (Latour 
2004: 205-206; original emphasis) 
 
Latour rephrases this approach through an ethnographic study (Teil 1998) in which the use of 
odour kits constitutes the training of ‘noses’ in the French perfume industry. The odour kit 
consists of distinct pure fragrances in an arrangement of sharp and subtle contrasts and 
differences. The training sessions, the teacher and the kit provide the conditions and 
circumstances for learning to register and differentiate between more and more subtle 
differences in odours, thus ultimately becoming ‘a nose’. That is, the trainee becomes a nose 
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(un nez), as it were, as the trainee acquires a refined sense of smell that defines her ability and 
skill in detecting and producing olfactory compositions. ‘Acquiring a body’, as Latour writes, 
‘is thus a progressive enterprise that produces at once a sensory medium and a sensitive world’ 
(2004: 207; original emphasis). The therapist must learn to be affected by the specificities of 
what it means to work therapeutically. This demands an affective engagement of the body which 
takes discipline and practice. 
Rather than being a case of cultural or institutional socialisation then, learning to be 
therapeutic and to work therapeutically is a process of mutual articulation (McDonald 2014; 
Prentice 2005): therapists learn to be affected in the mutual articulation of both concrete and 
conceptual ‘working objects’ from diagrams and protocols to client cases and patients, their own 
bodies included. The patient and the therapist, especially, constitute each other in significant 
ways. Mutual articulation describes an affective and material process of co-constitution, a 
mutual articulation of circumstances and therapist in the specificities effected in the learning 
environment of psychotherapy. In the words of Latour (2004), we might say that before the CBT 
training, the therapists were ‘inarticulate’; both in the sense of their inability to see and speak 
psychotherapeutically, and in the sense that they had not yet learned to be affected by their 
teachers, colleagues and other ‘circumstances’, including books, paperwork and other objects in 
the course. They were thus unable to ‘think’, ‘listen’, ‘perform’, and so on, as a CBT therapist. The 
trainee therapists could be said to acquire new bodies by becoming more sensitive to ever 
keener distinctions that the world thereby affords them. In the psychotherapeutic environment, 
these distinctions are themselves rendered articulate in the theories, models, consultations, 
records, colleagues, clinical guidelines, and everything else that make up ‘CBT’. 
In the world of psychotherapy, ‘supervisions’ are thought to be one of the most important 
educational settings for therapeutic training. Supervisions can take the form of a group session 
or a one-to-one meeting and a qualified CBT therapist leads both types of supervision. The 
weekly supervision is designed primarily to evaluate the students’ clinical practice with their 
patients and to address the therapeutic issues that arise in consultations. The trainee therapist 
is asked to take detailed notes of each consultation and this is done routinely after seeing a 
patient. Notes are written down in a confidential ‘patient journal’ that the trainee brings to 
supervisions. Various clinical topics and intervention practices are discussed throughout the 
supervision that relate to the patient cases at hand, such as the appropriate treatment for ‘chronic 
depression’ or how to deal with ‘complex patients’, and students might be instructed in 
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‘transdiagnostic practice’ or the facilitation of ‘emotional regulation’, ‘goal-setting’, ‘relapse 
prevention’, and so forth. The supervision ideally brings all the specificities of psychological 
therapy together within a structured space and time.  
In the supervisions, the students consult their notebooks and patient journals to recount 
their therapeutic sessions. They might move from their present patient case back to past 
sessions or cases to detect differences and similarities. They relate these in turn to the accounts 
presented in the clinical textbooks, by their colleagues in the group and by the supervisor. 
Analogous to McDonald’s (2014) medical students and their ‘working objects’ in anatomical 
dissection and Prentice’s (2005) surgeons and their ‘instruments’ in surgical sculpting, the CBT 
students learn to work therapeutically at the interface of their own bodies and the instruments 
of psychological therapy. They move from one medium to another: notebooks, guidelines and 
diagrams are consulted, and they move comparatively between patient cases and accounts that 
circulate in the supervision group and in the clinical literature. The ‘working objects’ of this 
learning environment – all the notes, schemas, video recordings, patient journals, including the 
supervisor and colleagues (and much more) – become part of what it means to become a 
therapist, to acquire a body that knows what it is ‘to be therapeutic’. CBT students thus learn 
progressively to be affected by the materials that are instrumental in constituting ‘competency’ 
and ‘skill’ in sessions and supervisions, and they do so relationally with other therapists, 
supervisors, and patients.  
Working ‘therapeutically’ in practice, then, ideally confirms the models or theories on which 
knowledge and skill are seen to rest. The students are learning to identify aetiologies and 
pathologies; that means learning to pay attention to what is significant (literally) and putting it 
in context. The teacher is drawing the students’ attention to ‘patterns’, ‘traits’, ‘qualities’, ‘features’ 
and ‘characteristics’ of ‘disorders’, of ‘personalities’, and of CBT ‘interventions’. In the 
supervision, as in the therapeutic session, paying attention involves the ability to grasp and 
conceptualise these distinctions, a task effected through various classifications and scales, 
already acquired by the students in the learning environment of the classroom. 
Participation in the supervision group demands a capacity on the part of the student to be 
‘reflexive’ about their therapeutic work.81 ‘It’s in supervisions that we really develop as therapists’, 
announced the supervisor in one of our first group supervisions. ‘Becoming a good therapist 
 
81 On the question of reflexivity, see Chapter 6.  
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requires introspection and the willingness to apply to ourselves the same knowledge and 
techniques [from CBT] that we ask our patients to apply to their lives, and to learn from.’ The 
supervision is talked about as a ‘safe space’ where the trainees can share experiences and learn 
from failures and successes: ‘we are all vulnerable in supervisions’, as one supervisor put it. 
Sharing experiences and interpretations, perceived failures and successes, and the agreement 
on what constitutes error or progress, figure clinically as ‘observations’ in psychotherapy and 
may be perceived, in their own terms, as strictly ‘clinical’ but also as ‘personal’ or ‘anecdotal’ in 
quality. Conversation is framed using the appropriate conceptual language of CBT as printed in 
the textbooks and spoken by the supervisor; when students at times failed to put this language 
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In pursuit of a science of psychotherapy 
We move now from the training of therapists to the rather different context of conferences in 
which evidence-based psychological therapy is presented and discussed amongst professionals. 
These conferences offered important contexts in which ‘scientific research’ and the ‘evidence’ 
it offered were mobilised, engaged with, and understood. Conferences might be seen as part of 
a machinery of fact production in which, as sociologies and anthropologies of science have 
noted (see Edwards et al. 2007; McDonald 2012a; Candea 2016), the important ‘evidence’ that 
goes towards the making of facts is agreed or disputed. They can thus be thought of as a form 
of secondary peer review. I will expand on some of these points in the following paragraphs. 
Although they might be said to end up as a practice of this kind, the professional conferences 
I attended were not intended by their organisers to be the primary sites of evidence production 
but sites in which evidential material could be presented and further discussed. The account I 
present differs in some important respects therefore from an anthropology of science carried 
out ‘in the lab’ or research unit, where ethnographers might expect to find science ‘in action’ 
(Latour 1987). ‘Laboratory ethnography’ of this kind has in many ways laid the ground for both 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and anthropological studies of science, and it remains 
instructive here. However, this chapter (and the thesis as a whole) could be said to be more 
about what is subsequently made of the story of scientific research or fact production, not the 
story itself. 82  It is of course the researchers and scientists (including other implicated 
technologies and circumstances, human and non-human) who construct and conduct the 
experiments from which the ‘evidence-base’ of psychological therapies can be demonstrated, 
but it is the practising therapists and mental health professionals at large who have to be 
persuaded. It is the latter who consume the scientific facts produced and transform the status 
of evidence, who make therapeutic practices ‘evidence-based’, mobilising clinical programmes 
and action, incorporating certain facts for different purposes and disregarding others, and so 
on. Conferences are thus spaces in which a reliable ‘science of psychotherapy’ for which the 
basic science had already been done somewhere else, was intensely and obviously sought, albeit 
 
82 My point is partly inspired by my reading of Latour and Woolgar’s postscript in the second edition of 
Laboratory Life (Latour & Woolgar 1986), although they are making a (somewhat different) point about 
reflexivity; about the production of their own account or story and ‘what is subsequently made of [it]’ (ibid: 
284).  
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not without contention. A failure or reluctance to be persuaded by this pursuit of scientific 
evidence and endorsement prompted moral disapproval.  
This chapter touches on three main points. The first point is about ethnographic definition 
and self-definition: practitioners of evidence-based psychological therapy are well-rehearsed in 
a moral discourse, as we shall see in a moment, of professional self-definition. 83 
‘Psychoanalysis’ remains one category against which CBT has defined itself as ‘real science’, but 
it is also through this and related us/them boundaries that a problematic ‘gap’ between science 
and practice, or scientists and practitioners, has been forged and confirmed. Not all members 
of the category of ‘evidence-based’ practice are equally ‘evidence-based’ in the self-image of 
what counts as real science. 
The second point touches on historical inventions and reinventions of ‘objectivity’. We will 
be looking at how the general epistemological framework of EBM has offered scientific 
legitimacy to, and justification for, psychotherapy and, in turn, how evidence-based 
psychotherapy has become constitutive of what I call ‘evidential objectivity’.  
The third point I wish to make is that the very practice of psychotherapy has long posed 
problems for psychologists in their pursuit of a ‘science of psychotherapy’. One such pursuit, 
and we will see this throughout, has involved the tacit but persuasive metaphor of the ‘pill’ or 
‘medication’ as the epitome of a therapeutic intervention residing unequivocally in the realm 
of objective science. Proponents of psychological therapy, I suggest, have long sought 
recognition for it as the product of science, but crucially with ‘subjectivity’ as its scientific 
object. Psychological therapy could be said to have finally achieved such recognition, at least in 
the UK, but it is also because of this achievement that empirical tensions continue to loom 
large. 
 
We could say that shaping psychotherapy into an object of scientific inquiry has been a 
preoccupation of psychologists since the early days of its conception. Freud himself famously 
sought to place psychoanalysis on an equal footing with medical science (Freud was, after all, 
medically trained in nineteenth-century ‘physiology’ and ‘neuropathology’). Psychoanalysis 
was never successful, as we now know, in achieving the kind of scientific recognition Freud had 
imagined, although psychoanalytic psychotherapy did appear to gain, during the mid-twentieth 
 
83 In making this point, I draw widely on the work of Ardener 1982; Chapman 1978; McDonald 1989; 
Herzfeld 1989; Candea 2010.  
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century, a prominent clinical standing in the discipline of psychiatry across Europe and, 
especially, within American psychiatry of the 1950s and 60s (Luhrmann 2000; Marks 2017, 
2018a, 2018b). The critique of clinical judgement and decision-making in medicine that 
emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s (cf. Feinstein 1967; Cochrane 1973) laid the foundation for 
a movement that later became known as evidence-based medicine (EBM) in the 1990s 
(Lambert et al. 2006; Timmermans & Berg 2003).  
It is through the influence and recensions of the EBM movement  that psychotherapy in the 
form of CBT (and related therapies) has been seen to achieve its scientific status (see e.g. David 
et al. 2018; Parry 2000; Rowland & Goss 2000).84 A range of regulatory bodies in the UK now 
stipulate ‘evidence-based’ practice across different sectors from medicine and public health to 
urban planning, education, nursing, and economics – and right back to the national regulatory 
bodies themselves: the ‘evidence-based’ practice of mental health policy-making and 
implementation (see e.g. Department of Health 2015). The list of disciplines and areas of 
expertise that now lay claim to evidence-based practice is long and proliferating (Trinder & 
Reynolds 2000; Goldenberg 2006). 
We turn first to the conferences themselves.85  Conferences in psychology have become 
important occasions for the dissemination of new research that can inform clinical practice. 
They have become instrumental in shaping ‘evidence’ for the formulation and establishment 
of ‘standards’ of clinical training and ‘good practice’ across a range of healthcare professions. 
They have, in other words, become important regulatory events in ‘the generation and 
management of evidence’ (Cambrosio et al. 2006). Conferences are therefore interesting 
ethnographic sites in which ‘evidence-based therapy’ is constituted as a scientific activity – and 
through which notions of ‘science’ and ‘objectivity’ are shaped. We will then look at the 
invention (and some reinventions) of ‘objectivity’, after which we turn to the question of its 
opposite, ‘subjectivity’, and reflect on the ways in which the two have been separated, and then 
brought together, in the construction of a science of psychotherapy.86  
 
84 Psychotherapy has since claimed its own label as evidence-based (psycho)therapy (EBT). 
85 The material in this chapter is taken primarily from fieldwork carried out in conferences and meetings 
where research on evidence-based psychological therapies was presented and discussed. Some conferences 
focussed on ‘clinical’ and ‘work-related’ issues in the IAPT service, including the training of IAPT 
professionals (especially Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners [PWPs], CBT and Mindfulness therapists), 
whilst other conferences concerned the ‘implementation plans’ of new mental healthcare initiatives, 
strategies and technologies in the NHS. 
86 I am aware that we will pass through details in this chapter that might seem rather ‘theoretical’ to some 
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The professional conference 
Conferences have become instrumental in the practical achievement of the constitution of an  
evidence-based psychological therapy and its professional practitioners: therapists are expected 
to attend conferences and related events in which ‘the latest research’ is presented and often 
presented in such a way to be ‘applied’ in clinical practice. In an important sense, the 
‘conference’ is reified, as we shall see in the following, as the uniting ground of supposedly 
separate domains – ‘the science’ and ‘the clinic’, or ‘research’ and ‘practice’.  
The annual conference of The British Association of Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapies (BABCP) is one of the largest professional CBT conferences in Europe. It is 
also considered one of the most prominent conferences for researchers and practitioners 
engaged in evidence-based research on psychological therapies. Although CBT remains central 
to this annual conference, the research topics of the conference are diverse and cover a wide 
range of disciplines. The conference takes place over five days, each year in a different city in 
the UK. It attracts over one thousand delegates, with over 300 presentations with additional 
seminars such as ‘clinical round tables’ and ‘skills classes’. The BABCP conferences I attended 
also hosted exhibitions of fresh-off-the-press research posters, and stalls were set up by private 
healthcare companies whose research and products were on display for the duration of the 
conference. Although the conference is organised primarily for professional members of the 
Association in the UK, and attendance is part of their constitution as ‘professional’, attendees 
fly in from all over Europe and abroad. 
The self-defined professionals who attend these conferences tend to describe themselves as 
either researchers and scientists or as clinicians and therapists. ‘Clinician’ or ‘therapist’ refer to 
those who primarily work with people therapeutically (‘clinical work’) or those who simply 
work in a clinic (e.g. hospitals, healthcare centres, or in ‘private practice’). These terms are 
therefore used to distinguish between those who primarily conduct scientific research and 
those who treat ‘patients’. This professional division between researchers, on the one hand, and 
clinicians, on the other, is a common but often a misleading one, I was told, since many so-
called clinicians are engaged in research projects and, conversely, some researchers spend a 
great deal of their working hours doing clinical work. Psychological research is typically carried 
 
readers, but all this ‘theory’ is very much part of the ethnographic material I collected through fieldwork; it 
is part of the scientific epistemology that is being put to work in the IAPT service and elsewhere. 
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out in clinical settings, with patients; even when this is not the case, research projects typically 
draw on ‘clinical data’ provided by hospitals and other clinics. The term ‘clinical researcher’ 
has taken care of some of this mismatch. It is a title now commonly used by professionals in 
psychology who primarily identify as scientists but focus on specific ‘clinical’ objectives.  
The conferences I attended attracted clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, 
neuroscientists, nurses and various other healthcare practitioners, including, of course, CBT 
therapists, as well as other psychotherapists dealing with cognitive and behavioural therapies. 
They were meetings in which most attendees acted as academic colleagues, even if they were 
not. Contrary to the NHS conferences I had likewise attended, the professional CBT 
conferences were arenas in which critique and critical input were actively encouraged. The 
atmosphere was ambitious and competitive, but also collegial. Attendees talked about 
conferences as if they offered a direct window on to the latest evidence-based research. Not 
only did these conferences appeal to the kind of mental health professional who wanted to keep 
up, as it were, with ‘new evidence’ in their respective fields, employers (such as IAPT service 
providers or university clinics) also increasingly required attendance. It was thus generally 
assumed that conferences provided an educational means through which to both report on, 
and learn from, ‘scientific research’. Many professionals I met at these conferences were actively 
encouraged by their workplace to attend, with employers providing the conference funding for 
their delegates (the price of conference registration ranging from £400–500 per person [with 
one-day conferences in the range of £150–250] at the time of fieldwork). Attending conferences 
was clearly a marker of ‘professionalism’ and regular attendance marked out the serious 
professional. Such a professional is striving to be a scientist-practitioner – an ideal inherited 
from psychiatry and medicine, but one that has become tremendously important in the practice 
of psychotherapy since the introduction of EBM in the early 1990s. We return to this ideal in a 
moment. 
 This annual conference is also advertised as a ‘social’ event – with the ‘social’ external to the 
formally presented science – for professionals ‘to meet and mingle’. The conference 
programme includes an extensive timetable of ‘social entertainment’, complete with a party in 
a rented nightclub and music by the BABCP’s own members’ band. 
When mental health professionals arrive at these conferences, they are generally already 
accepting of the premises of evidence-based research, even if they are not knowledgeable about 
how exactly such research is conducted. The specificities of the methods and protocols involved 
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in evidence-based research are in many ways incomprehensible to outsiders, other than the 
researchers themselves. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that there by any means exists 
an intrinsic ordering of knowledge or intelligence between scientists and therapists whereby 
the latter fail to apprehend the scientificity of the former; nor do I mean to imply a succession 
of complexity from ‘clinical work’ through to ‘scientific research’ at the highest level, although 
it is significant that some professionals appeared to suggest this.  
Rather, the ethnographic point here is that the majority of psychotherapists are not trained 
in the evidence-based research which is understood to undergird their clinical practices. 
Therapists are in other words not trained as psychological scientists, even if they are 
increasingly expected to work and talk like them. Importantly, his means that therapists have 
not designed or performed the randomised control trials (RCTs) from which the ‘evidence-
base’ of their psychological intervention is understood to have been drawn. The hundreds of 
healthcare professionals who attend these conferences do not themselves have the necessary 
specialised skills to construct or scrutinise the technicalities on which ‘RCTs’, ‘meta-analyses’ 
and ‘systematic reviews’ rest – the epistemic trio that are seen to make up ‘evidence-based’ 
research. It is nevertheless this complex package of research – the science fresh out of the 
psychological laboratory as it were – which is seen as the most important and exciting aspect 
of the conference, and it is what attending healthcare professionals expect to get from their 
attendance  and bring home to the clinic.  
The words that mark out these conferences are ‘science’ and ‘research’. Not unlike other 
disciplines, psychological ‘research’ or ‘data’ are deemed either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, as in the case of 
psychiatric science (Luhrmann 2000: 160–161). Research is either convincingly ‘robust’ and 
‘rigorous’ or deemed ‘weak’ and ‘flawed’. Anthropologists are familiar with a similar evaluation 
of their own evidential practices whereby ethnography gets qualified through a moral language 
such as ‘deep’, ‘strong’ and ‘rich’, with the implication that bad ethnography is ‘thin’, ‘weak’ 
and ‘poor’ – or simply absent. Before the conferences then professionals are already well-
rehearsed in certain criteria that allow them to evaluate research; we saw in Chapter 4 that, 
through their education and training, they have already learned to discriminate in general 
terms between ‘good evidence’ and ‘bad evidence’, and so on. In addition, the professional 
conference itself often recapitulates a history of its discipline by means of which practitioners 
are supposed to acknowledge its embarrassing failures and simultaneously take due notice of 
their profession’s perceived accomplishments: what now counts as ‘good research’ and marks 
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out a ‘good’ practitioner. Such skills are often tacitly acquired and then translated into a moral 
language through which the tenets of evidence-based research seem ever more definitive. In 
the meantime, the assumptions built into this scientific epistemology and its notion of 
‘evidence’ are left largely unquestioned. 
The conference is thus a space in which attendees consume, and appropriate for their 
practice, scientific evidence. It is also a space in which the self-definition of a community of 
practitioners is put to work. It is through roundtable debates, presentations, question-and-
answer sessions, conversations in the corridors, networking during lunchbreaks, and in 
activities beyond the conference venue itself – the gossip and discussions in the pub, for 
example – that professional identities and values are wrought. This is not an easy and 
acquiescent activity, nor is it meant to be: dissent and debate are sought and self-consciously 
practised as part of what it means to participate. 
During my fieldwork, the professional conferences undoubtedly offered a battleground 
where seeming life-and-death issues were sometimes fought, but it was also through such 
battles that consensus and commonalities were then forged and confirmed. I saw how 
professionals in moments of heated debate were also ready to agree on a common purpose. ‘We 
are here because of research after all’ was a typical assertion that brought disagreements to an 
end. On one such occasion, one presenter had had enough of a roundtable debate when he 
resolutely declared: ‘let the evidence speak for itself!’. The problem was, of course, that evidence 
does not speak for itself. It needs speakers and, more importantly, an audience.  
In the conferences I attended, the presentation of evidence-based research was usually taken 
to be a scenario in which presenters ‘inform’ an audience, as if the research was intrinsically 
self-evident. In an early exposition of the study of scientific practice, Latour wrote: ‘The 
strength comes from the representatives’ word when they do not talk by and for themselves but 
in the presence of what they represent’ (1987: 72; original emphasis). Drawing on some of the 
insights from this earlier work of Latour (1987), we could approach the presentation of research 
as an act that relies on specific technologies (including visual, material, and textual) with which 
the presenters-as-representatives persuade their audiences of the significance of their research 
and its findings. The conference offers in this sense a representational stage on which research, 
conducted elsewhere, is enacted; the conference itself being a performative instance of a 
community of practitioners.   
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Like scientific journals, conferences have increasingly become international affairs that 
allow professionals to share their research beyond recognised national or institutional domains. 
That is, they provide another means of making research ‘public’. Conference presentations are 
themselves occasions that re-present the particular empirical contexts in which ‘evidence’ was 
said to be produced. The extensive publication of journals, together with conferences, entail 
formal processes of what Shapin and Schaffer (1989) refer to as ‘witnessing’. In bringing 
professionals together, conferences gather witnesses – who must be persuaded by the 
scientificity of research and the ‘fact’ (such as a new intervention) that it claims to represent. 
This involves performative occasions of re-presenting which enable the evidence to appear ‘to 
speak for itself’. Many such occasions draw their authority from claims to objectivity and 
rational scientific process, enacted through the aesthetic demonstration of visual models that 
pertain to be absent of particular ‘political’ or ‘subjective’ intention (Bruun & Pearson 2018), 
although they are often crucially central to decision-making and policymaking on an array of 
issues. Scientific persuasions of this kind usually rely on visual-linguistic representations – such 
as diagrams, statistics, maps, and other two-dimensional models (see Coopmans et al.eds 2014) 
– displayed, as they often are in conferences, in PowerPoint presentations, for example, and 
projected on a whiteboard or screen.  
For scientific research to become a robust ‘fact’ it needs to be witnessed beyond the context 
(e.g. research clinic) that produced it (Latour 1987). The process of ‘witnessing’ here is most 
obviously pursued through the widespread practice of publication in which research takes a 
textual form, whether in these conferences or in peer-reviewed journals thereby respected for 
their scientific and academic credibility. Journals are published in print and online, accessed 
and read; they are distributed and circulated amongst teachers, colleagues, students, enemies 
and friends, crossing national and institutional borders within minutes. The more witnesses, 
the better. As academics often tell each other: ‘publish or perish’ – a maxim apposite to the 
discipline of psychology. In the professional conferences of evidence-based therapy, the 
publication of research seems like a race, with five-year-old research publications considered 
more or less out-of-date. ‘Science moves fast’, I was told.  
The general analytical point to highlight here is fairly straightforward: conferences, 
alongside scientific journals, qualify – in other words, they equip, instantiate, factualise – 
research. If not its facticity per se (the research produced as ‘fact’, in the manner described by 
Latour and Woolgar [1986]), then at least its actuality: the fact that the research happened; the 
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trial was conducted, the data exist, the evidence can be witnessed with your own eyes. It could 
be said to be a central feature of conferences that they bring together empirical contexts beyond 
themselves. They are performative in an important sense; they are also ‘meetings’ of a kind 
(Brown et al. 2017). Conferences – together with the universities, clinics and organisations that 
shape them, including the governing and regulatory practices implicated in this complex of 
institutions – have all played their part in defining and shaping a science of psychotherapy. 
 
‘A real science’ 
Rejecting psychoanalysis 
In the conferences, psychology was presented as a thoroughly scientific discipline and CBT was 
generally cast as the ideal of a psychological intervention science. Indeed, ‘evidence-based 
psychological therapy’ appeared synonymous throughout with some form of CBT. This 
conviction was often established in opposition to other psychotherapies deemed ‘pseudo-
scientific’,  based on ‘anecdotal’ accounts or otherwise lacking in scientific evidence of 
effectiveness.87 ‘Psychoanalysis’ (or any other purportedly outdated form of psychotherapy) 
was often the target of such opposition against which CBT upheld its scientific credibility.  
People attending these conferences expected to engage with ‘real science’. A particular 
language of psychology was put to work – ‘trials’, ‘experiments’, ‘data’, ‘statistics’, ‘diagrams’, 
‘interventions’, and ‘measures’ – which most practitioners had already acquired through their 
education and training. This was all felt to be ‘real science’-talk. However, in these conferences 
and outside of them, an older language of psychology had provided the definitional backdrop 
against which the language of a ‘real science’ was pursued. 
Any reference to ‘dreams’, ‘symbols’, ‘the Oedipus complex’, or any other obvious 
psychoanalytic artefact would be out of the ordinary. None of the CBT therapists I met spoke 
this language.88 Rather, disconnection from older psychotherapeutic schools deemed ‘pseudo-
 
87 A reported lack of ‘evidence-based’ research in psychotherapeutic fields other than CBT has often been 
taken as sufficient proof in and of itself of their ‘ineffectiveness’ (Chambless & Ollendick 2001). However, 
many psychotherapeutic disciplines (e.g. child psychotherapy, music therapy, and other art psychotherapies) 
have been latecomers to the research practices derived from EBM and some have been explicitly averse to its 
scientific convention (Berg & Slaattelid 2017; Marzillier 2004). 
88  The exclusion of a psychoanalytic language may be surprising to some anthropological readers, as 
psychotherapists and psychologists are still frequently characterised as Freudians of some sort in 
anthropological texts and lecture rooms. Whilst varying degrees of engagement between psychoanalysis and 
certain strands of anthropology has continued (particularly in American cultural anthropology, see e.g. 
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scientific’ was actively sought and confirmed in many instances of the conferences and beyond. 
When presenters or other participants occasionally referred to Freud – or another such figure 
or concept apparently deprived of scientific credibility – eyebrows were raised in objection and 
eyes glazed over. ‘Here we go again’, whispered one attendee to me as we listened to a presenter 
giving a paper on the treatment of trauma, ‘can’t we just stick to the facts? Freud and his 
followers are dead and long gone.’ I soon learned that any mention of ‘the psyche’ evoked the 
threatening category of ‘pseudo-science’ and raised eyebrows and tuts of disapproval could be 
expected. Attending professional conferences reminded practitioners to think like scientists 
and to be ‘scientific’. 
On one such occasion, at the final ‘drinks reception’ of a five-day annual conference on CBT, 
I was engaged in a conversation with a team of researchers and therapists from a British 
university, when a young CBT therapist asked me how I had found the whole conference, 
knowing that I was an anthropologist doing research on psychological therapy. I wondered 
aloud, rather unreservedly, that I was surprised how none of the workshops and presentations 
had engaged or even mentioned psychoanalysis or psychodynamic psychotherapy – from what 
I had learned about CBT in this conference at least, it seemed to me that CBT had some 
important features in common with earlier schools of psychotherapy.89 ‘Well, what did you 
expect?’, came the swift reply from the younger practitioner, ‘this is a conference on CBT – not 
psychoanalysis.’ ‘CBT is based on science, psychoanalysis is not,’ added another.  
Such explicit comments were common as one regular practice of placing ‘evidence-based 
psychological therapy’ or ‘CBT’ into the ‘science’ category. ‘Psychoanalysis’ and even ‘Freud’ 
himself quickly became all that present-day psychotherapy was not. Psychoanalysts, and other 
such practitioners, were ‘old-fashioned’ and out of touch with the practical realities of their 
patients. They were deemed irresponsible for apparently allowing psychotherapeutic treatment 
to be a lengthy, time-wasting (and consequently costly) affair. CBT practitioners quietly 
described psychoanalysts or psychodynamic psychotherapists as ‘stuck in the past’ or obsessed 
with ‘the unconscious’. Both the psychoanalytic ‘past’ and ‘unconscious’ lacked scientific 
credibility. Psychoanalysis and its various descendants were considered unscientific not least 
 
LeVine 2010; Luhrmann 1998; Schwartz et al. 1992), it would be a mistake to assume this kind of continuity 
between psychoanalysis and other psychotherapies. 
89 With this and other such references to psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy, I do not mean 
to imply a special endorsement or sympathy reserved for these practices as opposed to CBT (I have examined 
a branch of psychoanalytic therapy elsewhere, see Bruun 2014a).  
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because many of the key ideas ascribed to them were deemed untestable: ‘How would you even 
put the “unconscious” through a clinical trial?’, remarked one psychologist, laughing. 
CBT, on the contrary, was presented as dealing with ‘the present’ and ‘the conscious mind’. 
And in a similar opposition to older psychotherapeutic schools, CBT was celebrated for ‘solving 
problems’ rather than ‘dwelling’ on them indefinitely. These professionals, self-consciously 
scientific and with a firm grasp on ‘evidence’, had therefore long thrown out the ‘psyche’; they 
were instead dealing with well-established scientific objects such as ‘cognition’ or ‘the brain’. 
Indeed, Freud seemed dead and long gone in these conference halls, and ‘the psyche’ with him. 
 
From ‘pseudoscience’ to ‘real science’ 
Psychotherapy has long struggled to achieve scientific credibility on an equal footing with a 
biomedically-orientated psychiatry in the provision of mental healthcare in the UK, but British 
psychotherapies have not been alone in this struggle; similar epistemological battles have been 
fought elsewhere in Europe and North America. During the twentieth century, this seeming 
rivalry was important in the historiography of both fields where it has travelled under rallying 
cries such as ‘talk therapy’ versus ‘drug therapy’. More recently, the historiographical 
juxtaposition of psychotherapy and psychopharmacology has reappeared as a perceived 
dispute between ‘the mind’ and ‘the brain’. These are debates and conflicts that still seem to be 
dancing around a question of whether the remedy for ‘mental illness’ is to be found in the 
person or in the pill: ‘is it me or my brain?’ (Dumit 2003). Since at least the 1970s, the use of 
psychopharmaceuticals has been the steady hallmark of a properly ‘scientific’ intervention in 
the treatment of people diagnosed with mental illness (Jenkins 2010).  
In the early 1990s, it was declared that we were finally, and securely, in the ‘Decade of the 
Brain’, as the US National Institute of Mental Health asserted (Danziger 2008). Emergent 
research in cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychiatry and neuropsychopharmacology promised 
to pave the way for truly objective, scientific explanations of what it means to be human (Rose 
& Abi-Rached 2013), not least in the area of mental healthcare. ‘Real science’, as a majority of 
psychiatrists and scientists proclaimed, had finally defeated the ‘pseudoscience’ of 
psychotherapy (cf. Lilienfeld et al. 2004): mental health problems were firmly located in the 
neurological make-up of ‘the brain’. They were ‘brain disorders’ that would eventually yield to 
drugs (Luhrmann 2012). 
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The product of a biomedically-orientated psychiatry, psychopharmacology (now 
increasingly known also as ‘neuro’-psychopharmacology) remains the most prevalent form of 
treatment in contemporary mental healthcare in the UK. We have already seen in Chapter 2 
how psychotherapeutic and psychiatric treatments have jostled for scientific credibility in 
different ways during the twentieth century. We also saw how ‘evidence-based’ practice has 
become instructive of how we should understand psychological healthcare, namely that 
psychological therapies are based on scientific research; they are the product of an ‘intervention 
science’ (cf. David et al. 2018), not a healing art. 
 
The scient ist -pract i t ioner 
Most IAPT practitioners who attend conferences are already experienced psychotherapists. 
They have already learned to work therapeutically, and part of this means understanding 
scientific research as informing clinical practice: how to determine the most effective 
psychological treatment for a specific condition.  
Conferences are meetings in which practitioners openly talk about how to ‘apply’ evidence-
based treatments, how to recognise ‘good’ from ‘bad’ practice in doing so – with plenty of 
conference papers dealing with the pedagogical aspects of all this. ‘Applying’ evidence-based 
research in clinical practice means working in accordance with the official protocols that have 
been produced by IAPT; manuals are in turn based on, and continuously updated in line with, 
the clinical guidelines published by NICE, the UK executive body that provides evidence-based 
guidance for the NHS. 
The idea of ‘applying’ research to clinical contexts and issues is an instructive reminder here 
of an epistemic hierarchy amongst the professionals of the conference. Scientists and 
researchers are often perceived amongst their peers as the ones on top of a hierarchy of 
knowledge production. Scientists are considered the spokespersons of ‘what we know’, as 
conference presenters put it. The therapist is considered secondary to the scientist in this 
division of labour, applying the findings that the scientist produces. Therapists must thus aspire 
to be ‘up-to-date’ with scientific research. Conferences are seen as the main arena in which this 
transmission of knowledge occurs, but it is ultimately in the very different contexts outside the 
conference room that ‘evidence’ is put into practice. 
This role of the therapist is discussed with reference to the epistemic ideal of ‘the scientist-
practitioner’. Since scientists and researchers who attend these professional conferences are 
 148 
understood to provide the findings of scientific research which clinicians are then understood 
to apply in their clinical practice, thus making psychotherapy ‘evidence-based’. Consequently, 
the very notion of applying research to clinical work also means that therapists are the ones 
entrusted with an authority of judgement (which is seen to derive from their clinical 
experience) in qualifying the relevance or suitability of any given research and its claims. A 
specific treatment might be deemed successful in the clinical trial, but the same treatment 
might not always work well outside of the particular empirical context that demonstrated its 
‘effectiveness’. Practitioners-as-scientists usually conduct research through their academic 
affiliation with universities or university hospitals and clinics, in specialised research centres 
and clinical labs. Research findings are then disseminated through these professional 
conferences and peer-reviewed membership journals as well as other international science 
journals. This extensive network of researchers, clinics, labs, hospitals and university research 
units is part and parcel of the ongoing production of a psychological science from the clinical 
trial of an intervention to the clinical consultation in which the tried and tested intervention is 
put into practice.  
The epistemic ideal at work here – of clinical practice as the application of scientific evidence 
– now regularly moves hundreds of practitioners many miles into conferences. It is an ideal 
that came into being with the rising critiques of clinical judgement in the 1970s and has also 
meant that the objectivity of clinical psychology now also distinguishes itself from older notions 
of scientific objectivity that emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
The invention and reinventions of objectivity 
What are the different kinds of objectivity and how have they been given new life in evidence-
based psychotherapy? Daston and Galison’s (2007) historical research presents an extensive 
account of scientific objectivity which traces its multiple and varied inventions across several 
emergent disciplines pertaining to the ‘the Arts’ and ‘Sciences’ – including this division itself – 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in particular. Importantly, Daston and 
Galison’s work shows how the concepts of ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ came into being in 
contradistinction to one another. ‘Subjectivity’ was all of that ‘objectivity’ was not: the 
‘individual mentality’ and the ‘inner life’ of a person with all its perceived idiosyncrasies such 
as emotions, dispositions and desires – all of which was deemed to get in the way in the 
laboratory and corrupt a truly ‘objective’ observation and representation of any ‘phenomena’ 
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out there in an already given ‘natural’ or ‘external world’. This bifurcation came through a self-
defining community of scientists and shaped ‘science’ and ‘the scientific’ (including ‘the 
scientist’) into what Daston and Galison (2007) describe as ‘ethico-epistemological’ activities 
or epistemic virtues. The most prominent of these epistemic virtues was the ideal of the scientist 
as detached observer. 
Daston and Galison outline four main modes of epistemic virtue that emerged over the 
course of at least the seventeenth century up to the middle of twentieth century. The first of 
these four ideals they call ‘truth-to-nature’ which became prominent in the early eighteenth 
century. It was explicated in great detail by the so-called ‘Enlightenment naturalists’, such as 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). It was practised particularly in the fields of 
cartography and physiology and their preoccupation with atlas-making and depictions of ‘the 
natural world’, primarily plants and animals. The aim was to produce, usually through drawing, 
idealised representations of natural objects; ‘a reasoned image’ of specimens excluding from it 
‘individual’ and ‘atypical’ characteristics in order to depict the essence or truth of God’s 
creation as reasoned by the naturalist. 
However, the naturalist’s capacity to represent a ‘natural phenomenon’ in its truthful form, 
guided by his reason to distinguish the essential from the anomalous, was an endeavour that 
was increasingly called into question in the first half of the nineteenth century. The ‘subjective’ 
disposition of the image maker was problematised: the truthfulness and authenticity of the 
image was thought to be prone to contamination by the naturalist’s subjective preconceptions 
of the object in question. A new scientific ideal emerged which sought instead to represent 
‘Nature’ without any intervention on the part of the image maker. It was during this same 
period that the term ‘scientist’ apparently came into being, said to be first coined in 1833 by 
William Whewell (1794–1866).90 In an age of factory production, the scientist as a detached 
observer was now expected to strive to work like a disinterested machine capable of producing 
accurate representations of objects without the interference of his own ‘subjective’ 
participation: the scientist had, on the contrary, to be ‘objective’. The new epistemological 
activity that arose in the mid nineteenth century was to produce visual images through 
mechanical depiction. This ‘mechanical objectivity’ came to the fore with the invention of 
machines and then photography and other visual technologies during this period. Objectivity 
 
90 ‘Natural philosophers’ and ‘natural historians’ were common terms in the eighteenth century up until the 
label ‘scientist’ was introduced and then widely employed post-1830s (Shapin & Schaffer 1985). 
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meant non-intervention and detachment on the part of the scientist, allowing nature to ‘speak 
for itself’. 
The third epistemic virtue outlined by Daston and Galison was in many ways an intensified 
version of mechanical objectivity. By the end of the nineteenth century, for some scientists, 
even photographic and mechanically produced images were not objective enough. They sought 
instead to arrive at formal structures of relations between phenomena abstracted away from 
laboratory observation and mechanical depiction. Daston and Galison refer to this even more 
‘austere’ form of objectivity as ‘structural objectivity’. It was particularly informed by the work 
of mathematicians, linguists and philosophers concerned with theoretical abstractions 
independent from any observer (machine, human or otherwise) in their emphasis on structural 
relations rather than empirical ‘objects’. 
Finally, the fourth epistemic regime noted in this historical survey of objectivities was in 
many ways a response to the self-abnegating and non-interventionist modus operandi of both 
mechanical and structural objectivists. During the early decades of the twentieth century, the 
proclaimed ‘objective’ authority of mechanical automaticity and the elimination of the 
scientist-observer became progressively challenged by scientists who advocated for a strategy 
that explicitly acknowledged the necessity of seeing scientifically through a trained, interpretive 
‘eye’. Daston and Galison refer to this epistemic virtue as ‘trained judgment’ (2007: 309-361). 
The trained and skilled professional with ‘seeing eyes’ was increasingly regarded as a necessary 
supplement to the ‘objective’ production and assessment of scientific objects, whether these 
objects took the form of images, diseases, diagnoses, and so on. In medicine and psychiatry, 
this particular kind of epistemic ideal became known as ‘clinical judgment’ and ‘clinical 
reasoning’ (or ‘the art of medicine’) throughout the twentieth century. In an important sense, 
clinical judgment still involved, and involves, a ‘detached’ perspective on the part of the 
practitioner, but objectivity no longer meant working as a disinterested ‘hands-off’ scientist. 
Anthropologists have shown how practitioners come to embody and enact this objectivity  
in different arenas of contemporary medical education and practice wherein particular 
corporeal and affective proprieties of detachment are acquired in the making, unmaking and 
remaking of different ‘bodies’ – involving living and dead bodies, cadavers and body parts, 
atlases, skeletons, manuals, 3D models and much more – as we move from anatomy teaching 
and dissection rooms to surgery and organ transplantation, and beyond (McDonald 2014, 
2015; Hallam 2017; Olejaz 2017; see also Candea et al. 2015). 
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It is important to note that the different modes of objectivity discussed above did not succeed 
each other in one linear fashion nor did the predominant ideals, such as trained judgment, 
cancel out former epistemic virtues. Rather, Daston and Galison make the case that earlier 
epistemic activities largely remained as they adjusted to competing notions of objectivity. For 
example, certain versions of nineteenth-century ‘mechanical objectivity’ have in many ways 
retained a hallmark of scientific objectivity, whilst it could also be argued to have been revivified 
with the invention of new visual technologies from the 1980s onwards with the development 
and use of neuroscientific imaging (such as MRI scans), virtual 3D models, and other 
computerised images. These have undoubtedly injected scientific practices with renewed 
enthusiasm for visual and automated representation (Cohn 2004; McDonald 2014; see chapters 
in Coopmans et al. 2014; Grasseni 2009).  
So, where does the objectivity of present-day evidence-based psychotherapy fit in these 
different (historiographical) modes of objectivity? In the following sections, I want to discuss 
three definitional shifts that I suggest have been fundamental in shaping psychotherapy into a 
persuasive object of scientific observation. 91  These shifts could be summarised briefly as 
discourses of 1) the objective and subjective; 2) useful science; and 3) evidence.  
 
The ‘object ive’ and ‘subject ive’ 
The first shift has to do with how nineteenth-century psychologists – such as Edward Titchener 
(1867–1927) and William James (1842-1910) and their students (see Coon 1993; Green 2010; 
Mandler 2011) – began to formulate a language of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ in a way that is 
evocative of present-day psychological therapy, but which differs from the definitions 
discussed above. What we have seen so far, drawing on the scholarship of historians of science 
(e.g. Daston 1978; Danziger 1997; Daston & Galison 2007), is that objectivity was all of that 
which subjectivity was not and vice versa. Importantly, as the two concepts emerged in a 
mutual definition of each other from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, ‘objectivity’ came 
to designate the pursuit of ‘Science’ which marked out a scientific epistemology and virtue (the 
scientist as detached observer first and foremost); and, at the same time, ‘subjectivity’ became 
increasingly associated with activities pertaining to ‘the Arts’ and the realm of human 
 
91 Observation refers here to the use of the randomised control trial (RCT), including clinical trials based on 
this experimental design.  
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interiority and creativity. Academic disciplines – and their institutional divisions – have largely 
inherited and revitalised these bifurcations and definitions. 
However, there is another historical point to highlight here which is rarely discussed. 
(Daston and Galison’s discussion of nineteenth-century psychology is after all sporadic and 
truncated by their focus on cartography.) Namely, psychologists in the late nineteenth and early 
to mid-twentieth centuries deployed the dichotomy of objective/subjective in a way that differs 
from the common usage of these terms that we are more familiar with today. That is, they were 
used in the classification of two distinct methods of scientific observation (Woodward & Ash 
1982; Green 2010): ‘objective’ was a term used to refer to what we might call an extrospective 
observation of human (or animal) behaviour, whilst the term ‘subjective’ referred to an 
introspective observation of one’s own ‘mental processes’ (or those of another human subject). 
In other words, ‘objective’ methods denoted a perceived exteriority (‘behaviours’ visible to the 
eyes of the scientist-as-observer) distinguished from ‘subjective’ methods which denoted an 
impartial introspection of a perceived cognitive interiority (such as ‘the mind’ or 
‘consciousness’). The latter method of observation itself suggested a particular epistemic stance, 
in the words of Daston and Galison. It was one which relied on certain skilled techniques of 
what became known as ‘introspection, which encouraged a particular conceptual vision of the 
subject matter of psychology as it turned to the nature and significance of ‘the mind’. 
Psychologists at the time disagreed amongst themselves which of the two methods were 
most scientific – and whether phenomena like ‘mental processes’ or ‘the mind’ could be 
considered proper scientific objects (Rieber 1980; Woodward & Ash 1982; Rose 1984; Mandler 
2011). Perhaps unsurprisingly, with the bloom of William Wundt’s (1832–1920) ‘experimental 
psychology’ (amongst others) in Britain and the rest of Europe and a general effort to 
distinguish psychology from philosophy and metaphysics, this vision of psychology – the 
‘subjective’ method – was deeply controversial and largely discredited. Wundt vehemently 
rejected the idea of introspection as a scientific enterprise for psychology (cf. Wundt 1902) and 
many psychological scientists I met consider him the founding father of the discipline for 
exactly those reasons. According to Wundt and others who were later grouped together under 
the name of ‘behaviourists’, the very notion of ‘the mind’ was nonsensical and at best obsolete: 
it was derided by Wundt and his colleagues, in self-conscious distinction to philosophy, as a 
metaphysical concept – and hence unscientific (Mandler 2011). As such, the mind was best left 
to philosophical speculation. 
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Other psychologists however, such as Edward Titchener (1867–1927), a former student of 
Wundt, argued for introspection as a scientific approach to the study of ‘the human mind’ in 
which the ‘introspective psychologist’ assumed the position of an impartial and disinterested 
‘introspector’, capable of observing his own and others’ thoughts from an educated position of 
detached reflection (see Green 2010). These earlier psychological scientists were thus interested 
in what some of them described as ‘mental processes’ that could be conceived of as scientifically 
feasible objects of observation for the trained scientist-as-introspector. It was in the light of this 
enthusiasm and the disputes it generated that Titchener proclaimed that the psychologist as 
‘introspector’ promised a scientific ‘description of the world with “man left in it”’ (Titchener 
1915: 8).  
This proposed ‘subjective’ method of observation – the very idea of introspection involving 
a human subject required to inspect their own perceived ‘mental’ experience – is a matter of 
interest to this thesis precisely because it shows us the theoretical commitments and 
contestations amongst psychologists over a century ago and what some of these psychologists 
seem to share with their present-day colleagues. And more to the point: I would argue that 
these early advocates of psychological introspection preceded the scientific persuasions that 
were later to become the heart of evidence-based psychological therapy: the notion of the 
human subject as a self-inspector with a capacity to observe and self-report on their own 
‘mental health’ or ‘mind’.92 
 The human subject’s assumed capacity to introspect and the purpose of introspection itself 
are taken up and enacted in different ways in contemporary psychological therapies, and we 
will see some aspects of this in Chapter 6, when we turn to the therapeutic practice of CBT and 
mindfulness. 
 
Towards a useful sc ience 
The second shift has to do with the significance of ‘science’ and its counterpart ‘society’. In an 
older conception of scientific objectivity, ‘objective science’ was ideally driven not by its 
potential usefulness to ‘society’, ‘the public’, or ‘individuals’ – as people in the UK and 
elsewhere might understand and live scientific facts today (e.g. Dumit 2004; Martin 2007; 
 
92 Mental health or mind is of course understood here, ethnographically speaking, with various reference to 
terms such as subjectivity, inner life, cognition, mental processes, events or experiences, and so on – concepts 
that are widely deployed in contemporary psychology and in social anthropology (see Introduction).  
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Strathern 2005) – but by a disinterested observation of the world (Green 2010). Scientific 
objectivity was, in other words, to be guided by the ideal of what some scientists of the 
nineteenth century would call a ‘useless’ science (ibid). Science, in the most common version 
of this view, should not be made to serve or be dictated by presumed societal needs because 
such an enterprise was believed to obscure the objectivity of scientific inquiry. Therefore, 
objective science had to be occupied not with its applicability, but with an impartial account of 
the scientific object in question. Scientific research was seen as the neutral pursuit of objective 
accounts of ‘the natural world’; all of which could be jeopardised if ideas of ‘usefulness’ had 
dictated it. This particular conception of ‘Science’ as self-consciously divested of its potential 
usefulness stands in stark contrast to prevalent ideas of objectivity in contemporary clinical 
psychology. Indeed, IAPT professionals see themselves engaged in what we might call a ‘useful’ 
science: namely, scientific research which produces evidence of effectiveness for societal 
purposes, such as interventions to be used to treat people with mental ill-health. We are also 
familiar in anthropology with the widespread and longstanding ‘Science and Society’ debates 
(see e.g. Edwards et al. 2007; Nowotny et al. 2001; Candea 2016), which are very much part of 
this latter conception of science prevalent in contemporary clinical psychology. This shift also 
means that many IAPT professionals – CBT and mindfulness therapists alike – now tend to 
understand and discuss their work as an ‘applied’ science. 
Consequently, I shall argue that as psychology and its practitioners have moved into an era 
of accountability and audit in the UK (Strathern 2000) and onto the quest for therapeutic 
certainty encouraged by EBM (Lambert et al. 2006), an older world of positivism in which 
scientists sought, and still seek, representations of ‘nature’ or any ‘natural fact’ (McDonald 
2012a) has shifted into a radically more instrumentalist world with a focus on ‘evidence’.  
This is still a world, however, which invokes an older understanding of evidence as facts 
about the world, with the assumption that scientific facts are progressively verified or falsified 
in light of ‘the evidence’ (Goldenberg 2006). In this world, only claims verifiable through 
empirical observation (i.e., experimentation) are meaningful (i.e., real). In other words, the 
‘evidence’ generated by trials is assumed to be facts about the world, about the world of mental 
healthcare here specifically. What I observed in the professional conferences and in meetings 
with commissioners, therapists and scientists was that this specific approach to evidence-
making is what warrants the qualifying words of ‘scientific’ research and ‘objective’ science. 
However, unlike the logical positivists of the early twentieth century, these professionals 
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engaged in evidence-based research do not pose ‘Science’ as some abstracted logical system of 
explanation. Rather, I would argue that scientific research is now firmly understood in terms 
of its instrumentality. Scientists engaged in research into psychological therapies are explicit 
on this point: scientific research is about generating evidence that has a specific use and purpose 
in therapeutic contexts. They talk about it in largely functional terms: evidence of the 
effectiveness of an intervention. 
 
An evident ial object iv i ty 
The third and final shift I want to discuss concerns the significance of evidence alluded to 
above. A much-cited definition of EBM describes the movement as ‘the conscientious, explicit, 
and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual 
patients’ (Sacket et al. 1996: 71). As an initial observation, we might note that the ubiquity of 
this kind of reasoning in evidence-based practice and its seeming obviousness in the 
therapeutic world make it difficult to argue against without appearing to also argue against 
‘good, effective care’ or against the idea that practitioners should be able to be held accountable 
for their clinical decisions. Similar tensions emerge in other logics of care (cf. Mol 2008).  
In the contexts of conferences and in conversations with IAPT professionals, the qualifying 
‘objective’ was deployed to describe the successful production of ‘evidence’ on which therapies 
were seen to be ‘based’. ‘Evidence’, in turn, was specifically understood as evidence of 
effectiveness, with effectiveness being a marker of (therapeutic) usefulness. Evidence-based 
therapy is thus about ‘what works’, as both scientists and therapists would often point out. It 
hinges on questions and concerns that we might think of as instrumentalist: the testing of a 
means to pursue an end, with the means and the end result referring respectively to the ‘test 
therapy’ and ‘patient recovery’. It is consequently orientated towards already defined and 
classified therapeutic problems. The scientists would often describe their experimental research 
to me as ‘problem-solving’ and ‘goal-oriented’ – a language evocative of CBT itself.  
Hence the instrumentalism at work here is apparent in the way in which practitioners and 
scientists alike talk about objectivity in largely methodological terms: as the testing of 
interventions in order to determine the reliability of these to serve a clinical purpose effectively. 
All of this appeared to be in line with the tenets of EBM that philosophers, anthropologists and 
sociologists have identified (see e.g. Goldenberg 2006; Lambert et al. 2006; Timmermans & 
Berg 2003b). The objectivity of psychotherapy could thus be said to lie in the achievement of 
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its evidentiality. It could be said to differ, therefore, in important respects from other prevalent 
types of objectivity identified by Dalston and Galison (2007) as I discussed above – although it 
does not necessarily negate them. I would also situate this kind of evidential objectivity as one 
amongst a variety of contemporary epistemic practices involved in the ‘collective management 
of evidence’ to which regulatory objectivity refers (cf. Cambrosio 2006, 2009). 
The methodology of the randomised control trial (RCT) is the defining feature of this type 
of scientific objectivity, analogous perhaps to how the camera and ocular machines defined 
mechanical objectivity in the nineteenth century (Daston and Galison 2007). But unlike the 
mechanical and structural objectivists, present-day psychological scientists engaged in 
psychotherapy research do not see themselves as detecting a universal nature or structure of 
the object of experimentation. Nor is their work primarily directed towards producing or 
enacting visual representations of their scientific objects (‘interventions’), as we might observe 
in other contexts of biomedicine wherein brain scans, anatomical atlases, 3D models of the 
human body, and so on, come to hold a definitional or ontological epistemic authority (see e.g. 
Cohn 2004; Hallam 2013; McDonald 2014; Mol 2002). In making this point, however, I should 
likewise stress that strong representationalist and universalist ambitions still inform the 
scientific epistemology of psychotherapy research. Although researchers might not, in their 
own terms, be engaged in the discovery of some absolute truth or the generation of visual 
representations, many do see themselves nonetheless as revealing some generalised if not 
universal understanding of phenomena discussed as human psychology, mental processes, 
cognitive structures, and so forth. In the professional conferences I attended, it was also not 
uncommon for psychological therapies to be presented in such a way as to suggest that we were 
witnessing interventions that could ideally be applied anywhere in the world.93 
Above all though, researchers seek to ascertain the effectiveness and applicability of a tool 
for a task: ‘what works?’, was the common question everywhere. Evidence-based research is 
understood then as providing a basis for effective psychological therapies and doing so partly 
in an attempt to establish the scientific validity of psychological healthcare in general. This has 
been an important achievement for the professional communities of psychologists and CBT 
 
93 Anthropologists have countered such universalist ambitions within the psy disciplines in rather different 
ways, from ideas of cultural variability (e.g. Kleinman 1980; Littlewood 2002; Luhrmann et al. 2015) to radical 
re-thinkings of the relationship between anthropology and psychology (Toren 2012). 
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therapists in their self-definition as practitioners of ‘real science’ against the perceived 
underbelly of ‘pseudoscience’94 still felt to haunt the discipline of psychology.  
 
Pills and the problem of psychotherapy 
After several years of training and clinical practice, psychotherapists seem generally to end up 
feeling confident about the effectiveness of the treatments they provide, despite the apparent 
difficulties of knowing how and when a treatment was deemed ‘effective’. The epistemological 
uncertainty involved here is a lingering ambiguity concerning the testing of the effectiveness of 
a psychological therapy in clinical trials.  
Psychotherapy still appears far removed from the testing of interventions such as 
medication: psychotherapeutic care appears to be nothing like prescribing or taking 
medication. This might seem like an obvious and otherwise innocent point, but it is partly 
through the metaphorical ‘pill’ that psychotherapy has eluded its own ambiguity and 
complexity. In its quest for an ‘evidence-based’ status, psychotherapy is required to make itself 
amenable to the scientific parameters of EBM. This requirement has proved challenging, 
however, and there has been a flurry of publication activity concerning this. 95  One main 
challenge has been that EBM proposes a strict methodology for demonstrating evidentiality 
primarily through the use of RCTs in the assessment and evaluation of interventions.  
For any intervention to be trialled and tested within the parameters of the RCT it must be 
treated as if it were a singular, homogenous thing. The object of experimentation must be held 
still, it must be stabilised or ‘controlled’ (Latour & Woolgar 1986; Shapin & Schaffer 1985). 
Ambiguity and complexity are therefore eclipsed where singularity or certainty is sought. The 
RCT is designed to determine the causal relationship between single variables: for example, and 
to put it simply, the causal relationship between a) a chemical compound (e.g. pharmaceutical 
drug) and b) physiological or neurological reactions. This causal relationship is tested in a 
controlled clinical setting based on a randomisation process. RCTs entail an epistemological 
commitment to what we might term empirical reduction (Berg & Slaattelid 2017) in which 
‘psychotherapy’ as a practice (or set of practices) is treated as if it were a stable entity. The 
 
94 For some ongoing debates on the scientific psychology literature, see e.g. Lilienfeld (2010); Lilienfeld et al. 
(2004).  
95 See e.g. Parry (2000); Chambless & Ollendick (2001); Bower & King (2000); American Psychological 
Association (2006); Berg & Slaattelid (2017); Greenhalgh et al. (2014). 
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research methodology of an RCT necessitates a conceptualisation of psychotherapy as a ‘single 
variable’ – the metaphorical ‘test drug’ – that can be ‘controlled’ in the trial. This requires 
practices of standardisation and exclusion. During the clinical trial, practitioners are required 
to follow strict clinical protocols in delivering an intervention, excluding from the practice of 
psychotherapy (‘the intervention’) the practitioners themselves. Protocols are not merely 
guidelines, they are prescriptive: they impose specific rules for the conduct of the therapeutic 
session (the experimental setting) and stipulate an exact procedure for the provision of the 
intervention that is the object of the trial. The protocol is thus part of the practices of 
standardisation and stabilisation.96 These ideas are also found in definitions of CBT itself when 
it is conceived of as a ‘set of techniques’ in which effectiveness and applicability are inherent to 
the intervention itself rather than dependent on the circumstances (such as the relationship 
between the therapist and the patient) in which the intervention is carried out. 
Historically, RCTs were also designed in the testing of pharmaceuticals (Bothwell et al. 2016; 
Lambert 2006; Timmermans & Berg 2003). The modern RCT is said to have been developed in 
the mid-twentieth century by medical researchers concerned with the treatment of ‘diseases’ 
and in the assessment of new medications, especially the use of antibiotics, antihypertensives 
and antipsychotics (Bothwell et al. 2016). RCTs quickly became convention in pharmaceutical 
research during the second half of the twentieth century, but researchers initially struggled to 
establish RCTs as a conventional research methodology in the area of psychotherapy (Bower 
& King 2000). Even well into the 1990s, and although some psychiatric researchers had 
conducted many RCTs of psychotherapy by this time (Bothwell et al. 2016), clinical researchers 
more generally still struggled to apply RCTs to research in clinical psychology and some 
deemed it an ‘impossible’ evaluation of psychotherapy: it was argued, for instance, that 
psychotherapy was highly ‘individualized’, resembling nothing like the testing of psychotropic 
medication (Seligman 1995). A renewed enthusiasm for cognitive and behavioural therapies 
came to the rescue (cf. Salkovskis 2002; Layard et al. 2007; Butler et al. 2006): these 
psychological therapies promised, unlike their psychodynamic predecessors, a short-term and 
efficient approach to mental healthcare. They were soon gathered collectively under the 
acronym of ‘CBT’ (Marks 2012). In the UK, CBT became the most invested-in research topic 
in clinical psychology – pioneered by research units at Oxford University and Kings College 
 
96 Latour and Woolgar (1986) have described some aspects of this process as the practice of ‘purification’. 
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London, followed by Cambridge and Exeter Universities (Marks 2012, 2015). CBT research 
eventually paved the way for making RCTs a gold standard of psychotherapy research more 
broadly such as mindfulness. 
Whilst the movement of EBM has clearly expanded beyond the testing of medication, both 
the experimental model of the test drug and the biomedical model of intervention still largely 
served as epistemological referents in ‘evidence-based’ research as presented and discussed in 
the psychology conferences I attended.  
And yet psychotherapy is not a pill. It is not a chemical compound nor a psychoactive 
substance; it is not a medication to be swallowed or injected. ‘Drug therapy’ and ‘talk therapy’ 
differ in their objects, assumptions and practice. This point raises at least two basic questions: 
what exactly is psychotherapy and how might it differ from medication? These are questions 
of ethnographic import. Researchers and practitioners of evidence-based psychotherapy have 
generally sidestepped such problems of ontological implication: are pills and psychotherapy 
the same ‘thing’? What constitutes the nature of psychotherapy? And so on.  
They have instead framed evidence-based research in psychology as a matter of 
methodology: psychopharmaceuticals and psychotherapies should be tested by the same 
standards. 97 Of course, this was partly owed to a general insistence on what commentators have 
seen as scientism within EBM (see Goldenberg 2006), and it remains persuasive: if medical 
interventions have to undergo clinical trials as a validation of effectiveness (and in order to be 
implemented in a healthcare service), then surely psychological therapies should be subjected 
to the same evaluation? In the meantime, this extensive focus on methods of testing seems to 
have muted in discussions, in conferences or journals, the important question of what exactly 
is being tested. It is now generally felt, nevertheless, that applying the framework of RCT to 
psychotherapy research makes ‘talk therapy’ and ‘drug therapy’ compatible objects of scientific 
evaluation. Brought together by the trial, differences have seemingly been reconciled. 
In the discussions and debates on this topic, issues have thus been frequently addressed as 
inherently ‘methodological’. That is, research on psychotherapy tends to be a question of 
designing or adjusting the precise conditions and technologies of trials. However, the 
experimental model itself (evaluating psychotherapy through the RCT) often eludes critical 
questioning, as researchers’ attention is turned to a concern with the accurate conduct of the 
 
97 I use the term methodology here to refer to the systematic description and prescription of a set of methods. 
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scientific method: which statistical standards should be used? Which measures are most 
reliable? How should scales be evaluated? What is the minimum number of research subjects 
(patients) for a clinical trial? Should all patient groups be evaluated against the same measures? 
And so on. These questions came up regularly in the conferences and they are questions that 
challenge the protocols and conventions of carrying out experimental research. They are not, 
however, meant to challenge the scientific epistemology on which evidence-based 
psychotherapy rests – such an undertaking could easily appear to be hostility towards scientific 
authority, or simply science-bashing. Yet the challenges that researchers often report when 
discussing the design, conduct and dissemination of RCT research could be seen as inevitably 
epistemological questions. That is, methodological debates end up pointing to the many 
different ways in which researchers acquire knowledge, the empirical validity of methods used 
to acquire knowledge, and theories of knowledge involved (‘How do we know what we know?’). 
The problem of making psychotherapy amenable to the experimental methodology of EBM 
has been duly noted by practitioners of psychotherapy themselves and several solutions to 
overcome this problem have been proposed but remain contentious. Practitioners have 
frequently discussed such matters in meetings and conferences and in the pages of scientific 
journals.98 They are discussed, in other words, in the arenas of witnessing important to the 
construction of these issues as common matters of concern that might ultimately divest 
themselves of their own contexts of construction; we could use insights from elsewhere here to 
suggest that such issues centre around how to turn aspects of therapeutic interventions not into 
matters of concern but into matters of fact (Latour 2004b; Shapin & Schaffer 1985). 
The contours of scientificity that appear in the technologies of meetings and on the printed 
page, in the conferences and journals in this field, have generally tended to mute any radical 
critique. We have seen how mental health professionals who might publicly object to the 
premises of evidence-based psychological therapy run the risk of being subsumed under the 
counter-category of ‘pseudoscience’ and aligned derisively with the likes of Freud. When, for 
example, a psychotherapist in the audience at a conference on IAPT openly questioned the 
validity of ‘evidence-based’ approaches based on RCTs, the presenter responded with moral 
disapproval that bordered on derision: ‘Most of you critics are old, bitter psychotherapists 
bemoaning an outdated discipline’. The criticism levelled at the approaches and standards 
 
98 See, for a small selection, Berg & Slaattelid 2017; Bower & King 2000; Chambless & Ollendick 2001; David 
et al. 2018; Greenhalgh et al. 2014; Marzillier 2004. 
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drawn from EBM has often been framed in this way – as the voice of an older generation of 
psychotherapists and psychoanalysts feeling challenged by the ‘progress of science’, as another 
conference presenter put it to his approving audience. 
Proponents of evidence-based therapy seem to have been generally keen to comment that 
objections to EBM come from psychotherapists belonging to older psychoanalytic and 
psychodynamic schools; practitioners who currently stand, it is argued, to lose scientific and 
professional credibility because CBT and other IAPT therapies have proved themselves more 
‘effective’. Whilst it is certainly the case that a majority of critics of IAPT are defending older 
psychotherapeutic schools.99 There is however a growing number of academic articles written 
by trained IAPT professionals and CBT therapists, as well as clinical psychologists and some 
psychiatrists, who have raised similar critical concerns about evidence-based practice from 
within their own professional commitments (see e.g. Binnie 2015; Chambless & Ollendick 
2001; Pearce et al. 2015). Some critics question whether the evidence-based approach is the 
only viable method in which clinical practice can be scientifically informed and evaluated. 
During my fieldwork, in the margins of conferences and elsewhere, I met critics who said they 
sought to discredit the framework of EBM; others proposed to enlarge the notion of ‘evidence’ 
and suggested that RCTs might not always be the best research design for judging the 
effectiveness of psychotherapy. 
The varying positions and the nuances in these debates are important to emphasise; the 
anthropological outsider should not too easily subsume these disputes under two enduring and 
neatly opposing camps – with CBT practitioners and scientists, on the one hand, and the rest 
(e.g. psychoanalytic psychotherapists), on the other. It seems that practitioners of CBT and 
other IAPT therapies, as well as those who practise psychotherapies outside of the convention 
of EBM, might well support or condemn aspects of evidence-based practice. It is 
simultaneously the case that IAPT therapists have been formally trained in evidence-based 
practice and tend therefore to be more committed to its protocols. Otherwise, the variety of 
critical stances seems in part to be owed to the broad range of psychotherapeutic training 
programmes and institutes in England (see Davies 2009). It is also common now for 
practitioners to be educated in, and work across, more than one psychotherapeutic discipline. 
I met CBT and IAPT therapists who had also trained as psychoanalysts, existential 
 
99 For a sample of such critics, see Rizq (2012); Marzillier (2004); Samuels & Veale (2009); Lees (2016). 
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psychotherapists, or in some other psychotherapeutic discipline commonly regarded in 
professional contradistinction to CBT. We should therefore not assume that we are dealing 
with two or more clearly separated camps of practitioners, even if the whole gamut of debates 
tends to be construed as such. 
All of this takes us back to the general point about ethnographic definition and self-
definition with which I began this chapter: we see that therapists are well-rehearsed in a moral 
discourse of professional self-definition, in which the apprehension of stark boundaries 
between therapeutic schools and related us/them distinctions are re-drawn constantly in 
conversations between psychotherapists and in written histories of psychology, too (for a 
recent example of this, see Hall et al. 2015).100 This can seem at times to result in a never-ending 
ramification of sub- and counter-disciplines, with divisions wrought in self-conscious 
opposition and new therapeutic schools born every other year. All of this can also be brought 
together with seeming ease (which was the case in the NHS conferences I attended) under a 
single, common title of ‘psychotherapy’ or ‘psychological therapy’.101 
I have suggested that evidence-based psychotherapy has been effected in part by construing 
any tensions between psychotherapy and the RCT as exclusively a matter of ‘methodology’. 
This shift towards a methodological framing is one owed to EBM and its prescription, ordering 
and regulation of scientific evidence (Cambrosio et al. 2006, 2009). We have seen thus far that 
the notion of evidence-based psychotherapy relies then on a redefinitional process in which 
‘psychotherapy’ is construed as an object that can be tried and tested through randomised 
control trials. There are at least three practices here that have been fundamental in making 
psychotherapy evidence-based within this framework: 1) objectification; 2) standardisation; 
and 3) quantification. These are interrelated practices and are mutually implicated in the 
constitution of evidence-based psychotherapy. Objectification refers here to the therapeutic 
provision and effects of psychotherapy framed as ‘objects’ that can be experimented upon; 
standardisation concerns psychotherapy practised as a set of manualised and precoordinated 
‘techniques’ and ‘interventions’; quantification refers to the way in which a person’s experience 
of the effects of psychotherapy is rendered into a measurable, numerical form – a number or 
set of numbers – elicited through patient questionnaires (also referred to as ‘measures’ and 
 
100 For an anthropological account of certain aspects of this boundary-making in psychotherapeutic training. 
101 See Introduction for comments on this terminology. 
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‘scales’). We could say that self-reporting enacted through the use of the patient questionnaire 
is the central technology through which ‘subjectivity’ is measured and stabilised by rendering 
the clinical subject’s ‘subjective’ experience quantifiable. It is also the important instance in 
which the ‘effectiveness’ of the psychotherapeutic intervention is reified ‘objectively’ as it quite 
literally appears as a score on a sheet of paper.  
As a result, in the assessment of the effects of a specific psychological therapy for a specific 
condition, ‘subjectivity’ – in the sense of a putative interiority of a human subject, we might say 
– can seem, ethnographically, to pose problems in that the clinical subject’s experience of 
mental ill-health and their experience of engaging in psychotherapy are neither easily nor  
reliably objectifiable nor quantifiable. Consequently, the main challenge has been, and 
continuous to be, one of inspecting subjectivity objectively.  
This has been achieved not through a bracketing off or draining away of the ‘subjective’ – as 
we saw earlier in Daston and Galison’s historiography of objectivity, and, as anthropologists 
might witness in other clinical contexts of biomedicine referenced throughout this chapter – 
but rather by transforming ‘subjectivity’ itself into an object of scientific observation. This is 
done in the daily practices of diagnosis and treatment, such as in assessment calls on the 
telephone with IAPT’s Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners and in the therapeutic 
consultations with IAPT therapists. The tasks of assessment and treatment evaluation rely 
primarily on the use of scaled questionnaires. These provide the material means of systematic 
classification in which what becomes the experiential reality of the patient is ordered and 
scored. This procedure requires most importantly a capacity of the patient to self-evaluate and 
self-report, a topic we explore further in Chapter 6. The patient questionnaires both assume 
and require such a capacity. They are usually filled in as part of an initial diagnostic assessment, 
and subsequently, when used to evaluate the progress of a treatment, completed by the patient 
before and after consultations and therapy sessions.  
The use of scaled questionnaires in psychology is of course not new and has long featured 
as one of the most widely used technologies in observing and evaluating subjective experience 
objectively. We could think of the questionnaire as a material instantiation of a simultaneous 
process of objectifying, standardising and quantifying. That is, in the assessment of both 
psychotherapy and psychotherapeutic subjects, questionnaires render apparently subjective 
experiences observable, measurable and numerical. Experience, we might say, becomes a score, 
 164 
a quantity. As we have seen, this reconstitution has historically been a difficult 
accomplishment. 
 
Appealing to ‘the evidence’ as a fundamental principle of healthcare seems now to be the 
dominant rationale. However, evidence is not about ‘the world out there’, as I have shown, 
revealing nature in its universal forms and functions. It concerns instead the certainty of 
effectiveness. Evidence-based practice claims to rationalise the contexts and specificities of 
providing healthcare, which involves framing clinical decision-making as separate from its 
practical complexity and ambiguity. It is precisely in this move that we see what might aptly be 
described as efforts to eradicate the ‘social’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, and other perceived opposites 
of an impartial, value-free science which claims an objective grasp on reality.  This has been, 
and is, an important achievement in establishing therapeutic certainty and in the attempt to 
demonstrate universal singularity in the face of what may feel like alarming complexity and 
multiplicity (McDonald 2011, 2017). This objectivity can cause serious troubles, nevertheless, 
and the ‘social’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’ and other ‘factors’ that are seen potentially to intrude on 
scientific practice have persistently been difficult to keep out of the objectivist universe. 
Eventually, many of these ‘factors’ have had to be dealt with, too, and are often discussed in 
conferences and professional meetings as the stuff of ‘co-production’ or ‘the contexts’ of 
psychological therapy (see Chapter 1 and 3). 
We have seen that the evidence-based framework assumes, anticipates and effects the 
coherence of psychotherapy. It is not designed to address empirical complexity, but to reduce 
complexity and multiplicity into a set of variables that can each be ‘controlled’ by way of 
converting them into numerical values in the analytical phase of the trial. Consequently, in the 
scientific objectification of psychotherapy – or, we might say, in the administering and 
representation of CBT as empirically stable and uniform – unwanted complexity is erased. This 
feels like a burdensome epistemology to some psychotherapists. However, therapists I met 
know that psychotherapy has long appeared ‘messy and ambiguous’ in a clinical world wherein 
biomedical psychiatry has sustained scientific authority in the treatment of mental health 
problems. It has therefore been a significant achievement to render psychotherapy into a 
scientific object capable of being examined in accordance with the principles of the clinical trial 
– thus acquiring a hard-won objectivity on an equal footing with the testing of drugs. Reducing 
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CBT meets mindfulness  
This chapter explores the models of selfhood that evidence-based psychological therapy invites 
its subjects to engage with.102 We look in more detail at some of the therapeutic specificities of 
psychological therapy as we move from CBT to mindfulness. This chapter examines, therefore, 
some features of CBT and mindfulness that revolve around a capacity to take oneself (or one’s 
self) as an object of introspection and reflection. We will see that whilst psychological therapies 
in the form of CBT and mindfulness have become recognised as effective, scientifically founded 
interventions in the treatment of mental health problems within the framework of IAPT, they 
have also generated their own therapeutic uncertainties. I argue that CBT and mindfulness have 
come to shape conflicting models of ‘the mind’, with different notions of selfhood effected 
through these practices.  
The move from CBT to mindfulness here is primarily an ethnographic one as it is informed 
directly by the fieldwork I undertook: when I followed the training of CBT therapists, as we 
saw in Chapter 4, it became clear to me that the practice of CBT had become increasingly linked 
with another psychological therapy that likewise had claimed an ‘evidence-based’ status in the 
UK. This therapy is called Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), although it is more 
commonly known simply as ‘mindfulness’.103  Mindfulness is one amongst other evidence-
based psychological therapies provided through the IAPT programme. Indeed, according to 
some historians (see e.g. Marks 2012; Drage 2018b), mindfulness in the form of MBCT is said 
to have been partly derived from CBT (as well as offering a radical reinvention of it), although 
 
102 For clarity, I use the word ‘participant’ throughout this chapter to distinguish the subjects of psychological 
therapy from the therapists who teach them. It is worth noting, however, that in the practice of psychological 
therapy, the therapeutic language tends to shift away from an explicit distinction between professionals and 
patients. Instead, IAPT therapists often use the term ‘practitioner’ to convey a more neutral position for the 
clinical subject of psychological therapy (which therapists might more readily refer to, amongst themselves 
in clinical meetings and supervisions, as ‘the patient’). Part of the rationale of this shift in language is that 
patients are themselves becoming practitioners of CBT by virtue of learning to do CBT (or any other IAPT 
therapy). So, although the terms ‘practitioner’ tends to denote a trained therapist, it is also used to include 
all practising persons: ‘therapists’ and ‘patients’ alike. 
103 Definitions of ‘mindfulness’ have attracted an enormous amount of debate in recent years, amongst 
Buddhist scholars, psychologists, and mindfulness practitioners alike, as well as many other academic 
commentators, delineating histories and etymologies (for a selection of these debates, see Sharf 2015; 
McMahan 2008; McMahan & Braun 2017; Kabat-Zinn 2011; Loy & Purser 2013; Drage 2018a). Whilst there 
is no space to deal with these debates here, I should stress that my use of the term follows that of the IAPT 
therapists I studied: ‘mindfulness’ was generally used to refer to the psychological therapy of MBCT, 
although the practice of mindfulness was not exclusive to clinical contexts or problems, and did not always 
follow the eight-week course model of MBCT (Crane 2012; MAPPG 2015).  
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in my conversations with mindfulness practitioners, this was seen as a deeply contentious 
history of mindfulness. Practitioners themselves often prefer to trace a history of mindfulness 
back to Buddhist meditation traditions and cognitive scientists distinct from any history of 
CBT. Nevertheless, in most clinical textbooks and in the academic clinical psychology 
literature, mindfulness is often included in the plural designation of ‘cognitive and behavioural 
therapies’ and subsumed under the category of ‘third wave CBT’. I will come back to these 
points in the following paragraphs. 
So, whilst this thesis has not taken up mindfulness as its central concern (that would require 
another book), many of the points I have discussed with reference to CBT will have 
ethnographic resonance with aspects of mindfulness and its institutionalisation in the UK. I 
came across the practice of mindfulness in nearly all my field sites; in IAPT and NHS 
conferences in particular, but also in the lecture rooms on CBT, in the supervisions with 
students and supervisors, and through mindfulness workshops and courses advertised 
frequently at the South London Community Centre, and at the University of Cambridge where 
I returned after fieldwork. 
This thesis could perhaps just have ended with CBT and stayed put there; this would 
certainly have made the task at hand easier but limiting my account here solely to CBT would 
mean leaving out a great deal of the current state of the IAPT service. First, as I pointed out in 
the Introduction, the term ‘CBT’ is often used to refer to a distinct psychotherapeutic school of 
thought, which itself is said to be a combination of two schools: the invention of ‘cognitive’ 
therapy in the US in the late 1950s and 60s, commonly attributed to the work of Aaron Beck 
and Albert Ellis, combined with ‘behavioural’ therapy developed in post-war Britain owed to 
the work of psychologists at the former Institute of Psychiatry and the Maudsley Hospital (see 
Chapter 2; see also Marks 2012, 2015). CBT brought together in the singular – ‘standard CBT’, 
as some practitioners refer to it in the IAPT service – has been our main focus so far. 
However, CBT is also discussed as an umbrella term – often in the plural, ‘cognitive 
behavioural therapies’ – to capture different therapeutic orientations and offshoots. Some of 
these different orientations have been incorporated into the IAPT service as the service has 
expanded and evidence-based psychological therapies have multiplied. It has not been possible 
to deal with this elastic variety of CBT-derived therapies in this thesis nor the evaluation of 
each in relation to ‘CBT’ in the standardised singular. I mention all this here to acknowledge 
that there is a significant amount of therapeutic variety within the IAPT service (at the time of 
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writing) despite the obvious prevalence of CBT and mindfulness. 104  ‘Standard CBT’ is 
nevertheless what most IAPT therapists train in, as we saw in Chapter 4. 
The ethnographic point here is that mindfulness therapy has clearly proliferated alongside 
CBT and other therapeutic interventions available through IAPT. Indeed, mindfulness had 
become so commonplace by the time I began my doctoral fieldwork that it was now frequently 
advertised and offered in workplaces and schools, and through other everyday instances of 
people’s lives in the UK.105 For example, mindfulness had apparently become so prevalent as a 
type of therapeutic everyday tool beyond clinical contexts and concerns that, since 2017, an in-
built ‘mindfulness app’ has featured on the standard ‘Health’ section of every iPhone.106  
We will pass through a range of entities in the following paragraphs – from cognitive 
distortions and sensing bodies to thoughts and core beliefs, for example – with each one worthy 
of ethnographic commentary. There is no space to elaborate on all therapeutic aspects of CBT 
and mindfulness in this chapter without omission. Rather, I have aimed to examine the aspects 
I feel are of particular salience for shedding some ethnographic light on the kinds of selves these 
therapies envision and entail, and which they in turn provide experiential confirmation of, for 
the people engaged in their enactment. 
Some readers might feel that it has taken a long time to reach the therapeutic session itself. 
Some might even have wondered why we have not yet seen the ‘real’ practice of psychotherapy 
 
104 The psychological therapies available in IAPT depends in part on which specific therapies (or ‘therapeutic 
pathways’, as many professionals now call them) have been commissioned and prioritised by NHS England’s 
regional CCGs [Clinical Commissioning Groups]. The therapies available might vary from year to year, 
depending on the performance index of each local IAPT service (see Chapter 3). But, generally speaking, 
apart from ‘standard CBT’, other therapies subsumed under the umbrella term of ‘cognitive behavioural 
therapies’ typically include Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy, Compassion-Focused Therapy, 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Metacognitive Therapy, Schema Therapy, Narrative CBT, and 
Behavioural Activation.  
105 I had already carried out some preliminary fieldwork on CBT, as noted briefly in the Introduction, during 
my graduate studies in 2013 and 2014; a time also when an interest in ‘mindfulness’ was reaching quickly 
and intensely beyond its clinical application in IAPT (with most of the research on MBCT in the UK 
conducted in clinics associated with the Universities of Bangor and Exeter [see Cook 2015]). When I began 
the fieldwork for my PhD three years later, in the summer of 2016, ‘mindfulness’ had, in one form or another, 
secured a place and a name in various contexts beyond IAPT (see Cook 2016; Bruun 2018). 
106 Numerous mindfulness apps are also currently available in app stores on smartphones that users may 
download either for free or to buy. Mindfulness apps appears to far exceed an enthusiasm for CBT apps, with 
few of the latter available on smartphones such as Quirk CBT and Moodpath. In comparison, mindfulness 
apps available in the UK include Calm; Headspace; Reflectly; The Mindfulness App; Breethe; Elevate; BetterMe; 
Mindfulness Daily; Self-care, and many more. Many of these apps claim to help users becoming ‘mindful’ of 
a diverse range of purported issues from lack of concentration at work to weight gain, stress and depression, 
and much more; they aim generally to help users becoming more ‘present’ and ‘aware’ in the moment.  
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(the clinical context) or met any ‘real people’ (the patients), as it were. The category of ‘the 
patient’ – perhaps medical anthropology’s own version of the native – more easily lends itself 
to the tacit notion of particular human subjects felt to be more authentically or sufficiently 
‘ethnographic’ than, say, the scholars working in the psychology department next door.107  I 
hope that I have made it clear enough throughout the thesis that I have not assumed that the 
therapeutic practice nor the patients are more ‘real’ in this sense than the mental health 
professionals, academics, the conferences, training course, and indeed the histories and 
theories, and so on, that we have followed until now. ‘Patients’ or ‘service users’ are implicated 
throughout the thesis, as they were during my fieldwork with mental health professionals, but 
they have not been dealt with explicitly; I do not intend to offer a ‘patient perspective’ (or 
perspectives) in this final chapter either, but, in an important sense, we could be said to have 
finally arrived amongst them. 
 
‘Watching thoughts like clouds in the sky’ 
Mindfulness appears to be ‘quite trendy in mental healthcare’, remarked a psychologist after 
we had witnessed an entire day of presentations on mindfulness research at a CBT conference 
in Manchester. One of the presenters had begun his research paper by declaring that 
‘mindfulness is based on ideas within Buddhist traditions going back hundreds of years’. ‘It is 
time’, he told us, ‘that we learn from the Buddhist monks and the positive effects of meditation.’ 
He wanted to engage his CBT audience on the reported salience of mindfulness therapy in the 
treatment of depression (and a range of other issues) alongside CBT. 
For the keynote presentation of this same conference, the lights had been dimmed and a 
flowering lotus had been projected onto the screen behind the stage. As we settled into our 
seats, a man and a woman entered the stage and sat down on two chairs. They spoke to the 
 
107 It is in keeping with the lingering traditional strictures of anthropological interest at work here that some 
readers might feel that we are missing the ‘patient perspective’ in this thesis. The assumption implies that the 
context of the patient – i.e., people subjected (for example, to psychotherapy) – is where the anthropological 
enquiry and interest is supposed to be located. I touched on a related point in the Introduction (see p. 11) 
but I want to stress that it has been one of the implicit aims of this research to do away with this 
presupposition, which I suspect is a more common one when (medical) anthropologists seem to leave the 
‘the clinic’ or ‘the patients’ – or any other such ‘semantically dense’ reality (Ardener 2007 [1989]) – behind. 
Many anthropologists have, of course, long moved on from the assumptions at work here, and ethnographic 
studies of professionals, academics, bureaucrats, etc., in the field of healthcare have proliferated greatly. An 
important point contained in the ethnography of this thesis is precisely that professionals are as interesting 
and as fit a subject for ethnography as are patients. 
 171 
audience with calm, silky voices. The presenters ‘invited’ us to engage in a mindfulness exercise 
prior to their lecture. One of the presenters asked us to attend to our body, to its position, the 
support of the seat we were sitting on, the softness of the padding on the seat and, then, our 
breath. The title of the lecture appeared on the whiteboard above the lotus: 
 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy helps depressed individuals to access and activate the positive 
affect system when invited to direct compassion towards the self 
 
‘Attend to your breath’, instructed one of the presenters in a slow, soothing voice. He asked us 
to close our eyes and imagine our body as a solid mountain; to feel the fixed ground beneath 
our feet; to imagine our head in the sky, the changing weather around the mountain top, the 
clouds passing by… We were then asked to ‘attend’ to our own ‘inner clouds’ – our ‘thoughts’. 
‘Bring your attention to your thoughts’, he instructed, ‘and just observe them.’ ‘Attentionally, 
but without judgement’, he added. The other presenter explained how negative thoughts could 
be especially difficult to observe without judging or inspecting them, but the therapeutic point 
was to ‘let them go’. ‘Just watch your thoughts like clouds passing by in the sky’.  
Occasions like these in the conferences I attended on CBT or IAPT were not uncommon. 
Mindfulness appeared to form part of many institutional contexts in which CBT was formally 
being put to work. Amongst the CBT students, whose training I had followed, mindfulness 
exercises similar to the one described above were often practised before the start of 
supervisions. Mindfulness approaches were also frequently discussed vis-à-vis more 
established CBT techniques. Mindfulness would thus be taught in the classes and supervisions 
every now and then for certain therapeutic purposes and to ‘complement’ CBT. On such 
occasions, the supervisor would stress that both were ‘evidence-based’ psychological therapies 
after all. Likewise, many of the university lecturers I met through the CBT course recounted 
how they practised mindfulness as part of their work as therapists in IAPT. They were trying 
to be ‘mindful’, they told me, when working therapeutically with patients. In staff meetings at 
the Community Centre in South London, we had been taught how to use mindfulness in our 
daily work to ‘improve our wellbeing’. It was also through the Centre that I had come across a 
‘free’ eight-session mindfulness course held in the hall of a public library located only a short 
bus ride away from the Centre where I lived.  
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The mindfulness course was led by two IAPT therapists trained in MBCT and had been 
sponsored by the local IAPT service as one amongst many initiatives to improve access to 
psychological therapy. I signed up for the mindfulness course and attended the eight evening 
sessions advertised, which were spread out over six months. I had already been taught a great 
deal about mindfulness at this point through the CBT training I had participated in, and 
through my reading of scientific journals, self-help books, and clinical manuals on 
psychological therapies; these were literatures that were not only relevant to many aspects of 
my research but featured also ethnographically as ‘required reading’ at the university course 
and in clinical roundtable discussions at conferences.  
CBT and mindfulness are not unalike: in the context of the NHS, their provision follows 
similar clinical protocols, including psychological assessment and evaluation procedures, and 
both have been recommended by the NICE guidelines as ‘evidence-based’ therapies for the 
treatment of depression (see e.g. NHS 2018).108 In the classes and supervisions that I followed, 
we learned that CBT and mindfulness are often combined in practice in the context of IAPT. 
At the present time, mindfulness is provided for people who are diagnosed as suffering from 
‘recurring episodes of depression’ (3 or more episodes) or who are deemed ‘currently well’ but 
are considered ‘at risk of relapse’ (NICE 2019: 27–28).109  
Furthermore, both CBT and mindfulness therapists often stress that neither therapies aims 
to restore the person to a permanent state of wellbeing, but that these therapies enable the 
person to learn to manage a range of problems over the course of their life. Such ‘problems’ 
include what might be seen as clinical problems along diagnostic lines, that is, CBT and 
mindfulness have variously been deemed effective for a range of conditions from depression 
and anxiety to chronic pain and high-blood pressure, although some of these claims remain 
highly contested in the scientific literatures of both fields (with only a few specified conditions 
currently included in the NICE guidelines [cf. NICE 2019]). However, problems are also 
 
108 Both therapies usually follow a programme of a total of eight therapy sessions (or twelve sessions when 
‘High Intensity’ therapy is prescribed to the patient), although some of the therapeutic themes dealt with in 
those sessions vary.  
109 Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy is currently prescribed to patients in the IAPT service according 
to two NICE Clinical Guidelines: 1) ‘For people who have had previous treatment for depression [CBT 
and/or antidepressant medication] but continue to have residual depressive symptoms’ (see CG90: 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg90 [published October 2009, updated April 2018]) and 2) ‘For people 
with a previous history of depression who are currently well and who are considered at risk of relapse despite 
taking antidepressant medication, or those who are unable to continue or choose not to continue 
antidepressant medication’ (see CG91: https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg91 [published October 2009]). 
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frequently understood and addressed in terms of ‘life circumstances’ or other such notions in 
which everything from lack of sleep to work stress, feeling insecure, distracted or uninspired, 
become therapeutic concerns whilst often appearing to eclipse the language of ‘therapy’ by 
defining mindfulness as a daily practice as opposed to a therapeutic intervention.  
 It is also now routinely asserted, especially in the field of mindfulness, that ‘wellbeing’ and 
‘happiness’ are not ‘the goal’ of the practice per se. Wellbeing or happiness tend instead to be 
presented as an almost inadvertent positive effect of practising.110  Rather, in the CBT and 
mindfulness courses I followed, we were told that one of the goals of this kind of psychological 
therapy was to become ‘your own therapist’. Thus, mindfulness therapy could likewise be said 
to figure, like CBT, as an ideal type of a therapeutic practice that leaves the ‘psyche’ safely 
behind (see Chapter 5): as its extensive proliferation beyond the context of IAPT suggests, 
mindfulness appears to have divested itself quite significantly of a perceived ‘social stigma’ still 
associated with ‘psychotherapy’.  
In the meantime, CBT remains instructive both as the founding therapeutic framework of 
IAPT and in terms of its wider influence on other psychotherapeutics in the UK, including 
mindfulness therapy itself. And yet the popular appeal of mindfulness seems often to eclipse 
this prevalence of CBT. Mindfulness has been introduced extensively into public health services 
in the UK, including training programmes and large-scale research investments, and beyond: 
mindfulness features widely on social media, in smartphone apps and self-help books. Many 
institutions in the UK such as universities now also include and advertise mindfulness courses, 
which are offered to help students ‘cope’ with ‘exam-stress’, to ‘enhance’ their ‘mental 
performance’, achieve a better ‘work-life balance’, and so on. Ethnographers have already 
begun to comment on the recognition of mindfulness beyond its clinical application; alongside 
CBT, it appears to have become one of the most favoured forms of therapy or ‘self-care’ in the 
UK and elsewhere (Cook 2015, 2016, 2017; Drage 2018a; Vogel 2017; Wheater 2017). 
Whilst advocates of mindfulness have typically wanted to see it as a therapeutic practice with 
ancient origins in Buddhist meditation practices (e.g. Kabat-Zinn 2011), it seems to have been 
developed as a form of psychological therapy in the late 1990s (Drage 2018b) by cognitive 
scientists and Buddhist meditation practitioners, the one encouraging the other. Amongst 
 
110 For example, Cook has described how the ‘positive effects’ of mindfulness are ‘achieved through ongoing 
self-reflexive work by which the immediacy of life in all of its extraordinary ordinariness may be appreciated’ 
(2015: 232). 
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these practitioners, four men feature as the ‘founding fathers’ of MBCT: John Teasdale and 
Mark Williams, based at the universities of Cambridge and Oxford in the UK, and Zindel Segal 
in Canada and Jon Kabat-Zinn in the US. In 2004, following two randomised control trials (Ma 
& Teasdale 2004; Teasdale et al. 2000), mindfulness was given some scientific credence and 
recommended by NICE. Mindfulness therapy is currently provided in the IAPT service in the 
form of group-based therapy sessions led by one or more MBCT-trained therapists over the 
course of eight weekly two-hour sessions.  
There were mental health professionals at IAPT conferences who saw mindfulness as a 
direct rival to CBT, and some blamed it for having obliterated the ‘behavioural’ component of 
CBT. Some remarked at these conferences dryly that mindfulness was just another hype: ‘these 
fads come and go’, retorted one psychologist to me after a conference paper on the benefit of 
mindfulness to prevent stress amongst primary school children. She went on to cite a list of 
recent publications that had apparently hit back at the ‘hype’. In the case of mindfulness, this 
kind of criticism seems to have been especially controversial as the evidence-base for the 
proclaimed effectiveness of mindfulness has more recently begun to come under scrutiny. 
There is an increasing number of scientific publications in the fields of clinical psychology and 
neuroscience that appear to challenge the established place of mindfulness in the category of 
‘evidence-based’ therapy and its endorsement in the NICE guidelines; Mind the Hype: A 
Critical Evaluation and Prescriptive Agenda for Research on Mindfulness and Meditation is the 
title of one such recent publication (cf. Van Dam et al. 2018). Referring to the self-same 
methodological standards of EBM with which mindfulness research is assumed to be 
compliant, the critics have found significant faults with some key features of mindfulness 
research and ‘the evidence’ it has presented.  
During my fieldwork I became aware of psychologists and neuroscientists and other 
scholars – many of whom are openly mindfulness practitioners themselves – who had been met 
with a notable backlash from ‘the international mindfulness community’, as one of the scholars 
put it. The ‘Mind & Life Institute’ is one such mindfulness community of scientist-
practitioners, in its own terms, which claims to build a ‘scientific understanding of the mind in 
order to reduce suffering and promote wellbeing’,111 but one which has also become known for 
‘censoring’ those scientists who have questioned the scientific integrity of mindfulness research 
 
111 See https://www.mindandlife.org/people/ (accessed January 2017). 
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or the clinical recommendation of mindfulness as a form of psychological treatment (see e.g. 
Britton & Lindahl 2019). Certain critiques of mindfulness, then, especially of its promotion as 
an evidence-based psychological therapy in the UK – and, in particular, with regards to certain 
aspects of its Buddhist underpinnings (see Drage 2018a, 2018b) – have also been met with some 
hostility from prominent members of the scientific mindfulness community, many of whose 
senior members identify as Buddhist practitioners.  
Similar tensions were also played out in the mindfulness sessions themselves that I 
participated in. On one such occasion, for instance, other participants in the group reacted with 
scepticism to the explicit links that the therapist kept drawing between mindfulness as a form 
of ‘secular therapy’ and its ‘Buddhist legacy’. One woman stood up halfway into one of our first 
exercises when the therapist enthusiastically told us how ‘we should all be more like the 
Buddhist monks’. The woman in question tried to leave the room quietly and excused herself: 
as a Christian, she explained, she did not feel comfortable participating in the mindfulness 
practice since it was clearly also ‘spiritual’. She pointed out that she had signed up for the course 
because of ‘all the science behind mindfulness’. She was interested in the therapeutic effects of 
psychological therapy, she told the therapist, but felt uncomfortable ‘engaging in Buddhism’. 
The therapist tried to persuade the woman to stay, insisting that mindfulness had nothing to 
do with ‘religion’. On the contrary, it was ‘secular’ and ‘scientific’. The sceptical woman took 
her seat again, but she never returned to the sessions.   
We see at work here a tension in the practice of mindfulness with its own scientific 
persuasions whereby ‘science’ cannot easily occupy the same domain as ‘religion’, with the 
latter posing as a problem for claims to scientificity and therapeutic impartiality. Religion and 
science still can, and does, pose as a familiar a world wherein psychology strives to be ‘objective’ 
– it is a division with an apparently long and troublesome history (see Hardin et al. 2018). 
The MBCT sessions and public workshops I followed on mindfulness were predominantly 
attended by women, many of whom were in their 30s and 40s, or older. On many occasions, I 
was the only male participant in groups of between five and fifteen people.112 After a public 
mindfulness workshop I attended in London, I asked one of the presenters, a psychologist, 
about the female-male ratio in mindfulness therapy versus CBT, to which she replied that, in 
contrast with the ‘forceful intervention’ style of CBT, mindfulness offered a ‘softer’, more 
 
112 The predominance of female participants in the mindfulness sessions I followed resonates with other 
studies of mindfulness conducted elsewhere in Europe (see Vogel 2017, on a Dutch mindfulness course) 
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‘compassionate’, approach to psychotherapy and one which, therefore, appealed to a lot of 
women.113 Whilst mindfulness can thus pick up traditional notions constituting femininity, 
and appeal thereby, CBT can elide with masculinity. CBT was quite often described as being 
more ‘masculine’ in its therapeutic approach and requirements, with all its talk of ‘action plans’, 
‘rational inspections’, ‘thought records’, ‘goal-settings’, and so on. The ‘attention-’ and 
‘compassion’-focused therapies to which mindfulness is seen to belong are commonly 
described as constituting a ‘third wave’ of cognitive behavioural therapies (Marks 2012). Some 
therapists I met felt that ‘third wave CBT’ had inserted all the missing ‘feminine’ aspects of 
psychological therapy, not least of which was an attention to ‘emotions’ and ‘the body’ – and 
to ‘attention’ itself. 
There are important differences between the psychological therapies of CBT and 
mindfulness, which go beyond any gender elisions. These are differences concerned with the 
ways in which people are asked to engage with their reported distress or other problems: the 
kinds of interventions they are asked to make on themselves and the shape and significance of 
‘the mind’ and ‘self’ effected through these. The rest of this chapter examines these therapeutic 
specificities of CBT and mindfulness, asking what kind of ‘selfhood’ is sought or wrought 
through engaging in their practice. 
 
Models of the mind 
A shift from CBT to mindfulness reveals serious therapeutic tensions as different models of 
‘the mind’ are articulated and effected through the assumptions, requirements, and claims that 
constitute these practices. In CBT and in mindfulness, as in other cognitive therapies, ‘thinking’ 
and ‘thought’ elide with a conception of ‘the mind’ at work here. First, we will be moving 
further into some ethnographic descriptions of CBT and mindfulness therapy before probing 
some issues concerned with the significance of ‘reflective thought’, ‘metacognition’ and ‘self-
care’. We finally arrive at anthropology’s relationship to psychology, exposing a pressing 
question implicated in this thesis: what it might mean to do an anthropology of psychology. 
 
113 The view eclipsed the fact that mindfulness as a form of psychological therapy – MBCT and MBSR 
[Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction] – seems to have been designed exclusively by men (see Drage 2018a, 
for biographical histories) with women appearing to have been involved only in its promotion – such as, for 
example, Rebecca Crane at The Centre for Mindfulness Research and Practice at Bangor University (see e.g. 
Crane 2009, 2017).  
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CBT: the self as rational inspector   
‘Change your thoughts ’  
On the training of IAPT therapists in Chapter 4, we saw that CBT presents, in its most 
condensed form, a tripartite model of human psychology consisting of ‘cognition’, ‘behaviour’ 
and ‘emotion’. We saw how these three concepts define and explain the practice of CBT in 
delineating the content and form of a universal ‘human psychology’.114 When we move to the 
CBT sessions themselves, participants are learning to practice CBT much like the therapists 
themselves have been taught it. In the therapy sessions I participated in, we were taught to 
identify ‘distorted’ patterns of thought in order to then inspect and evaluate them so that 
‘negative thoughts’ can be replaced with ostensibly more ‘accurate’ cognitive habits that do not 
lead to negative emotions and behaviours.115  
This basic theory of CBT is evoked in many other instances outside the sessions themselves 
where some form of CBT is being put to work; for example, a best-selling self-help book states 
clearly this approach with the title: Mind over Mood: change how you feel by changing the way 
you think (Greenberger & Padesky 2016 [1995]). A typical CBT exercise in such self-help books 
might involve filling out a flowchart to identify self-critical ‘automatic responses’ that occur 
whenever you face a setback, like being criticised at work or rejected after a date. Other 
exercises might involve learning ‘coping strategies’ to manage ‘symptoms’ that are seen to be 
characteristic of a disorder that has already been diagnosed through IAPT’s assessment 
procedure (see Chapter 3). In the sessions, as in the self-help literature, participants and readers 
are thus asked to be reflective by engaging in a practice of introspection by which perceived 
negative thoughts are interrogated ‘critically and rationally’. The aim is to ‘challenge’ those 
thoughts that are experienced as ‘negative’ in order to ‘change’ them. 
CBT is usually provided in sessions of one-to-one consultation (which last between 45 and 
60 minutes each) if a person is referred to the IAPT service as a ‘patient’ and is diagnosed with 
a ‘moderate’ to ‘severe’ mental health problem. Patients who are diagnosed with a ‘mild’ to 
‘moderate’ mental health problem (such as ‘work-related stress’) might be placed in the 
 
114 Cf. Beck & Rusheds (1979);  Clark and Fairburn (1997); Neenan and Dryden (2014). 
115 It is rarely explicated in CBT what exactly counts as adaptive or healthier thoughts, but they are always 
contrasted with ‘maladaptive’ or ‘negative’ thoughts. The latter are often discussed as beliefs that are held 
irrationally, with the implication that changing or adjusting them means greater accuracy between 
‘cognition’ and ‘reality’ (see also Chapter 4). 
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category of ‘Low Intensity’ [LI] intervention and offered group-based therapy combined with 
CBT exercises on a computer (cCBT). Therapy sessions are usually offered on a weekly basis, 
with ‘treatment plans’ lasting between 6 and 14 weeks. The structure of the sessions is fairly 
standardised – through the training together with the professional conferences, NICE clinical 
guidelines and IAPT manuals of the kind we have seen – across the range of mental health 
problems that are assessed and treated in the service. 
At the first session, participants are typically asked to formulate the problems they most 
want help in solving and, assisted by the therapist, they then devise an ‘action plan’; this is a 
process that is discussed amongst therapists as a ‘collaborative case conceptualisation’ or 
‘intervention strategy’. The experience of any difficulties on the part of the patient that might 
arise over the course of therapy are discussed in what is seen to be a ‘problem-solving’ and 
‘goal-orientated’ manner. The action plan usually catalogues prescribed ‘homework’ in the 
form of various ‘self-help’ strategies and behavioural exercises that the patient has agreed to 
work with outside the sessions. This homework is seen to involve the deliberate practice of new 
‘cognitive’ habits. The idea is that, as the patient progressively learns to ‘apply’ the ‘techniques’ 
of CBT, the patient becomes a practitioner of CBT of some sort.  
A central feature of CBT therapy entails identifying ‘problems’ that may be as diverse as ‘lack 
of self-esteem’ or ‘bereavement’ or identifying ‘symptoms’ such as ‘insomnia’ and ‘rumination’. 
There is no easy demarcation here of the ‘mental health problems’ that a patient might report 
or the ‘problems’ that might form part of a diagnostic assessment and then feature in 
subsequent sessions as ‘symptoms’ of a discrete mental disorder. For example, ‘problems’ 
identified by the participants – lack of sleep and appetite, for instance – might be construed as 
ordinary ‘life stressors’, thus in terms that are quite different from those problems that are 
construed as ‘symptoms’ of a ‘disorder’. As such, a participant’s reported experience of lack of 
sleep and appetite might in one context be dealt with as a result of ‘stress’; in another it is a core 
symptom of ‘depression’. However, both problems and symptoms become in practice part of 
the same theory of ‘distorted cognition’ or ‘negative thoughts’, and subject to the same general 
technique of rational inspection.  
Rational inspection involves the use of different working materials, most important amongst 
these being the ‘thought record’. These records are worksheets that are seen to provide the best 
practical tool to rationally evaluate and interrogate negative thoughts. Patients are asked to fill 
out thought records through which they record, in writing, the content of the negative thoughts 
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they experience; these are typically summarised as brief statements that are referred to as 
‘negative core beliefs’. The statements might seem as heterogeneous as the ‘problems’ that 
shape them; ‘I am not a good dad’, ‘I will fail my exam’, ‘no one loves me’, and ‘life is 
meaningless’, were some of the examples that had been written on patients’ thought records in 
the CBT supervisions I followed. The CBT thought record claims to take the patient through a 
step-by-step evaluation of the content of each negative thought and to conceptualise thoughts 
as ‘responses’ to a given situation or environment.  
The rational inspection then proceeds in which the patient is asked to provide ‘evidence’ 
against the negative core belief. To put this simply: if one’s negative core belief is that ‘no one 
loves me’ one might be asked to formulate new statements – ‘I do have friends who love me’, ‘I 
know my children love me’, and so on – that ‘prove’ the negative belief wrong. The therapist 
assists the patient throughout this rational inspection in which the ‘accuracy’ of the content of 
a negative thought is constantly questioned. We were repeatedly asked to observe and reflect 
on our own thoughts in an effort to actively change them. The aim here was to ‘cultivate’ what 
is understood to be a more accurate set of core beliefs: more positive cognitive habits. The 
therapeutic goal was thus seen to revolve around an inspection of the content of thoughts. 
CBT invokes here common conceptions of selfhood that are already meaningful in the UK 
beyond the context of mental healthcare. It is perhaps not surprising that the therapeutic 
language of CBT and the language of accountability and managerialism concur: ‘managerial’ 
and ‘entrepreneurial’ selves – subjects capable of self-care, self-control and self-help – have 
been important inventions of a similar period (Foucault 1991; Rose 1996). They came into 
being particularly in alternative worlds constructed in rebellions against centralised state 
structures and reliance on ‘the State’ during the late 1960s and 1970s; they have  also  been given 
life in the 1980s through the very different  ‘new public management’ reforms in the UK, and 
a neoliberal ‘rolling back of the state’ (Hood et al. 1999). It was during these same decades that 
cognitive and behavioural psychotherapeutics where developed and combined into ‘CBT’ 
(Marks 2012). A distinctly new language of the clinical subject was forged in which ideas of 
self-help and self-inspection became particularly instructive and redefined ‘mental healthcare’. 
It is also in the diagnostic assessment of patients in the IAPT service, through the use of 
‘patient health questionnaires’ (e.g. PHQ-9 for the diagnosis of depression, see Figure 1), that 
we see a self construed as a rational inspector. In other words, a patient’s experience of distress 
is extracted through standardised, itemised questionnaires that render ‘patient experience’ into 
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numerical quantities that align with symptomatology – that is, a set of symptoms that are seen 
as characteristic of a psychological condition exhibited by the patient.116  
CBT’s reliance on this technology of measurement and quantification assumes a reflective 
patient with a capacity also to perform self-assessment; it assumes an introspective and reflexive 
self; a subject willing and capable of reporting on their own experience – understood as 
‘thoughts’, ‘feelings’, ‘behaviours’ and ‘physical sensation’ – confirming, in turn, the basic CBT 
model of human psychology. Psychological questionnaires, often combined with other 
documents such as informed consent forms, action and goal-setting plans, patient journals, 
and so on, can thus be seen as constituting a ‘formal regulatory rendering of a subjectivity’ 
(McDonald 2014: 136); a particular kind of subjectivity which is already taken for granted in 
many other contexts where audit and accountability, (bio)ethics and bureaucracy come 
together (see e.g. Reubi 2012; Riles 2006; Strathern 2000). 
The psychological questionnaires which are typically used throughout the CBT sessions 
could thus be said to configure and reify the very subject it assumes: an individuated mind-in-
a-body composed of a universal human capacity to take ‘thoughts’ as objects of reflection and 
inspection. Such proprieties are consolidated experientially and contextually in particular 
material and conceptual circumstances – first and foremost in the therapy sessions, but also 
beyond the clinic – wherein self-report and self-inspection are taken as axiomatic human 
capabilities. Importantly, this capacity of in(tro)spection assumes an interiority of the human 
subject as the locus of an individual psychology or ‘mental health’ – the object of introspection. 
This requirement to self-report and self-inspect – in a sense, to make the self accountable – 
might well be reinforced in other areas of people’s lives in the UK, such as in daily working 
practices of self-checking and self-management. The pervasiveness of CBT was further 
conveyed to me when I returned to Cambridge after fieldwork in 2018 and discovered that my 
Department’s website had been updated with a ‘Student Wellbeing’ page on which ‘wellbeing’ 
had been formulated according to the model of CBT; there was no explicit mention of ‘CBT’ 
however, but its model of human psychology was nonetheless clear. The statement on the 
website reads, using the language of CBT: 
 
 
116 The most established type of questionnaire used in psychological assessment is based on Thurstone and 
Likert scales developed in the 1920s and 1930s; for a detailed account of these, see Young (2017). Patient 
questionnaires in IAPT are commonly referred to as ‘identification tools’, ‘measures’ or ‘scales’. 
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Signs and symptoms of mental health and wellbeing issues include: 
Thoughts:  difficulty concentrating; disruptive, interrupted or racing thoughts; difficulty making 
decisions; negative thinking; lack of self belief. 
Feelings:  reduced self-worth; prolonged sadness; rapid mood changes; anxiety; panic; increased 
irritability; feelings of being overwhelmed or out of control. 
Behaviour: lack of motivation; being tearful; less active; disorganisation; social withdrawal; difficulty 
falling or staying asleep; poor work/life balance; agitation. 
Physical:  fatigue; lethargy; tremors or palpitations; difficulty breathing; weight loss or gain; lack of 
appetite.117 
 
However, although CBT is available in Cambridge through IAPT’s scheme of self-referral (see 
Chapter 1), as it is everywhere else in England, it is mindfulness therapy – not CBT – which is 
advertised by the University’s psychological services. Since 2019, mindfulness therapy has been 
offered to students by all Cambridge Colleges, organised by the University’s extensive ‘Learning 
Mindfulness at Cam’ initiative, which runs an IAPT-based eight-week course each term (i.e., 
weekly group therapy sessions). Mindfulness is described here as a ‘well researched and 
effective approach to improve well-being’; as a ‘natural human impulse to be aware’; and as a 
‘secular approach to meditation’.118 It is further explained on the University’s website that 
mindfulness therapy is about developing a ‘regular practice’ much like ‘learning a language’ or 
‘going to the gym’.119 The goal of the practice is summarised as such: 
 
Mindfulness is about learning to accept what happens inside you in a self-accepting way, not 
getting rid of it [ibid.; my emphasis] 
 
We could say, in summary, that the person is constituted here as an autonomous, self-
determining ‘individual’ with a capacity to reflect. Secondly, ‘mental health’ is understood to 
refer to a particular kind of experience in which subjectivity is located in the ‘inside’ of a human 
being. The sense of self is a sense of interiority. And finally, we see at work a ‘self’ construed in 
managerial terms: the self in charge of itself. In CBT, the therapist takes the role of the 
metaphorical manager who teaches people to become managers of their own lives.  
 
117  ‘Student Wellbeing’, https://www.socanth.cam.ac.uk/about-us/student-wellbeing [accessed January 
2018).  
118 ‘Learning Mindfulness at Cam’, https://www.cambridgestudents.cam.ac.uk/welfare-and-
wellbeing/mindfulness-cam/learning-mindfulness [accessed August 2019] 
119 ‘What is Mindfulness’, https://www.cambridgestudents.cam.ac.uk/welfare-and-wellbeing/mindfulness-
cam/what-mindfulness [accessed August 2019].  
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In mindfulness, as we will see, it is not so much ‘management’ that is sought through the 
therapeutic practice, but rather ‘detachment’.      
 
Mindfulness: the self as detached observer 
‘ I  am not my thoughts’ 
In one of the eight-week courses I attended on mindfulness, we were invited to participate in 
‘guided meditations’ as one of the central techniques of the therapy. Meditation was seen as 
integral to the psychological therapy we were engaged in and was presented as offering us a 
way of learning and practising mindfulness beyond the scheduled sessions of the course. 
Meditation exercises also formed part of our daily ‘homework’ between sessions. We were 
instructed that it was on the basis of active participation in the sessions as well as doing the 
assigned homework that we could begin to develop ‘a new kind of relationship with ourselves’ 
through ‘cultivating’ new ways of relating to our ‘Thinking Mind’. 
 In the first of eight sessions I followed, we were introduced to a couple of therapists who 
would lead the sessions. Two of the therapists were trained as clinical psychologists and the 
other had first trained as a nurse before qualifying as a psychotherapist in IAPT. Christina, one 
of the psychologists, introduced the course: ‘Mindfulness is very uncomplicated’, she began, 
‘it’s logical, and it’s basically free: you can do it anytime and anywhere. It is a way of thinking 
and a way of being.’ Christina went on to describe how mindfulness means paying attention in 
the present moment, ‘attentionally and non-judgmentally’. In this eight-week programme, as 
in the many other mindfulness workshops I had attended, we were told that mindfulness is 
about realising that ‘thoughts are just thoughts: I have thoughts, but I am not my thoughts’. 
Drawing on particular strands of East Asian Buddhist philosophy (see McMahan 2008), 
MBCT teaches a notion of ‘the self’ which is not reduced to or composed of the ‘thoughts’ or 
‘cognitions’ that pass through a ‘thinking mind’. Thoughts are described through spatial 
metaphors in which we attend to them like ‘clouds in the sky’; clouds come and go, they make 
their appearance: clouds can be dark and grey, at other times they are bright and white. The 
sky, however, is not made up of its clouds – it has clouds. During these sessions, then, we were 
gradually practising and learning techniques that reaffirmed how our ‘mind has thoughts’, but 
‘is not its thoughts’. We were taught that thoughts, like clouds, can be observed. This required  
a ‘detached’ perspective (cf. Cook 2015) on a perceived mental or psychological interiority; in 
other words, it required an objectification of thinking in terms of thoughts seen as ‘mental 
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events’ occurring in the interiority of our being and not seen as ‘a reflection of the self’. 
Christina continued: ‘We can watch our thoughts, acknowledge them compassionately, and 
then gently let them go’. It was through the metaphorical language of ‘the sky’ versus ‘passing 
clouds’, that we were asked to attend to thoughts as ‘not really real’. The sky – our ‘real self’ – 
was perceived to be, within the metaphoric, somewhere above the clouds. 
Each session began with a guided meditation lasting half an hour, in which we were asked 
to ‘sense’ different body parts through ‘mindful breathing’ and ‘mindful attention’, travelling 
from the feet on the ground to the top of our heads – a technique referred to as the ‘body scan’. 
As we were ‘scanning’ each part of our bodies, the therapist ‘guided’ us to distance ourselves 
from any ‘worries’ and ‘distracting thoughts’ by reminding us to constantly bring our attention 
back to our breath:  
 
Once again, if you notice your attention wandering, just make a mental note of where it’s going… 
and when you do that, just very gently then bring your attention back to this moment as you are 
sitting here. 
 
We were reminded that our breath is with us all the time, even though we are not always aware 
of it. We were told to focus on ‘the breath’ whenever we noticed that our ‘mind’ wandered off, 
to bring our attention back to it ‘like an anchor’. Through the metaphorical anchor and 
attention to breathing, we were then asked to attend to an internal awareness of our ‘self’:  
 
Sometimes when our mind is very active or we feel anxious and depressed, we know that our breath 
is always here like an anchor. We can always bring our attention back to our breath and thus become 
aware of ourselves. 
 
Attention to breath and breathing thus appeared, in practice, to be akin to gaining a sense of 
self. This awareness of a ‘self’ was contrasted with ‘negative thoughts’ as events. Negative 
thoughts were described as the product of the ‘auto-pilot mode’ of a mind out of order: all the 
fearful, insecure, dominating, lazy, perfectionist or deprecating parts of a person perceived to 
have emerged and taken control somewhere during the course of one’s life. Being caught up in 
thoughts was frequently explained as an effect of a ‘doing mode’ of mind as opposed to a ‘being 
mode’. Contrary to CBT, in the mindfulness sessions we were asked to cultivate the self’s ability 
to observe and detach from the content of thought as opposed to interrogate and change it. We 
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were learning then to ‘be’ with our thoughts, feelings and sensations, rather than ‘do’ them as 
it were (e.g. react or act on negative thoughts). The ‘being mode’ that was sought to be 
cultivated in the sessions was explained in instructions such as telling yourself that ‘it [thinking 
a thought] is OK. Just gently observe it and then let it go. Watch it pass’. 
Negative thoughts – sometimes spoken of in the metaphoric of internal critics – were said 
to be dealt with therapeutically through the practice of ‘decentring’. Decentring is a technique 
that is seen to depend on an ability to ‘observe’ thoughts intentionally and non-judgmentally 
in an effort to ‘distance’ oneself from them. It was through learning to practise this ‘detached’ 
perspective that one would eventually be able to decentre the mind from its thoughts, which 
would then instead appear as objects of observation – and hence experientially distinct from a 
sense of self.  
As we reached ‘the head’ in these guided meditations, we were asked to relate to our thoughts 
in the particular way we had learned in previous sessions: to observe them with ‘detached 
curiosity’, to allow them to be there – ‘it is OK: I have thoughts, but I am not my thoughts’ – 
watching the thoughts pass like clouds and finally disappear. When participants described 
themselves as ‘having a thought’ in these terms, they were reifying an important idea of 
selfhood evoked in mindfulness therapy. Notably, that thoughts are not ‘real expressions’ of 
who you are or of reality, but that they are instead to be seen as ‘events’. We had learned that 
we could distance ourselves from thoughts through attention to breathing rather than thinking, 
and by visualising thoughts as ‘drifting by as clouds in our heads’. Participants generally felt 
that it was important to learn to relate to thoughts as metaphorical ‘clouds’ in order to 
experience them as ‘events’. But it was also deemed a difficult task.  
The participants on this mindfulness course were in the progressive process of acquiring an 
ongoing experience of an internally consistent and authentic mind-body-self construed as 
separate from the thoughts of its own making. The perceived tendency amongst people to 
conflate ‘thoughts’ with ‘selfhood’ or ‘reality’ (discussed by some of the psychologists as a 
propensity of ‘human cognitive experience’) was the assumption against which mindfulness 
presented its therapeutic objective: to experience thoughts as just ‘thoughts’, as not really ‘real’. 
It was also what participants found most difficult to achieve. 
This was evident when, at the end of each meditation, the therapist asked us how we 
experienced the exercise, and to reflect on the progress of our mindfulness practice in the past 
weeks. We were asked to share and evaluate our experiences with the rest of the group. Below 
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is an extract from one of these many ‘evaluations’ (this one is taken from a session half-way 
through the eight-week course):120  
 
‘So, what was it like doing the exercise today?’, asks the therapist. 
‘It was difficult’, replies one of the female participants. Others nod in agreement.  
‘Why was it difficult?’, asks the therapist. 
‘I guess it was very difficult because I’ve been running around all day, and now I was asked to just sit 
down and stop my mind racing,’ the woman responds. 
‘Yes, stopping your mind racing – what was that like?’, asks the therapist. 
‘Well, I know it’s a good thing to do…’ The therapist intervenes: ‘So that’s your thinking mind right 
there, but what did it feel like?’ 
 ‘Well, I enjoyed it,’  
 ‘You enjoyed it, good’. ‘How did the rest of you find it?’, she says looking at the others in the group. 
 ‘It felt peaceful’, another woman replies. 
 ‘Peaceful’, repeats the therapist, ‘Good, thank you. That’s positive. Anyone else? What did it feel like 
bringing your attention back to yourself?’  
 ‘I was distracted a lot by my thoughts’, says another participant, ‘they [thoughts] still seem very real 
to me.’ 
 Another participant nods and adds: ‘I feel you have to have a lot of control over your attention all 
the time. It’s difficult. It’s not just something you do automatically. It’s a bit easier now than in the 
beginning [of the course], but I still find it quite difficult to practise when I leave the sessions: I’m 
not really present with myself — I am often in my head with my thoughts.’  
‘In your head. That’s very interesting… so you were thinking a lot when you first started [the 
course]?’  
 ‘Yes. I’m still trying to distance myself from my thoughts, but my attention shifts all the time.’ 
 
Both CBT and mindfulness explain depression as the result of ‘maladaptive cognitive 
functions’.121 The self, and relation to self, that people are asked to engage in, however, differs 
 
120 This is constructed from notes and a recording of the session; this recording was made with participants’ 
permission, of course. 
121 For example, as one of the psychologists put it: ‘One of the reasons why mindfulness is very helpful for 
people with long-term depression, is that people with long-term depression are very often in their heads; 
they are often ruminating a lot and critically-thinking. When we practise meditation and mindfulness, we 
can be where our attention is, and we can see where it is going — if it is focusing on thoughts that are not 
very helpful. And we can then stop it [the attention] going down that channel, and we can learn to attend to 
ourselves in a different way by learning to be in the present moment. We can learn how to respond [to 
 186 
between the two types of therapy. In CBT, ‘negative thoughts’ are taken seriously; that is, they 
are rationally examined and evaluated in an effort to ‘adapt’ or ‘modify’ their content for the 
better – for a better self. We could summarise this stance as suggesting that (negative) thoughts 
are ‘real’ as they are seen to have experiential effects. In mindfulness, on the other hand, 
‘thoughts’ of any kind are not granted the same ontological status: the patient is asked not to 
examine or evaluate thoughts but to ‘watch’ and ‘observe’ them in the present moment, to 
separate them from a sense of self.  
On many such occasions during the mindfulness course, it was brought out how this 
separation of ‘thoughts’ and ‘self’ – a stance which demanded a simultaneously ‘detached’, 
‘compassionate’, and ‘non-judgemental’ perspective on thoughts as ‘drifting events’ – was 
difficult to experience beyond the meditation practice itself: ‘When I’m doing the meditation I 
know that the thoughts I have are not necessarily a real reflection of who I am: that I am not 
my depression. But most of the time, my thoughts – the good and the bad – feel part of who I 
am. They are real.’ 
In mindfulness, you are asked to evaluate not the contents of your thoughts but instead to 
attend to a specific kind of relation with and perspective on your thoughts. Thus, over the course 
of learning mindfulness, people are explicitly asked not to challenge and change their ‘negative 
thoughts’, as in CBT, but to observe them: ‘watching thoughts like clouds in the sky’. 
 
Cognitive cultivators: ‘Reflective thought’ and ‘metacognition’ 
When moving from CBT to mindfulness, we are required then to cultivate an ability to ‘watch’ 
our thoughts, located in what is understood to be a cognitive ‘inside’. In the therapy sessions of 
mindfulness, as with CBT, we thus encountered a notion of selfhood that locates and forges an 
individuated self in a psychological ‘interiority’ (Navaro-Yashin 2012) or ‘inwardness’ (Taylor 
1989). It is the way in which participants in CBT and mindfulness are asked to engage with and 
experience such an interiority that is of interest here. An ethnographic shift from CBT to 
mindfulness, I suggest, presents us with a therapeutic shift that turns on a question of the 
significance granted to ‘thoughts’ and the position of the subject towards thinking.  
 
depressive thoughts] in a more helpful way. That’s one reason why mindfulness is helpful for treating low 
mood and depression. A lot of people who suffer from low moods are quite distracted from their own 
emotions and they are in their Thinking Mind a lot of the time. And when they are thinking and ruminating 
a lot of the time, they are actually missing a lot of what’s lovely to enjoy in life, for example, even walking 
down the street or tasting a meal.’ 
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In the practice of both CBT and mindfulness, participants were tacitly asked – ‘guided’ or 
‘invited’, as therapists put it – to understand their subject position as a case of ‘becoming your 
own therapist’. People were asked to take up a position as a kind of cognitive cultivator. This 
generally involved, in the therapists’ terms, cultivating your abilities to ‘work’ on yourself by 
engaging in what therapists variously described as ‘psychological homework’, ‘mental fitness’, 
and ‘dedicated training’. The now very common references to ‘physical fitness’, ‘going to the 
gym’, and the like, seemed to provide a powerful metaphoric for therapists in describing what 
‘working on yourself’ might mean in psychological therapy. This analogy between physical and 
mental health is reinforced in a common therapeutic language with the talk of exercises, 
techniques and sessions. So rather than being talked about as ‘psychological intervention’, for 
example, mindfulness therapy is often presented to participants as a series of ‘mindfulness 
exercises’. ‘Working on yourself’ and ‘becoming your own therapist’ involved becoming a 
practising subject (analogous to the gym-goer). In a popular self-help book, for instance, 
clinical psychologists Elaine Foreman and Clair Pollard introduce CBT as a form of 
psychological ‘workout’ through which ‘you really can sharpen, tone up and keep your mind 
fit by regular workouts at the mental gym. […] Your workout strengthens you as you develop 
new qualities and performance-enhancing, stress-reducing, life-improving beliefs’ (Foreman 
& Pollard 2011: 10).  
As we have seen, the central therapeutic instruction in mindfulness requires the participant 
to take up a detached perspective on ‘negative thoughts’ through which thoughts are construed 
experientially as metaphorical ‘clouds’. That is, the aim is to not experience your thoughts as 
reflecting your ‘self’ – thinking as an aspect of selfhood, we might say – but rather as a series of 
events that occur in the cognitive interiority of an observing self at the centre of mental activity. 
We are reminded of the metaphor of the mountain top (the self) around which revolves the 
changing weather (the mind or thoughts). This specific kind of detachment entails an 
objectification of ‘thoughts’ and a subject/object dualism demonstrated by the construal of the 
self as an observer, on the one hand, and the observed (thoughts/cognition/mind), on the other. 
Importantly, it is through this dualist rendering of the subject as an observer combined with 
a detached perspective towards the thoughts that people in mindfulness therapy are asked to 
view thoughts simply as ‘mental events’. Regardless of the content of your thought – the content 
of what your internal critics might tell you – for instance, ‘I am useless at my job’ or ‘I will never 
love again’, the participant is asked to view these as simply mental events: as events that do not 
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in any way reflect an ‘I’ – a self. We were, in other words, asked to engage in an experience of 
selfhood detached completely from our thoughts that were said to pass through our minds.   
Thoughts were thus rendered into objects of observation distinct from the observer. 
Repeatedly, however, participants I spoke with over the course of my fieldwork in these sessions 
found this stance particularly difficult to maintain. Participants expressed how they were used 
to identifying their experience of thoughts as part of a sense of self. For these participants, ‘self’ 
and ‘thoughts’ were difficult to separate; it was difficult to uphold a totally ‘detached’ 
perspective on thinking as distinct from the thinker. Mindfulness therapists generally 
responded to such unease by stressing that what mattered was that we were trying to pay 
attention to our mind by observing our thoughts, on purpose, and without judgment. 
Importantly, this stance was contrasted with the encouragement found in CBT to interrogate 
the content of your thoughts. ‘I have thoughts, but I am not my thoughts’, was the key mantra 
here that mindfulness therapists constantly asked participants to repeat when experiencing 
negative thoughts. This ability to detach or decentre from what was perceived to be ‘internal’ 
experiences thus relied on the objectification of ‘thoughts’ through the ascribed meditations of 
‘watching’ and ‘observing’. 
As we saw in the mindfulness exercise at the beginning of this chapter, techniques of 
watching and observing without inspecting or judging were taught through the use of 
metaphors and visualisations whereby thoughts-as-events were attended to visually and 
perceptively as ‘air’-like attributes of ‘the human mind’: clouds, the sky, the weather. We return 
to the implication of this spatial topography and its moral definition in a moment.  
Anthropologists have only recently begun to study the therapeutic practices of evidence-
based psychological therapies. In her study of an MBCT course at the University of Exeter, 
Cook presents mindfulness therapy as a cultivation of a cognitive mode of detachment, which 
results in a renewed engagement with the world and a sense of self (Cook 2015). She describes 
how mindfulness ‘is understood as a way of cultivating a skillful engagement with life, 
reconfigured as a technique of self-discovery and self-transformation, as well as physical and 
mental health’ (Cook 2015: 227). Cook argues that the effect of this therapeutic work is akin to 
the significance of ‘reflective thought’ in Foucault’s theory of ethical self-cultivation (Foucault 
1988d, 1997: 223–301). According to Foucault, the capacity of conscious, reflective thought is 
what constitutes ‘the very stuff of ethics’ – namely, ‘the relationship of the self to itself and the 
relationship to the other’ (Foucault 1997: 300). Foucault writes: 
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[Thought] is what allows one to step back from this way of acting and reacting, to present oneself as 
an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, conditions, and its goals. Thought is 
freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes 
it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (Foucault 1997: 117; my emphasis)122 
 
This idea is taken up by Cook and described in the therapeutic practice of mindfulness, with 
reference also to an anthropological literature on the question of ethics and freedom (especially 
Laidlaw 2014). The practice of cultivating a detached perspective on one’s thoughts is theorised 
as taking ‘the form of an aspiration towards and training in reflexive self-consciousness’, which, 
Cook suggests, lies in ‘the relationship that the participant has with his or her own internal 
responses’ (Cook 2015: 220). 
The ethnographic forms of ethical reflexivity and self-care that are alluded to here are 
suggestive of similar points made in my own anthropological writing concerning the 
therapeutic work of clinical psychologists (Bruun 2013). I have previously described the 
therapeutic relationship of psychological therapy as a way of imagining and practising self-
other relations which constitute an ethical process as the clinical subject gradually learns to 
envisage and enact new modes of being and relating to self and others. This involved, in turn, 
the cultivation of an ‘ethical sensibility’ on the part of the therapist (ibid.: 27-29). 
In her ethnographic study of a ‘mindful weight loss’ course in the Netherlands, Else Vogel 
(2016) has similarly drawn on Foucault’s notion of ethical self-cultivation in her approach to 
mindfulness-based therapy. Vogel refers specifically to what Foucault called the ‘arts of 
existence’ and cites a quotation from the second volume of his History of Sexuality (Foucault 
1992): 
 
[T]hose reflective and voluntary practices by which men [sic] not only set themselves rules of 
conduct, but seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make 
their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. 
(Foucault 2012: 10–11, as cited in Vogel 2016: 4). 
 
 
122 Crucial to Foucault’s theorisation of ‘ethics’ as ‘reflective thought’, is the understanding, as Cook points 
out, that what is meant by ‘thought’ is not limited to the content of thinking, which he recognises as culturally 
and historically contingent. 
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The idea of ‘reflexive self-consciousness’ sought in mindfulness therapy, as described by Cook 
(2015: 220), and the orientation towards the potentialities of ‘self-care’ and ‘self-
transformation’, as described by Vogel, emerge as ethnographic instantiations of Foucault’s 
‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1988d): ‘to make oneself into a certain kind of person’, as 
James Laidlaw has put it (Laidlaw 2002: 321–322). 
Thus, the combination of techniques, comportments and narratives that make up 
mindfulness introduce a specific model of selfhood: an individuated self-in-a-mind-body 
comprised of ‘cognition’, ‘emotion’ and ‘sensations’, complete with a ‘reflective consciousness’. 
Both Cook and Vogel leave us with anthropological accounts of psychological therapy that both 
presuppose and enable a notion of the self in these terms, construed most importantly as the 
capacity for detached reflection. The subjects of psychological therapy, then, turn out to be 
Foucauldians in pursuit of some form of ethical self-cultivation. 
I want to underline four main points here. Firstly, in CBT and mindfulness, selves are talked 
about as inhabiting ‘individuals’ and self-cultivation is seen as the effect of presenting oneself 
as an object of reflective thought; namely, to reflect on one’s self. Secondly, ‘self’ is understood 
to refer to a particular kind of experience in which selfhood is located in the ‘inside’ of an 
individual. The sense of self is a sense of interiority. Thirdly, Foucault writes about ethical self-
formation in terms of a universal human capacity of reflective thought which is taken to be the 
ground of ethical life. And finally, this particular language of analysis – self-cultivation, self-
fashioning, self-creation, self-formation – suggests that we are dealing with a notion of the self 
which is seen as always in-the-making (cf. Strathern 1995) – always a product, in these ethical 
terms, of its own ‘reflective thought’ (and the reflective thought of others). However, this way 
of talking about ‘the self’ is not the only way in which ‘it’ can appear in our anthropological 
analyses.123 
 
123 Of course, Foucault’s influence on anthropological approaches to ‘the self’ is remarkably diverse and any 
attempt to characterise this literature collectively as ‘Foucauldian’ or ‘post-Foucauldian’ runs the risk of 
overgeneralisation and might miss out on the specific anthropological critiques of the limitation of 
Foucault’s approach to subjectivity and selfhood voiced by the very same authors who draw on his work. In 
spite of these hesitations, it seems important to note still that Foucault’s theory of self-cultivation is 
profoundly evocative of psychoanalytic thinking on intersubjectivity and the relational formation of the self 
(see e.g. Kirshner 1991), especially with regard to the French tradition of psychoanalysis of the same period 
in which Foucault wrote (see Lacan 1981). It seems that Foucault’s own notion of the self, and what it owes 
to psychoanalysis, has been left largely unexamined. A more general point is that anthropologists have often 
used Foucault as their conceptual arsenal to deconstruct ‘essentialist’ concepts associated with 
psychoanalysis or psychology (see Introduction). However, an anthropological tendency to deconstruct 
psychoanalytic theories of ‘self’ – from Malinowski (1927) to Leach (1958) and Lévi-Strauss (1963), through 
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The enthusiasm for reflective thought has also more recently entered anthropology through 
a new analytical language borrowed from psychology that centres around the psychological 
concept of ‘metacognition’. Metacognition was a term invented in part to account for an area 
of study in cognitive development psychology concerned with the ways in which children 
become aware of their own cognitive abilities in a learning environment. Metacognition is said 
to have been coined by the development psychologist John Flavell in 1976, although cognitive 
psychologists of earlier decades, prominent figures such as Piaget, Hart and Vygotsky, have 
also been credited with the research and ideas leading up to its conception. Flavell’s use of the 
term to describe children’s self-reflecting abilities in making certain judgements (such as the 
ability to evaluate why 2+2 = 4) was rather more specified than the way in which 
anthropologists have tended to deploy the concept in recent years – in peculiarly more 
generalised terms whereby ‘metacognition’ or ‘metacognitive’ appears to stand for a universal 
human capacity to reflect on one’s own mind or mental activity.  
This has been elaborated recently by anthropologists as referring to a capacity to reflect on 
your own thought processes or thinking about thinking; as a process or practice of observing 
and relating to one’s own cognition; and as reflexive self-consciousness (cf. Luhrmann 2018; 
Mair 2018; Mair & Cook 2018; Schjødt & Jensen 2018). According to the anthropological 
theorisation, practitioners of CBT and mindfulness could be said to engage in an explicit 
practice of metacognition in these terms. Metacognition is here the capacity to become aware 
of, observe and relate to your thoughts. It is the capacity to be ‘meta’ – from Greek meta, 
meaning ‘after’ – in relation to one’s own cognition. ‘Beyond thinking’, we might say. 
It is in such a formulation that we might detect similarities with an anthropology of ethics 
that talks of the ethical subject in cognate terms. Metacognition is here presented as a human 
capacity that is at once an intrinsic feature of the human mind and a practice that can be 
‘cultivated’. The higher up the cognitive ladder or diagram, the more into the moral landscape 
of ‘the self’ we are seen to tread. Cognition, awareness, attention, and all other perceived 
workings of ‘the mind’ are often construed through common metaphors by which they are 
granted a ‘higher-order’ status (e.g. clouds/sky). In CBT as in mindfulness, ‘cognition’ 
distinguishes a mind in a body distinct from its relations with others or an ‘external’ world; and 
vice versa, ‘the world’ is seen to enter through cognition: through ‘internal’ and individuated 
 
Foucault (1961), and onwards – does not automatically render anthropological writings on the ‘self’ void of 
essentialism (see e.g. Quinn 2006). 
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thinking and reflection (see also Chapter 4). Metacognition, as practised in CBT and 
mindfulness, is thus a concept that stacks the world spatially and vertically. It assumes human 
cognition in terms of a cognitive hierarchy, a stratum in which cognitive capacities are ordered 
from the ‘lower’ to the ‘higher’; metacognition refers to what is called ‘higher order’ thinking 
in the cognitive sciences. It has also been likened to a form of ‘higher consciousness’ or ‘radical 
reflexivity’ (Cook 2018, citing Taylor 1989: 163; see also Teasdale et al. 2002; Luhrmann 2018; 
Mair 2018; Mair & Cook 2018); in CBT, this ‘higher consciousness’ and ‘reflexivity’ are seen as 
an effect of the participants learning to evaluate their thoughts as objects of inspection, whereas 
in mindfulness, such notions hinge on the participants’ cultivated ability to observe and then 
detach from their own cognitive experience. 
 ‘Metacognition’ involves then a powerful spatial metaphoric that has tended to hold 
common salience in the theoretical worlds of anthropologists and psychologists alike. Versions 
of this epistemological and moral topography remain widespread in some areas of 
anthropology: for example, in how some anthropologists still arrange and conceptualise 
categories such as ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ through to ‘culture’ and ‘cognition’.124 We tend to 
find the former two – economics and politics – resting on more solid ontological ground, and 
they are felt perhaps to be more ‘material’ or ‘real’, with the latter – culture and cognition – 
occupying a realm of abstraction and felt to be more intangible; cognition and culture have 
their own reality – at least to some anthropologists who write about ‘culture’ or ‘cognition’ as 
gatekeepers of what it really means to be human (see e.g. Bloch 2012; LeVine 2010; Luhrmann 
et al. 2015).  
The concept of metacognition has perhaps become another such organising category in 
anthropological analyses and can feel as if it is moving us up the moral ladder. Some 
anthropologists may feel that metacognition has offered an exciting psychological language 
through which to speak to an anthropology of ethics (cf. Mair & Cook 2018), and it has 
undoubtedly promised, like the notion of ‘culture’, another technique of self-knowledge for 
anthropologists (cf. Strathern 1987).  
 
124 For various critiques of these categories, see Ardener (2007 [1989]); McDonald (2006; 2012); Toren & 
Pina-Cabral (2011); Candea (2011).  
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In the meantime, running away analytically with concepts like metacognition as a meta-
category of what it means to be ‘ethical’ runs the risk of elevating ‘reflective thought’ (or 
‘reflexive self-consciousness’, ‘radical reflexivity’, etc.) above other ethnographic concerns.  
 
Care and self-care 
Many anthropologists could be said to have fallen in love with Foucault since the 1970s, and 
for good reasons, when his genealogies of madness, the ‘psy’ disciplines and power/knowledge 
brought new insights and concerns to the fore, and many have more recently rekindled their 
Foucauldian love with the rise of new anthropological orientations towards the ‘ethical’, ‘self-
care’ and ‘the good’, also owed, at least in part, to the work of Foucault.125 
Foucault’s positioning of ‘the ethical’ as intrinsic to the human subject has been particularly 
instructive to social anthropology in recent years. It is the later work of Foucault concerned 
with what he called the ‘genealogy of ethics’ (see Laidlaw 2018) that has yielded new 
enthusiasms amongst anthropologists. Much of the current anthropological enthusiasm for 
‘the ethical’ and ‘subjectivity’ is owed to this Foucauldian literature (and to feminist 
scholarship). ‘Ethical self-cultivation’ is commonly theorised as the reflexive capacity of human 
beings to relate to themselves and others; a capacity that allows the individual to imagine and 
act out a potentiality of self-other relations; and to act upon oneself in a certain way in order to 
become a certain kind of person (see Laidlaw 2002, 2014; Faubion 2011; Moore 2011). 
Important aspects of psychological therapy could thus be understood as constituting a 
particular kind of ‘ethical’ process in these terms: the practice of ‘psychotherapy’ constitutes a 
progressive positioning of an ability and willingness to imagine, learn, and act on new self-
other relations, with the instantiation of the ‘therapeutic relationship’ itself requiring an ethical 
engagement on the part of both therapist and patient; there have certainly been suggestions of 
this in earlier analyses (see Bruun 2013).  
However, there are important limitations to this kind of theorisation in that it shares a 
language with its objects of analysis. Psychological therapies or the ‘psychotherapeutic’ share 
in a language of ethical self-cultivation. A language of ‘care’ and ‘self-care’ derived from an 
anthropology of ethics can persuasively move us away from governmental accounts of 
 
125 See e.g. Faubion (2011); Laidlaw (2014); Mair & Evans (2015); Mattingly & Throop (2018); Moore (2011); 
Robbins (2013). 
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psychological realities and also allow us to appreciate the ‘openness’ (Vogel 2016) of reflecting 
and acting upon one’s self – theories of ethical self-cultivation reframe the language of 
‘intervention’ as a practice of (self-)care. 
The language of care and self-care that has now been appropriated in both anthropology 
and psychology has wrought new realities for both. Psychological therapies construed as 
interventions have been felt by some anthropologists to be ‘cold’ (Pols 2012) – scientifically 
detached, impersonal, and instrumental – as opposed to the ‘warm’ qualities that clinical 
practices might also be seen to involve, such as alleviating pain, removing a cancerous tumour, 
washing a dead body; listening, understanding, respecting, engaging, and indeed ‘intervening’ 
– in bodies, minds, tissues, cells, and thoughts. This shift from cold to warm is what Annemarie 
Mol and others have described as attending to ‘good care’ or ‘the logic of care’ (Mol 2008): it 
has meant new attention to the ‘persistent tinkering in a world full of complex ambivalence and 
shifting tensions’ (Mol et al. 2010: 14). 
When studying psychological therapies, anthropology can very easily slip into the same 
assumptions that therapies like CBT and mindfulness rest and rely on: assumptions about what 
counts as ‘scientific evidence’ and ‘good care’, for example. We as anthropologists might too 
easily (and unintentionally) proceed in our own professional analyses by taking for granted 
cherished notions and values that we hold about ourselves and the world in which we live in – 
and we might well share some of these ideas with the psychotherapists I studied – be it the 
ostensible realness and virtue of ‘wellbeing’, ‘self-care’, or indeed a sense of ‘self’, ‘cognition’, 
‘the human mind’, and so forth. This thesis has attempted to proceed without taking these ideas 
– and the authenticity and virtue we might ascribe to them – for granted.  
 
Doing anthropological research on mental healthcare will usually involve working your way 
through ever more technical and specialised publications from the cognitive sciences. It can be 
difficult, even for the anthropologist, not to be persuaded by the intricacy and mastery of 
research methodologies, for example, or more simply the density and seeming conclusiveness 
of diagrams, statistics, and experiments, through which a scientific discipline such as 
psychology operates and produces its scientificity. 
The historical relationship between the disciplines of anthropology and psychology  serves 
as a case in point here (Hickman 2010; Moore 2007; Toren 2012a). Anthropology and 
psychology can be seen to have produced their own interdisciplinary fields, from cognitive 
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anthropology in Britain (Frake & Tyler 1987) to psychological anthropology in America 
(Schwartz et al. 1992), both of which have become influential in anthropology more broadly. 
More recent anthropologies continue to be largely forged in the epistemic world of the 
cognitive sciences on both sides of the Atlantic, albeit in obviously very different ways.126 
Psychological anthropology and anthropological studies of ‘psy’ disciplines have not always 
departed in their claims and assumptions from those found in the therapeutic realities that they 
had set out to study and write about. Few anthropological studies have allowed themselves to 
treat psychological worlds ethnographically in a way that means not only describing the 
knowledge claims of the people studied but also interrogating the very assumptions that 
underlie psychological epistemologies, and through which knowledge claims of various kinds 
come to seem so axiomatically reasonable or real. 
I have tried to avoid theorising ‘the self’ prior to analysis in order to let it appear 
ethnographically. The advantage of an analytical suspension of our own presuppositions about 
what the ‘the self’ might mean is that it elucidates how we construe ethnographic objects of 
enquiry in the first place whilst avoiding, more rigorously, ethnocentric theorisation. 
I have suggested that ‘reflective thought’ and ‘metacognition’ might not be unproblematic 
concepts in our anthropological analyses, and that the enthusiasm for both is ethnographically 
interesting. CBT and mindfulness, as well as anthropological theories of ethical self-cultivation, 
have all participated in shaping an ethnographically interesting being that both CBT and 
mindfulness require: an individuated mind-in-a-body composed of reflective thought; a ‘self’ 
capable of rendering itself into an object of care and intervention. It is also a self that seems to 
emerge as a kind of cognitive cultivator. ‘The self’ is objectified as a project of self-care.  
These cherished notions of selfhood located in a universal human capacity of reflective 
thought, presently salient in both psychological and anthropological worlds, share in the 
persuasions of an earlier psychology that sought to rescue ‘subjectivity’ from the elusive 





126 See e.g. Biehl et al. (2007), on ‘subjectivity’; Bloch (2012), on ‘cognition’ and ‘human nature’; Luhrmann 




This thesis has presented an ethnographic insight into evidence-based psychological therapy 
in the institutionalised form it is now taking in the United Kingdom. It has attempted to throw 
ethnographic light on some of the effects of this institutionalisation and the scientific 
persuasions that have made it possible. 
Chapter 1 opened with a therapist’s reflections on what she felt was the problem of  
psychological therapy as it had been constituted and provided within the medical model of the 
IAPT service: IAPT did not leave a lot of space, we were told, for people to be ‘contradictory’ 
and ‘complex’ human beings. We saw in this first chapter how practices of ‘improving access’ 
to IAPT in a community centre in South London unfolded in the daily work of mental health 
professionals, volunteers, and residents to encompass and enact other forms of therapeutic care 
beyond IAPT’s ‘(bio)medical’ model of psychological provision and intervention. 
Contradiction and complexity abound. The case of the community centre and its efforts to 
improve mental health and wellbeing exemplified how there might be limitations to how we 
approach, think about, and situate the effects of the IAPT programme specifically (and mental 
healthcare services in general) along the conceptual division and contestations of 
medicalisation/de-medicalisation as frameworks or explanations of the ‘psychotherapeutic’ 
and the ‘biomedical’. We were reminded, with some therapists themselves yearning for the 
‘relationship’ in psychotherapy, of the inherent relationality of ‘care’. 
Chapter 2 offered some historical reflections on ‘mental healthcare’ in Britain in the context 
of considering some key historiographical moments in the written histories of psycho-
therapeutics. These histories provided an important backdrop against which we then turned to 
the invention of the IAPT programme and the ideals and concerns through which it was forged. 
I argued that particular economic arguments grounded in ‘happiness economics’ were the 
driving motor behind the 2008 instigation of IAPT as a nationwide public mental health 
service. I suggested that IAPT was designed as a joint ‘psychological-economic’ enterprise 
through its founders’ – the psychologist David Clark and the economist Richard Layard – 
reconstruction and mobilisation of the category of ‘depression’, combining at once therapeutic 
and economic objectives.  
Chapter 3 took us into the institutional context of IAPT and the model and monitoring of 
IAPT itself. It then described and examined some common critiques of IAPT and psychological 
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therapy and the significance of such critiques for anthropological analysis. I argued that 
Foucauldian theories have tended to shape the anthropological imagination and the study of 
‘psy’; that anthropological critiques and contextualisations might not always differ greatly from 
those found amongst the people under study; and that we are witnessing, in another area of 
social anthropology once again, a theoretical shift from ‘governmentality’ to ‘freedom’; from 
‘self-governance’ to ‘self-care’. 
Chapter 4 brought us to an IAPT-accredited university course in Northern England where 
we followed some aspects of the education and training of CBT therapists. The chapter 
explored how students of CBT learn to be ‘therapeutic’ through a dynamic process of acquiring 
bodies through which new affordances can also be constructed; bodies that are newly sensitive 
because they have learnt to be affected by all the circumstances that constitute ‘Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy’. I argued that learning to work therapeutically is at once a corporeal and 
conceptual engagement as students learn through a simultaneity of theory and practice, moving 
between different ‘working objects’ from manuals to diagrams, patient cases and 
questionnaires, including categories of illness and care, over the course of their training. In 
doing so, this chapter attempted to move anthropology beyond an analytical overemphasis on 
‘narrative’ and ‘emplotment’ – even in ethnographic contexts of ‘talking therapy’.  
Chapter 5 invited us to the conferences in which evidence-based therapy is discussed 
amongst professionals, and in which a ‘real science’ of psychotherapy is self-consciously 
pursued and defined against a notional ‘pseudoscience’. The chapter juxtaposed some historical 
and contemporary inventions and reinventions of ‘objectivity’ and looked at how some of these 
have been transformed through the emergence of ‘evidence-based’ psychology and its efforts 
to locate itself in evidence-based medicine (EBM). We saw for example that the practice of 
‘introspection’ as the epistemic bedrock of psychology has long posed problems for the 
discipline’s ambitions to achieve an objective status on an equal footing with medicine. 
Consequently, the human ‘subjectivity’ deemed at the heart of psychotherapy has been required 
to be constituted as a stable object of scientific observation. A version of this scientificity could 
be said to have been finally achieved with the recognition of IAPT therapies as ‘evidence-based’, 
but it is also because of this achievement that empirical tensions have continued to loom large. 
Chapter 6 explored the models of selfhood that evidence-based psychological therapy 
‘invites’ its subjects to engage with and how such subjects are tacitly cast in the process. This 
chapter described and examined the therapeutic specificities of psychological therapy as we 
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moved from CBT to mindfulness. By comparing CBT and mindfulness, I argued that whilst 
they have become recognised as effective interventions for a range of mental health problems 
within the framework of IAPT, they have also generated their own therapeutic uncertainties. 
Psychological therapies have come to shape conflicting models of ‘mind’, with different notions 
of selfhood effected through these practices.  
I have tried to show throughout the thesis that the invention of the IAPT programme in its 
nationwide implementation as part of the NHS was a self-defined ‘scientific’ strategy informed 
by both clinical need and economic cost-effectiveness to promote evidence-based 
psychological therapy. This entailed most significantly a formulation and promotion of CBT 
as the hallmark of a psychological intervention science. I have argued that the reported ‘success’ 
of CBT, including the provision and proliferation of evidence-based psychological therapies in 
general, has been largely achieved within the frame and shadow of EBM in its striving to gain 
scientific recognition on an equal footing with psychopharmacology. Evidence-based practice 
defines evidence, we have seen, as that which has been produced through the use of randomised 
control trials, with this experimental method relying on specific modes of objectification, 
standardisation, and quantification. These trials offer the ‘evidence’ on which psychological 
therapies are seen ideally to be ‘based’ – through their citation – and are crucial to those 
therapies’ enactment. Psychology’s pursuit of scientific objectivity, its citation and production 
or reproduction of evidence in conferences, journals and professional training, has required 
psychological therapy to be transformed into an object of science, with ‘subjectivity’ at its core. 
I have attempted to show that such an ambition is not new in psychology – that is, it is not a 
new ambition that has appeared with IAPT – but is a longstanding preoccupation. Rather, 
scientific persuasions of this kind have been given new life, and generated new tensions, with 
the invention of IAPT.  
My research has also shown that key to the IAPT service are the structural constraints of 
limited NHS resources: that mental health professionals report inadequate short-term training 
at the lowest levels of the professional hierarchy (i.e., Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners); 
that the most treatment-intensive provision of psychological healthcare only consists of 8–12 
one-to-one CBT sessions – and often relies too heavily on brief psychological assessments and 
manualised instructions (or ‘psychoeducation’) and computerised CBT-based programmes, as 
IAPT therapists have to be ‘outcome’-focussed and ‘target’-orientated from the outset of 
clinical practice.  
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I have tried to suggest that a productive way of approaching ‘evidence-based psychological 
therapy’ calls for a keener ethnographic treatment of psychological epistemologies. In shifting 
the analytical focus away from an exclusively genealogical examination of ‘psy’ and its 
institutions – including structuring theories of governmentality, on the one hand, and ethical 
self-cultivation, on the other – I have drawn attention to the practitioners’ own accounts of the 
IAPT service and their experiences and understandings of their own work.  
One important aspect of my approach has been to take a deliberate step back from common 
analytical categories found in both psychology and anthropology, as I detailed in the 
Introduction. I have in other words sought to avoid taking for granted some cherished 
assumptions about the human subject and its perceived interiority that are found in the 
analytical toolkits of both disciplines. This thesis has instead attempted to look at why we 
(anthropologists and psychologists alike) might find certain ideas – for example, cognition 
construed as a reflective capacity pertaining to a cultivating self or the practice of introspection 
and observation or the notion of evidence – so compelling and indispensable. This is not an 
easy task, of course. It is not easy to interrogate psychological theories that mental health 
professionals might hold about themselves and others and the world in which they work; and 
far less easy to hold some of those same prevailing ideas in my own professional discipline up 
for ethnographic inspection. It is not an easy task, nor is it always well-received.   
Consequently, I have suggested that it is no longer our anthropological task to say this or 
that is or is not wellbeing and mental health, or to point to ‘the mind’, ‘subjectivity’ or 
‘(meta)cognition’ as a locus of anthropological insight. Instead, these concepts are dispensed 
with analytically so that they can be studied as part of how people might constitute, reject or 
live them; how they might understand any of these notions and engage in the therapeutic 
realities that have taken shape around them. The direction I have taken in this thesis was also 
intended, therefore, to help foreground some tacit commitments in anthropology that might 
not always depart from the persuasions or sensibilities of psychotherapy. Despite the apparent 
diversity of theoretical orientations in the respective disciplines, the ‘interpretive’ and ‘reflexive’ 
work, for instance, of anthropologists and psychotherapists is remarkably alike – and the 
resonances are obvious to those who know both (see Luhrmann 1998, 2000, 2019, on this 
point).127 Anthropologists have not always been ready to acknowledge such commonality, as I 
 
127 Anthropology and psychotherapy or clinical psychology have, of course, distinctively different ‘objectives’, 
we might say, as psychotherapists are ultimately interested in the therapeutic care of people whilst 
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have suggested on several occasions throughout the thesis. Increasingly, however, some 
anthropologists have called for more direct engagement with the psy disciplines and the 
cognitive sciences. 128  Notwithstanding the merits and ambitions of such (admittedly very 
different) calls for engagement, this thesis has sought instead to offer a different 
anthropological engagement through detachment of a kind (Candea et al. 2015); a detachment 
from common psychological realities in an attempt to contribute to an anthropology of 
psychology. 
It is certainly not an easy task to do an anthropology of psychology in these terms: to do an 
ethnography of people for whom ‘mental health’ is a universal, if variable, feature of human 
beings; of people who live this and practise it and for those whose selfhood or professional 
world takes experiential shape around it. This has not been easy because the ethnographer will 
consequently have to outline and interrogate certain realities – notions, approaches, theories, 
actions, etc. – which we as anthropologists may well share and cherish in our own daily lives or 
intellectual worlds (see McDonald 1986, on this point). Recent anthropological attention to 
‘metacognition’, for example, shows how exceedingly difficult it is to reflect on our division of 
the universe (to borrow a phrase from Candea 2011), and in turn allow this conceptual world 
to unfold as the stuff of ethnography.129 Of course, this very thesis might be seen precisely as a 
demonstration of psychological ‘metacognition’ or Foucauldian ‘reflective thought’, but only 
so within the same structures of a conceptual world that I have tried to examine here. I hope I 
have made it clear that such a response would be to miss the point. 
The recent enthusiasm for metacognition, for instance, in the fields of both psychotherapy 
therapy and anthropology is ethnographically interesting in and of itself. Why? Because, as we 
have seen, theories of metacognition and reflective thought have all helped shape an 
ethnographically interesting human subject that psychological therapy at once requires,  
 
anthropologists are not (necessarily); psychotherapists are trying to help people change whereas 
anthropologists have traditionally imagined themselves as trying to change the people they study as little as 
possible.  
128 See e.g. Bloch (2012); Khan (2017); Luhrmann et al. (2015); Martin (2019); Throop & Laughlin (2007); 
Whitehouse (2001). For some critical reviews, see Hickman (2010); Irvine (2018); Toren (2012a). See also 
introduction and articles in the April 2020 special issue of the JRAI, edited by Tanya Luhrmann (2020) who 
report on the ‘Mind and Spirit’ project, a major collaboration between anthropologists and psychologists. 
This special issue appeared several months after my thesis was submitted and examined, but I want to include 
a reference to it here since the project speaks to some important theoretical and empirical questions and 
problems dealt with in this thesis. 
129 This scenario also seems particularly ironic since ‘metacognition’ is often presented as a form of radical 
reflexivity.   
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assumes and confirms: an individuated mind-in-a-body-subject complete with a reflective self-
consciousness; capable of rendering an experiential interiority or ‘self’ into objects of 
observation, inspection and knowledge in the pursuit of its own perceived ‘mental health’.  
Lastly, this thesis shares, in its own way, a ‘renewed interest more generally in care as a 
relational quality’ (Lynch & Cohn 2016: 534). It is also within such an anthropological concern 
with ‘care’ that we might detect some of ‘the limits of [our own] relational thinking’ (Candea 
et al. 2015). The self in relation to itself and others has long been not only a defining feature of 
anthropology and, indeed, of psychotherapy, but also the definition of ‘care’ itself (cf. Foucault 
1988c, 1997).130 This thesis has not always ventured beyond this definitional world, but I hope 




















130 Different versions and expositions exist in anthropology of such a defining feature of the discipline and 
its subject-matter, with a focus on, for example, the category of the person (Carrithers et al. 1985), self-other 
relations (Moore 2007), relations themselves (Strathern 2020), intersubjectivity (Toren 1990), self-formation 
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